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ANNEX I 
THE ARTICLE 7 PROCEDURE 
Under the procedures set out pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), 
NRAs must define the boundaries of relevant markets in accordance with competition law 
principles, taking utmost account of the SMP Guidelines and the Recommendation on 
relevant markets. If they find that relevant markets are not effectively competitive, NRAs are 
obliged to propose appropriate regulatory measures to address market failures. A market is 
not effectively competitive if one or more players is dominant (or has significant market 
power, “SMP”) in this market. Where operators are found to be dominant, NRAs are required 
to propose appropriate regulatory remedies to ensure effective competition. In the event of 
effective competition on the market, existing regulation has to be lifted. The market analysis 
has to be carried out in cooperation with the national competition authorities. 
Before adopting final measures on market definition, market analysis and the imposition of 
remedies NRAs must not only carry out a national consultation but are also required to notify 
their draft measures to the Commission. Once an NRA notifies the Commission of its 
proposed measure for a particular market, the case is registered, and an ad hoc case team 
comprising officials of the services of both the Information Society and Media and the 
Competition Directorates General is appointed. The case team analyses the notification and 
may ask the NRA concerned to provide further information or clarification for the purpose of 
conducting the assessment. The team must carry out its assessment and comply with the 
necessary internal checks and balances, within the legally binding deadline of one month. At 
the end of this period, and provided that the notified measure does not raise “serious doubts” 
as to its compatibility with Community law, the Commission may decide to make comments. 
NRAs are to take utmost account of comments issued by the Commission before adopting the 
draft measure in question. 
Table 1: Overview of the Phase 1 investigation 
Receipt of notification and
acknowledgement of receipt
Assessment of completeness
Case reg istration and
relevant parties informed
Notification  COMPLETE
Notification INCOMPLETE
Decision on complet eness
AN ALYSIS
of notification Request for a meeting
Information required from NRA
Information supplied without request
NRA withdrawal of notification
Translation of documents required
Translation of documents required
“Comments - without serious doubts
“Serious doubts”
“No comment”
FINAL draft proposed Decision
COMMUNICATION
to relevant NRA
CLOSING
PHASE 1

Day 0

+ 1 month
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
COMMUNICATION
to relevant NRA
AN ALYSIS
suspended 
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In the event that the Commission expresses serious doubts, the investigation period is 
extended by a further two months ("phase two" investigation) during which the NRA may not 
adopt its proposed measure. During these two months, the case team resumes an in-depth 
examination of the case and invites third parties to make known their views. What follows 
thereafter is an intense exchange of information between all interested parties (including the 
NRAs and industry players); all data provided and views expressed are carefully considered 
by the Commission. At the end of the investigation period, the Commission may withdraw its 
serious doubts (in which case the NRA may adopt the draft measure), make comments (of 
which the NRA must take utmost account when implementing the draft measure) or require 
the NRA to withdraw its proposed measure. In such an event, the Commission, before issuing 
its decision, submits its draft decision to the Communications Committee for an opinion. The 
NRA in question may decide to withdraw its draft measure at any stage of the notification 
procedure. 
Table 2. Overview of the phase 2 investigation 
 + 1 month
Analysis of
Notification
Request for a meeting
Information required from NRA
NRA withdrawal of notification
Translation of documents required
Communication to relevant NRA
Start of Phase 2
Withdrawal of initial objections 
Draft decision to require the NRA
to withdraw the notification
Communication to COCOM
Advisory procedure before COCOM
Commission’s written procedure

Scenario 1 Scenario 2
+ 3 months Closing of Phase 2 
Information supplied without requirement
 
 
 
 
. 
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ANNEX II 
TABLE CONCERNING COMPETITION/REGULATION IN THE EU (31/03/2007) 
Status of notifications
AT BE CY CZ DK EE ES FI FR DE EL HU IRL IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT SE SI SK UK
1 a aa aaaa a aaa aa aaaaa
2 a aa aaaa a aaa aa aaaaa
3 a aa aaaa a a a aa aa a aa
4 aa a aa aa aaa a aa aa
5 a aaa aaaa a a a aa aa a aa
6 aa a aaa aa aaa a aa aa
7 a aaa aa a aaa aa aa a
8 a aaa aaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaa
9 aa a a aaa aa aaaaaaaaa aaa
10 a aawwaaaaaa aaaaaa aa a
11 a aaa aa aaa aaa a a aaaaa
12 aaa aaa aaa aaa aw aa a aa
13 aa a a aw a a aaa aa aaa
14 aa a w aa waa aaa aa a wa
15 a aaa aaw aaaa aaw aa a
16 aa aa a a a a aaaaaa aaaaa aaa
17 a a a
18 aa a a a aa a aa
Separated notification for remedies 
a Final measure adopted
w Withdrawal (totally or partially) not yet re-notified
Notified
Partly notified 
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ANNEX III 
1.  MARKETS OVERVIEW 
This document highlights the main trends and conclusions of all markets assessed before 
31 March 2007. 
1.1.  Retail access for residential and non-residential users (markets 1 and 2) 
Retail access can be described as the provision of a connection to the fixed public telephone 
network for the purpose of making and/or receiving telephone calls and related services (such 
as faxes and dial-up internet). 24 NRAs have completed and notified their analysis of the 
retail access markets
1.  
In line with the Recommendation, most NRAs defined separate markets for residential and 
non-residential customers, while the British, Dutch, Greek, Cypriot, and Irish NRAs defined 
the retail access markets on the basis of different levels of access (mainly PSTN or ISDN). 
Some NRAs included alternative means of access into the market, including optical cable and 
local area networks. In most cases, this inclusion did not affect the finding of SMP or the 
scope of regulation. Nevertheless the Commission requested the Polish NRA, UKE, to 
withdraw its measures concerning markets 1 and 2 because UKE had not provided sufficient 
data to support the inclusion of xDSL access services in markets 1 and 2. 
All NRAs that notified the markets for retail access thus far found the incumbent operators 
dominant on these markets. Even if NRAs generally imposed the full set of remedies, 
including price control
2, carrier selection and carrier pre-selection obligations, as well as 
wholesale line rental
3 the application of remedies raised some concerns. 
In particular, the Commission commented upon the absence of effective ex-ante price control 
obligations in Germany, the Czech Republic and – with the exception of carrier (pre-) 
selection – in Finland. Additionally, it considered the "retail-minus" approach chosen by the 
NRA in Luxemburg insufficient. The Commission also questioned the effectiveness of the ex-
post price control in Germany and reminded Germany of Article 19(3) of the Universal 
Service Directive which foresees that CS/CPS must be provided on a cost-orientated basis; it 
also commented on the missing cost accounting methodology in Slovakia. 
                                                 
1  The Estonian NRA has not yet notified markets 1 and 2. The Commission requested the Polish NRA to 
withdraw its measure on 10 January 2007. 
2  The Czech NRA (CTU), however, decided that the imposition of a price control obligation was not 
necessary. Given the strong position of the incumbent on the market, the Commission invited CTU to 
verify whether the remedies imposed at the wholesale and retail level are effective at addressing the 
market failures in the retail access markets. 
3  Customers may be allowed to opt for calls to be carried by another operator than the one providing the 
access line. Such an alternative operator can be selected either in advance without having to dial a 
routing prefix for each call (carrier pre-selection) or on the basis of a routing prefix for each call (carrier 
selection). Wholesale line rental makes it possible for alternative operators to offer retail access services 
together with calls services to end customers in a way that the customer only receives one single bill 
from the alternative operator. The alternative operator resells to the end customer the access line that it 
rents from the incumbent at the wholesale level.  
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Further, the Commission had doubts whether the NRAs in Hungary, France, Slovenia and 
Spain had sufficiently assessed the impact of wholesale remedies in addressing market 
failures at retail level. According to Article 17(1) of the Universal Service Directive, 
obligations at retail level can only be imposed if remedies at wholesale level would not result 
in the achievement of the objectives defined in the Framework Directive (including the 
promotion of competition, the completion of the internal market for electronic communication 
services and benefits for users). The insufficient consideration of wholesale remedies when 
defining retail obligations could create barriers to the single market. In particular, the 
Commission commented on wholesale line rental in Portugal and Spain and asked Poland to 
specify its wholesale line rental obligation. 
1.2.  Retail local, national and international voice calls for residential and non- 
residential users (markets 3 to 6) 
These markets comprise all outgoing telephone calls from a fixed location. Publicly available 
telephone services for residential and non-residential customers are still commonly provided 
over traditional fixed telephone networks. 24 out of 25 NRAs notified their analysis in 2006. 
A second phase examination was launched by the Commission issuing doubts on the 
exclusion of calls made 0708 numbers via calling card operators from the Polish market. After 
additional information was provided by the Polish NRA, the Commission decided to 
withdraw its serious doubts.  
In a majority of notifications, the fixed line incumbent was found to have SMP in all calls 
markets. However, the following number of national markets was (partly) found competitive: 
two markets for national calls for residential customers (market 3); eight markets for 
international calls for residential customers (market 4); three markets for national calls for 
non-residential customers (market 5) and nine markets for international calls for non-
residential customers (market 6).  
1.3.  Retail leased lines (market 7) 
A leased line is a permanently connected communications link between two premises 
dedicated to the customer’s exclusive use. The market for retail leased lines corresponds to 
the minimum set of leased lines, as defined in the Commission Decision 2003/548/EC
4. Thus 
far, 24 NRAs have notified their review of market 7. Most NRAs defined the retail leased 
lines market in line with the Recommendation, while the Austrian, Portuguese and British 
NRA chose a broader market. Additionally, the Irish NRA defined a separate market for 
international leased lines, beyond the recommended market, in order to lift previous 
regulation, whereas the Maltese NRA included international leased lines in a global retail 
leased lines market. Finally, the Dutch NRA split the retail leased lines market into six 
separate national and five separate international markets, while the French NRA demonstrated 
that the inclusion of leased lines above 2 Mbit/s and leased lines with alternative interfaces 
was justified by specific national circumstances. 
It can however be assumed that competition of the retail market of leased lines will be 
achieved by the regulation of the corresponding wholesale markets (markets 13 and 14) in 
most Member States. 
                                                 
4  Commission Decision 2003/548/EC of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with 
harmonised characteristics and associated standards referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Service 
Directive, OJ L 186, 25.7.2003, p. 43.  
EN  7     EN 
Regarding regulatory remedies, Annex VII of the Universal Service Directive provides that 
NRAs shall ensure that the provision of the minimum set of leased lines follows the basic 
principles of non-discrimination, cost orientation and transparency. With the exception of the 
Finnish, Dutch, Spanish, Slovak and Hungarian NRA, NRAs imposed all the regulatory 
remedies foreseen by the Universal Service Directive. 
1.4.  Wholesale fixed call origination (market 8) 
Provision of wholesale call origination enables alternative operators to provide end users with 
retail fixed telephone services, including dial-up Internet services. All but one NRA have 
notified their analysis on call origination at a fixed location. NRAs defined the market in line 
with the Recommendation, with the exception of the British, German, Dutch and Danish 
NRAs
5.  
The incumbent operator was found to have SMP in all notified cases, which indicates that 
wholesale fixed call origination remains one of the bottlenecks in electronic communications. 
When regulating this market effectively, through carrier selection, carrier pre-selection 
obligations and wholesale line rental obligations, barriers to enter the downstream retail 
access and calls markets may be lowered so that retail regulation could be phased out. In this 
context, it is of paramount importance that NRAs impose effective and proportional remedies. 
Therefore the Commission commented upon the fact that the Polish NRA had not specified 
the details of the price control obligations before the introduction of a new cost accounting 
model and noted that the Slovenian NRA should introduce cost oriented tariffs within the 
shortest timeframe possible. Further, the Commission expressed its concern regarding the 
non-imposition of (i) WLR in Spain and (ii) of a cost-orientation obligation in the Slovak 
Republic. In Hungary, the NRA allowed the four local incumbents to charge origination rates 
40% higher than those of Matáv, which might impede further decreases of retail charges in 
the view of the Commission. 
1.5.  Wholesale fixed call termination (market 9) 
Wholesale call termination can be defined as the wholesale service offered by operator A to 
operator B in order to enable the subscribers of operator B to call subscribers of operator A. In 
line with the Recommendation, all NRAs defined each individual fixed telephone network to 
constitute a relevant market for call termination. It follows that fixed termination markets are 
natural monopolies. With the exception of an initial notification by BNetzA – which was 
vetoed by the Commission – NRAs designated all the terminating operators as having SMP. 
In most cases the full set of remedies set out in the Access Directive were imposed on large 
SMP operators. Many NRAs applied asymmetric remedies, for example by imposing lighter 
cost control obligations on newly established operators.  
As outlined in Chapter 4.2.2. of the Communication, the Commission emphasised the need for 
a coherent EU approach. It underlined that the imposition of asymmetric remedies 
necessitates an adequate reasoning. The Commission also stressed the importance of efficient 
cost-orientation and cost-accounting obligations. To the extent that it would be considered 
disproportionate to impose costly cost-orientation and cost-accounting obligations on a small 
                                                 
5  The Maltese NRA proposed to include broadband wireless access in ist draft measure, albeit without a 
full substitution analysis. The Commission noted that although such inclusion was questionable, it 
would not have any effect on the finding of SMP.   
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operator, other forms of cost-control for such operators, such as benchmarking, could be 
considered. 
In several cases price control obligations were imposed in a way that does not guarantee legal 
certainty, such as ex post price control
6, "reasonable" prices
7, unclear cost accounting 
systems
8 or the freedom of the SMP operator to choose the accounting system. Further, the 
Commission underlined the importance (i) of accounting separation in order to ensure 
transparency
9.Accordingly, the Commission asked NRAs to modify the remedies in order to 
provide for transparency and consistency among Member States. In addition, the Commission 
commented on reviewing the need for asymmetric application of remedies
10. For instance in 
Hungary, four local incumbents were allowed to charge termination rates that are 40% higher 
than those of Matáv; in Poland, alternative operators were not made subject to any form of 
price control.
11 Although such asymmetry might be justified in exceptional cases because of 
objective cost differences which are beyond the control of the operators concerned, they must 
be adequately reasoned. If asymmetries in termination rates are not based on objective cost 
differences, they must be phased out within a reasonable time frame. In this context, it is of 
paramount importance for the purpose of guaranteeing legal certainty that glide paths for the 
reduction of termination rates are specified in the regulatory measures
12. 
1.6.  Transit services in the public fixed telephone network (market 10)  
Transit services refer to the (long distance) conveyance of switched calls on the public fixed 
telephone network. Depending on the network topology, the delineation between transit 
services and call origination may vary. Most NRAs defined the market in line with the 
Recommendation. The British, Dutch and German NRA, however, proposed more narrow 
market definitions; additionally, the British, Irish, Maltese, Cypriot and French
13 NRA 
segmented national and international transit services. In the case of the Austrian NRA, the 
Commission required the NRA to withdraw the draft measure on the basis of a flaw in the 
market definition
14. 
In a large number of Member States, new entrants are still dependent on the incumbent for the 
provision of transit services on many routes. Out of the 24 NRAs
15 that have notified the 
market thus far, 16 NRAs designated operators as having SMP
16. In addition, BNetzA found 
certain of the more narrowly defined transit markets to be effectively competitive. Some of 
the notifying NRA imposed the full set of the remedies, whereas the Commission commented 
                                                 
6  See the notification from the German NRA in case DE/2005/0239. 
7  For example in the case of a notification from the Slovenian NRA. The Commission stressed that a 
price control based on cost oriented wholesale charges should be introduced as fast as possible.  
8  For example in the case of a notification from the Finnish NRA. 
9 See  case  DE/2005/0234. 
10  For example in the case of notifications by the Italian, Swedish and Portuguese NRAs. 
11  See case PL/2006/0502. The Commission therefore invited UKE to monitor the market closely and to 
impose a cost orientation obligation on ANOs, if appropriate. 
12  See the case IT/2006/0384. 
13  The French NRA distinguished between intra-territorial and interterritorial transit markets and defined 
10 separate markets for the latter, on a territory-by-territory basis. 
14  The Austrian regulator has challenged the validity of that decision before the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) via a preliminary ruling request. (See case C-256/05, Telekom Austria). On 6 October 2005, 
the ECJ ruled that the regulator’s request for preliminary ruling was inadmissible. The Austrian NRA 
has re-notifed the market in January 2007. 
15  The Estonian and Danish NRAs withdrew their notifications.  
16  In Finland 14 operators were found to have SMP.  
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upon the non-imposition of price control obligations in Slovenia. Further, the Commission 
invited the Spanish NRA to consider imposing differentiated remedies given that alternative 
operators have gained significant market shares on some routes, while Telefonica still enjoys 
a quasi-monopoly on others. 
1.7.  Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to local loops (market 11)  
This market covers wholesale access to the metallic local loops and sub-loops, i.e., to the “last 
mile” of the public fixed telecommunications network connecting the subscriber to the local 
exchange and to the main distribution frame, respectively.
17 Once access is granted, new 
entrants can provide both voice and data services to end users over the local loop rented from 
the incumbent. Owing to the financial and social cost of duplicating this very last section of 
the fixed network, barriers to entry to this market are generally considered to be very high. All 
24 notifying NRAs found that this market is not effectively competitive and designated the 
incumbent operators as SMP operators. 
1.8.  Wholesale broadband access (market 12) 
Wholesale broadband access, (“bitstream” access or equivalent wholesale access), enables 
new entrants to provide retail broadband access services to end users by relying on their own 
backbone network in combination with access to the middle and lower parts of the 
incumbent’s network. Bitstream access is generally considered as an essential stepping stone 
for new entrants towards investment in full-scale own network roll-out on the basis of local 
loop unbundling (so-called “ladder of investment” theory
18). The question whether wholesale 
bitstream access products provided over non-PSTN infrastructure, typically cable but also 
other networks, currently or prospectively form part of this market continues to be debated. 
The Dutch and Maltese NRAs have defined the markets in this encompassing way
19, so that 
the outcome of the market analysis was affected. Several other NRAs have included cable in 
the market but in none of these cases the inclusion of cable had any impact on the SMP 
finding or the remedies proposed.  
24 NRAs have completed and notified their analysis; the large majority of them found the 
incumbent PSTN operators dominant
20. In most cases, the designated SMP operators were 
made subject to the full set of remedies under the Access Directive. Access obligations were 
not always imposed at several network levels.  
                                                 
17  Local loops were already subject to ex ante regulation prior to the entry into force of the New 
Regulatory Framework. Council Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop sets 
harmonised conditions for unbundled access to the local loop.  
18  There are three types of wholesale services that a new entrant can build on to offer retail broadband 
services: (i) a pure resale service, where the new entrant resells the incumbent’s broadband connection 
to the end user and does not invest in own infrastructure, (ii) bitstream, where the new entrant builds its 
own backbone but relies on the incumbent’s infrastructure for the lower and middle parts of the 
network, and (iii) local loop unbundling where the new entrant relies on the incumbent’s infrastructure 
only for the so-called “last mile”. The ladder of investment theory implies that new entrants pass 
gradually from relying on (i), via (ii) to (iii). In order to undertake investments in network development, 
they first need to be able to develop a sufficiently large retail customer basis relying on the network 
infrastructure of the incumbent. 
19  In the Dutch case the market that encompassed cable was declared competititve.  
20  Belgium's notification is still missing, whereas the Maltese NRA has withdrawn its notification. In 
Luxemburg those markets were not analysed separately de spite the lack of sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that trunk and terminating segments of leased lines belong to the same market.   
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The Commission had to comment in a number of cases on the proposed remedies imposed by 
the NRAs. Among other things the Commission asked Germany
21, the Czech Republic, the 
Slovak Republic
22, Luxemburg and Finland to adopt effective ex ante price regulation
23. 
Luxemburg, Lithuania, Poland
24 and the Czech Republic
25 were invited to grant access at 
appropriate levels / specify the level of access in order to enable the development of 
competition.. The Commission asked Germany and Spain to apply access obligations to 
VDSL infrastructure and Germany and Luxemburg to implement stand alone bitstream access 
(in particular "naked DSL"), which enables alternative operators to provide broadband to end 
customers without the obligation to rent a telephone line from the incumbent. The 
Commission also stressed the importance of accounting separation with a view to ensuring 
transparency
26. 
The Commission had to ask the German NRA to accelerate its notification of remedies, as 
Germany submitted a belated market analysis without notifying final remedies for more than 
one year afterwards. 
1.9.  Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines (market 13) and wholesale trunk 
segments of leased lines (market 14) 
Wholesale leased lines consist of dedicated unmanaged connections between two points. 
Operators use them either to complete their own network infrastructure or to provide retail 
leased line services (see market 7 above). Under the Recommendation, the precise delineation 
between trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is recognised as being highly 
dependent on the network topology specific to the Member States concerned. Consequently, 
the determination of the boundaries between trunk and terminating segments varies 
significantly among Member States
27. Further, the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
recommendation does not exclude segmentation between high and low capacity leased lines, 
provided such segmentation is justified pursuant to the principles of competition law. Some 
NRAs (including the British, Dutch, Greek and Lithuanian NRA) thus segmented wholesale 
leased lines markets according to bandwidth
28. Finally, it should be recalled that the 
Recommendation does not restrict the markets for terminating and trunk segments of leased 
lines to any particular interface or technology. Therefore some NRAs included wholesale 
leased lines with alternative interfaces (in particular Ethernet) in the wholesale leased lines 
                                                 
21  In particular, the Commission stated that (i) ex post price control is not appropriate to remedy the 
competition problems identified in the wholesale market,and that (ii) price control should be based on 
cost orientation. 
22  The Commission therefore invited the Slovak NRA to consider imposing IP and ATM access and 
possibly also access at the DSLAM. 
23  Concerning a notification from the Greek NRA, the Commission recalled that a margin squeeze 
analysis should not depend on unrealistic assumptions about the ability of new entrants to benefit from 
increased margins over time. 
24  In particular, the Commission reminded the Polish NRA of the importance of defining the scope of 
obligations imposed in an exact way.  
25  In the Czech Republic, the NRA proposed to impose an access obligation only at the IP level, but no 
ATM access. 
26  For example in the case of a notification from the Dutch NRA. 
27  The Commission commented on the lack of a clear defintion of the boundary between the two markets 
in Poland. 
28  Additionally, the Italian NRA excluded trunk segments below 2 Mbit/s from regulation because in its 
view that market was marginal. Although the Commission disagreed with this approach, it did not 
believe that such exclusion would affect trade between Member States.  
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markets because they are functionally equivalent to wholesale leased lines with traditional 
interfaces. 
24 NRA have notified the market for terminating segments for leased lines
29. All notifying 
NRAs found that the fixed incumbent operator(s) had SMP on this market, although the 
British NRA found that there was no SMP on the more narrowly defined market for very high 
capacity terminating segments of leased lines, whereas the Lithuanian NRA designated the 
incumbent operator as having SMP only on the market for low capacity leased lines. 
The market for wholesale trunk segments of leased lines was notified by all NRAs with the 
exception of the Polish and the Estonian NRA
30. Most of the NRAs notifying the market 
found it to be effectively competitive, whereas NRAs in the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, 
Malta, France, Greece, Lithuania, Cyprus, Spain and Luxemburg designated operators as 
having SMP.  
Regarding remedies in the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, the 
Commission commented upon price control obligations in several cases in order to ensure the 
consistent application of remedies across the Community, in particular because the 
Commission was not convinced that the proposed draft measures contained sufficiently 
effective mechanisms for the implementation of cost accounting methodologies. Further, the 
Commission invited the Spanish NRA not to limit the scope of the remedies to leased lines 
with traditional interfaces. 
1.10.  Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks (market 15)  
Currently, access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks are typically 
supplied together by mobile network operators as part of the same market at wholesale level. 
These services allow new entrants to make use of the infrastructure of a mobile network 
operator to provide mobile telephone services to retail customers. The 22 NRAs having 
notified this market thus far
31 did not deviate from the market definition contained in the 
Recommendation.  
Although the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation states that "… the level of 
competition generally observed in this market at the retail level indicates that ex-ante 
regulatory intervention at a wholesale level may not be warranted", the Irish
32, Spanish and 
Maltese NRAs found joint dominance on this market, whereas the Slovenian and Cypriot 
NRAs designated one operator as having single SMP on this market. Further, the Commission 
required the Finnish NRA to withdraw its notification following a veto decision; in its final 
measure the Finnish NRA concluded that the market is effectively competitive.  
The fact that at the wholesale level no access to third parties is granted does not per se mean 
that the market is non – competitive. Where the majority or all supply on the relevant market 
is captive, i.e. provided internally by vertically integrated mobile network operators, the 
structure of supply at the wholesale level can be derived from supply at the retail level. 
Competitive conditions at retail level are of crucial importance: they may provide an indicator 
of a rent to protect by the refusal to grant access at the wholesale level. 
                                                 
29  The German NRA withdrew its notification. 
30  The German and Slovak NRA withdrew their notification. 
31  It should be recalled, however, that the French and Polish NRAs withdrew their notification.  
32  The decision of the Irish NRA was annulled by an appeals body.   
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In order to find joint SMP in the wholesale market of mobile access and call origination, it is 
not indispensable to find joint SMP at the retail level, but – among the other criteria defined in 
the "Air Tours" case
33 – it must be shown that (i) fringe competitors, such as emerging mobile 
network operators, do not have the ability to challenge any anticompetitive coordinated 
outcome and (ii) that pent-up demand exists, which means that it must be demonstrated that 
third parties have been denied access to the networks of mobile network operators despite 
their reasonable request. 
1.11.  Voice call termination on individual mobile networks (market 16) 
Termination services are described under market 9 above. When provided on a mobile 
network, they are referred to as mobile termination services. 25 NRAs have notified the 
markets so far, having defined the market in line with the Recommendation, i.e. voice call 
termination by each individual network operator was found to constitute a separate relevant 
market. It follows that termination markets are natural monopolies and all NRAs found that 
all mobile network operators had SMP on their respective markets.  
In all countries price control have been imposed on the operators, albeit in a number of 
countries, asymmetrical remedies have been applied, i.e. certain operators benefited from a 
higher regulatory termination fee.  
Remedies have been highly heterogeneous throughout the EU, which cannot be explained 
solely due to different costs of the termination, but among other things to different costing 
models and highly different glide paths leading to a "cost oriented" level. As a consequence 
the regulatory outcome has been fragmented, despite the consistent method of SMP finding 
described above, leading to significantly different termination rates within the EU. 
The Commission had asked in several cases to bring termination rates down by shortening 
glide paths and ending asymmetric treatment (i.e. favourable treatment for specific operators) 
earlier. Moreover, the Commission asked not to let termination rates being negotiated by 
operators, in order to avoid further delay and the lack of transparency. Enforcement of the 
Commission's comment would not only have led to more harmonisation but also to lower 
termination fees in a number of Member States which can be expected to translate into lower 
calling costs for consumers and enterprises.  
1.12.  Wholesale national markets for international roaming on public mobile 
networks (Market 17) 
When a mobile subscriber travels abroad, his home operator needs to have negotiated with a 
mobile network operator in that country a network access agreement in order to enable the 
subscriber to make and receive calls. The network access corresponds to the provision of 
wholesale international roaming services. All of the 11 NRAs that have notified this market 
thus far found it effectively competitive. This market will be regulated via an EC Regulation.  
                                                 
33  Judgment of 06.06.2002 of the Court of First Instance, case T-342/49, Airtours vs Commission. The 
Court considered that for collective dominance to be tenable in the long run, the market must be 
conducive to tacit coordination (in particular because of a high level of transparency), there must be a 
credible and enforceable retaliation mechanism and it must not be possible for competitors or customers 
to undermine the co-ordinated behaviour.  
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1.13.  Broadcasting transmission services to deliver broadcast content to end users 
(market 18) 
This market includes the transmission of broadcasting signals (radio and television signals) on 
behalf of the content providers to the end users. The 16 NRAs that have notified the 
broadcasting market thus far have segmented it into various more narrowly defined product 
markets on the basis of the platform used (cable, satellite or terrestrial), the transmission mode 
(analogue or digital), the geographical coverage of the network (local or national) and/or the 
signal transmitted (radio or television). Concrete market circumstances, underlying the market 
definition, appear to vary substantially from one Member State to the other. A considerable 
number of submarkets were found to be competitive. Where NRAs wanted to exempt parts of 
the market from regulation (for example cable transmission networks and satellite networks), 
the Commission has carefully analysed whether such an approach was justified on the basis of 
the three criteria test not being met and/or on the basis of no operator having SMP the market.  
National terrestrial TV transmission systems seem to remain a bottleneck, in particular due to 
barriers to entry. Most cable submarkets were found to be competitive, the Netherlands and 
Germany being the exception, were SMP in the cable markets was found. 
However, on a forward looking basis competitive conditions can be expected to improve 
considerably in all Member States due to increased platforms competition, given the 
emergence of terrestrial digital television and internet television. 
The type of remedies imposed is subject to significant variations in the Member States, which 
was commented upon in several cases by the Commission in order to safeguard the 
consistency of regulation in the broadcasting transmission market. In particular, the 
Commission was concerned about the fact that some NRAs did not impose transparency and 
price control obligations. Further, the Commission services commented upon the 
implementation of price control obligations, either because they were not accompanied by an 
appropriate cost accounting methodology or the use of benchmarking, or because the 
timeframe foreseen for the introduction of price control was excessively long.  
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ANNEX IV 
Market 1: Access to the public telephone network provided at a fixed location for residential customers 
             
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / cost 
accounting  
Accounting 
separation 
Austria***** YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  NO***  NO 
Finland YES  43  operators  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
France YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Slovenia***** YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  YES  NO  
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Sweden YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  NO  YES 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  NO  YES  YES  YES****  NO 
Netherlands NO 1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Malta NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Germany NO  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Spain YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece NO*  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland NO  1  operator  The decision was vetoed by the Commission 
Luxembourg NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
                       
*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets   
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**Imposition of WLR               
*** Universal service-based price control obligation only 
**** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators         
 ***** second market review 
               
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
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Market 1: Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Non-discrimination 
2 - Publication of charges, terms 
and conditions of supply 
3 - BT only: annual ceiling for 
charges equivalent to RPI 
increase 
UK/2003/0009 
and 
UK/2003/0010 
2 segments defined: 
(i) residential retail 
analogue exchange 
line services and (ii) 
residential retail 
ISDN2 exchange 
line services.  
UK (excluding 
the Hull area) and 
the Hull area 
BT and 
Kingston 
4 - BT only: cost-accounting in 
respect of residential analogue 
access 
The Commission made a comment on:   
 
Markets defined more narrowly than in the 
Recommendation: A broader market definition, in line 
with the Recommendation, is not likely to lead to a 
different SMP outcome. Therefore the conclusion on the 
exact scope of the markets is not relevant. 
1 - Users' right to a connection 
to fixed telephone network  FI/2003/0020  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional  43 regional 
operators 
2 - Obligation to publish 
standard agreement terms and 
tariff information on services 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies at retail level: No further obligations are 
imposed on the SMP operators at retail level in addition 
to CS/CPS and other non-SMP obligations based on the 
Universal Service Directive. NRA should assess the 
impact of regulation at wholesale level and of CS/CPS on 
the market and consider additional regulation at retail  
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3 - User's right to pre-selection / 
carrier pre-selection 
level.  
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
6 - Price affordability 
PT/2004/0053 
and 
PT/2004/0091 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National PT  Group 
7 - Wholesale line rental 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Wholesale line rental 
Wholesale line rental is an appropriate remedy to address 
the lack of competition in the relevant retail market. The 
need for Wholesale Line rental should decrease, as 
competitors to the incumbent invest in their 
infrastructure.  
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AT/2004/0109 
AT/2005/0303 
AT/2007/0579 
In the second round 
of market review 
retail broadband 
access has been 
included 
National  Telekom 
Austria  1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Inclusion in the access markets of broadband access 
lines over which VoB services are provided 
TKK includes broadband access lines over which VoB 
services are provided in the retail access markets 
essentially on the basis of the argument that such lines are 
effectively being used, inter alia, to make and receive 
calls in full connectivity with the PSTN network.
34 
However, the functionality of narrowband access lines 
and broadband access lines in general overlap only partly. 
Although broadband connections are also capable of 
facilitating delivery of telephone services, customers 
generally will not switch from a narrowband to a 
broadband connection for the sole purpose of accessing 
voice services. Consumers switch from narrowband to 
broadband connections primarily to get access to higher 
speed Internet services. From a functional viewpoint, 
broadband access therefore tends to be only partially 
substitutable with narrowband access lines.  
Moreover, in accordance with competition law principles, 
product characteristics and intended use are insufficient  
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2 - Wholesale line rental 
to show whether two products are substitutes. Functional 
interchangeability or similarity in characteristics may not, 
in themselves, provide sufficient criteria, because the 
responsiveness of customers to relative price changes 
may be determined by other considerations as well.
35 
Before including certain broadband access lines within 
the same relevant markets as PSTN and ISDN access 
lines, TKK should therefore examine the prices of the 
various products and investigate what the impact would 
be if a hypothetical monopolist on the narrowband access 
markets would impose a small but significant non-
transitional price increase of 5 to 10%. Only if such a 
price increase causes customers to switch to broadband 
access so that the price increase becomes unprofitable, 
should broadband access be included in the relevant 
market.
36    
Even though broadband access services, however, may 
not be part of the relevant markets, such services, when 
offered by alternative operators, may have an impact on 
TA's market power since competitive constraints can, in 
particular circumstances, also stem from neighbouring  
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3 - Non-discrimination  
markets.  TKK could therefore have taken the provision 
of broadband access lines over which VoB services are or 
can be offered into account at the stage of the SMP 
finding. 
In any event, since TA does not provide any such 
broadband access lines as TKK has included in the 
relevant market, the exclusion of such services from the 
relevant market would not affect the SMP finding in this 
case nor on the scope of the remedies imposed.
37 Should 
TA, however, within the period of this review start 
offering broadband access lines over which it offers VoB 
services, the remedies currently imposed should not be 
extended to cover such broadband access lines without 
TKK justifying on the basis of further evidence that the 
inclusion of such lines in the relevant markets is justified 
on the basis of competition law principles. Such a finding 
would be subject to the procedure foreseen in Article 7 
Framework Directive. 
Efficiency of wholesale regulation   
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4 - Accounting separation  
 
 
 
 
TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes 
in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets 
since the first market review. This calls for the 
reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale 
regulation. The Commission already commented upon 
this issue in the context of TKK's second market review 
of the fixed wholesale markets
38. With regard to the 
present notifications, the Commission services would like 
to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the 
standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the 
upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to 
constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, 
could be lowered.  
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5 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
6 - Ex ante approval of end-
users tariffs  
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1 - Wholesale line rental 
(including reference offer and 
price regulated on a retail minus 
basis) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Carrier(Pre)Selection, also in 
respect of access supplied via 
Wholesale line rental to another 
operator 
5 - Obligation to supply calls 
not covered by carrier pre-
selection (freephone, 
emergency, premium rate calls) 
SE/2004/0112  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TeliaSonera 
6- Provision of unbundled 
broadband access (no 
requirement to purchase 
telephone subscription) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
HU/2005/0130 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Includes public 
Regional 
5 regional 
operators: 
Matáv, Invitel 
Távközlési 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the  
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payphones. Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, 
Emitel, Monor 
Telefon 
Társaság  2 - Not to increase prices in 
excess to the consumer price 
index. 
corresponding wholesale markets: Retail market 
remedies are supposed to be imposed after it has been 
recognised that remedies imposed on the wholesale 
market do not provide for effective competition. When 
carrying out the review of the relevant wholesale 
markets, the NRA should assess the effectiveness of 
remedies imposed at wholesale level in addressing 
market failures in the relevant retail market. 
1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and 
Wholesale Line Rental, 
including price control in the 
form of retail minus 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
5 - Accounting separation  
6- Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
IE/2005/0158 
Access for 
residential and non-
residential customers 
are included in one 
market. Lower 
narrowband access 
(PSTN, FWA, 
ISDN) and higher 
narrowband access 
(ISDN2 and 
ISDN30) are in 
different markets. 
National Eircom   
7 - Not to unreasonably bundle 
services 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Further consultations planned by ComReg on details of 
cost accounting and accounting separation are required to 
be notified to the Commission. 
SK/2005/0172  Similar to the  National Slovak  Telecom  1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection  The Commission made comments on:  
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2 - Price control (not allowed to 
charge unreasonably high or low 
prices) 
3 - Non-discrimination 
Recommendation. 
4 - Prohibition of bundling of 
products 
  
Proper national consultation on each draft measure 
when the measure has a significant impact on the relevant 
market. Give all interested parties the opportunity to 
comment on draft measures. 
 
Implementation of price control and cost accounting: 
Details on the implementation of price control and cost 
accounting have to be specified in the final measure. 
Reference to Art. 17(4) of the Universal Service 
Directive. 
  
Implementation of cost orientation related to CS/CPS: 
The Commission pointed out that cost orientation on 
CS/CPS should be implemented with an appropriate cost 
accounting method. 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
DK/2005/0183  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TDC 
2 - Price regulation (due to the 
Universal service obligations) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and 
Wholesale Line Rental  FR/2005/0221  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Metropolitan 
France, overseas 
territories and 
Mayotte (except 
the territory of 
Saint-Pierre-et-
France Télécom 
 
2- Non discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on:   
 
Remedies and next market review: ARCEP is invited 
to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of 
the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the 
shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit  
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3 - Prohibition of abusive 
bundling of access and call 
products 
4 - Prohibition of excessive or 
predatory pricing 
5 - Ex ante tariff information 
vis-a-vis the NRA 
Miquelon) 
6 - Accounting separation  
reviewing the present market analysis following such 
enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the 
proposed 2008 review. 
 
1 - Obligation to offer wholesale 
line rental (WLR) 
 
2 - Carrier Selection (CS) and 
Carrier Pre-selection (CPS 
 
SI/2005/0231 
SI/2007/0600 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Telekom 
Slovenije 
3 - Prohibition to charge 
excessive prices: price cap for 
subscription fees and maintains 
the cost-oriented price 
obligation with regard to the 
other end-user prices linked to 
access to the public telephone 
network. 
 
Concerning the first round of market review, the 
Commission made comments on: 
  
Remedies at retail level: When carrying out the 
forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant 
wholesale market, it is necessary to assess the 
effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale 
level in addressing market failures at retail level. 
 
Obligation to provide ADSL services not only to end-
users who subscribe also to ISDN: The remedy 
imposed (non-discrimination) would be more appropriate 
if it included a general prohibition to oblige end-users of 
fixed access products to subscribe to a particular type of 
access product under any circumstances unless it is 
technically necessary for the provision of a given service. 
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4 - Prohibition to limit 
competition by setting predatory 
pricing: As mentioned above, 
APEK maintains the method of 
cost oriented prices for those 
prices which are not  
regulated by price cap. The cost 
oriented prices methodology is 
based on fully allocated costs 
(FAC) and current cost 
accounting (CCA) 
 
5 - Obligation not to 
discriminate among end-users 
purchasing access to the fixed 
telephone network, namely to 
offer ADSL services to end-
users irrespective of whether 
they also subscribe to ISDN 
As regards the notification SI/2007/0600 (second market 
review) the Commission made no comments.  
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services. 
 
6 - Prohibition of unjustified 
bundling of services. APEK 
imposes on TS the obligation 
not to make certain services 
conditional upon the purchase of 
another service which the user 
does not need/want. 
 
1 – Wholesale Line Rental 
2 – non discrimination 
3 - transparency 
4 – not to unduly bundle 
products and services 
IT/2005/0260  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Telecom  Italia 
5 – price control 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
1 – cost accounting  NL/2005/0287 
OPTA distinguishes 
two retail access 
markets, (1) a low 
capacity access 
market that 
includes telephone 
connections with no 
more than two voice 
channels -i.e. 
National KPN 
2 – price regulation 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Narrow market definition 
OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than  
EN  30    EN 
3 – non discrimination 
analogue, 
ISDN1 and ISDN 2 
connections; and (2) 
a high-capacity 
access market 
that includes those 
connections with 
more than two 
telephone lines -i.e. 
ISDN 15, 
ISNDN 20, and 
ISDN 30 
connections 
 
4 - transparency 
foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, OPTA 
defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile calls, 
narrowband data services, calls to information numbers 
and calls to personal assistant numbers. The Commission 
is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is 
justified. However, in these particular cases, as it does not 
have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the 
remedies imposed, the exact market definition can be left 
open. 
 
DE/2005/0306 
DE/2006/0402 
the markets for 
access to the public 
telephone network at 
a fixed 
location as a single 
market for all 
customers using 
analogue access 
lines, ISDN lines and 
ISDN-PMX lines 
 
National DTAG  1 - CS/CPS 
Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in resolving 
the identified market 
failure in the fixed access market 
The Commission considers that in view of the fact that 
DTAG hence faces limited (potential) competition on the 
retail access market, the risk of excessive pricing by 
DTAG cannot be excluded. Ex post price control may not 
be effective in protecting consumers against that risk, in 
particular in view of the fact that the ex post price control 
foreseen in the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits tariffs 
that would be manifestly abusive. 
Therefore BNetzA should consider imposing a more  
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2 - The obligation to notify new 
tariffs 
 
efficient price control mechanism. 
Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / CPS 
obligation 
Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive provides 
that CS and CPS must be offered 
on a cost oriented basis. On the basis of this provision 
and Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive, the Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 
19(3) of the Universal Service Directive which provides 
that CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented 
basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will implement 
this obligation. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission also considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures identified on the 
retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA 
should impose on DTAG an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult 
for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. 
Such an accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a cost-orientation 
obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 
19(3) of the Access Directive 
 
ES/2006/0336  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National TESAU  CS/CPS 
Remedies at retail level: Article 17 of the Universal 
Service Directive provides that if, as a result of a market 
analysis carried out in accordance with Article 16(3) of 
the Framework Directive, an NRA determines that a  
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Price control for analogue 
access lines 
Non-discrimination 
Prohibition of anti-competitive 
behaviour 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
given retail market is not 
effectively competitive and concludes that wholesale 
obligations imposed under the Access Directive or the 
obligation to provide CS and CPS do not result in the 
achievement of the regulatory objectives set out in Article 
8 of the Framework Directive, the NRA shall impose 
appropriate regulatory obligations on undertakings 
identified as having SMP on a given retail market. 
The Commission notes that CMT has not yet completed 
the review of the related wholesale markets, in particular 
markets 8 and 11 of the Recommendation. 
In that respect, the Commission would like to remind 
CMT that when carrying out the forthcoming review of 
the corresponding relevant wholesale markets, it should 
assess the impact, appropriateness and the effectiveness 
of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in 
addressing market failures in the relevant retail market. 
Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail 
remedies as currently proposed in this notification, CMT 
is required to notify any possible resulting modification 
of retail 
remedies to the Commission pursuant to Article 7(3) of 
the Framework Directive. 
CZ/2006/0356  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National CTU  1 – CS/CPS 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Efficiency of the proposed remedies in resolving 
identified market failures: 
CTU considers that the proposed retail remedies, in 
combination with the remedies imposed on related  
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2 – accounting separation 
3 - provision of access services 
to the public telephone network 
at a fixed location for resale 
by third parties 
 
4 – cost orientation (only market 
1) 
wholesale markets, in particular wholesale unbundled 
access to metallic loops and sub-loops, are sufficient to 
remedy the market failure on these retail markets. 
Therefore, CTU does not intend to impose any pricing 
conditions neither in relation to the provision of access 
for resale by third parties nor in relation to the retail 
access market for non-residential customers.  
The Commission notes that the incumbent still has a very 
strong position on both retail access markets. 
CTU is invited to closely monitor the development of 
competition on these markets, to verify whether the 
remedies imposed at wholesale and retail level are 
effective in addressing the market failures in the retail 
access markets. In case the development of competitive 
conditions would not be satisfactory, CTU should 
consider before the end of the three year period of review 
whether to amend the retail remedies as currently 
proposed in this notification 
 
MT/2006/0394 
The inclusion of 
Broadband Wireless 
Access (BWA). 
National Maltacom  CS/CPS 
The Commission made a comment on: 
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Wholesale Line Rental 
Cost orientation 
Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
Non discrimination 
Transparency 
Prohibition to bundle services 
The inclusion of BWA in the same market as fixed 
residential analogue and 
cable access lines 
The MCA considers that BWA is a potential substitute to 
fixed access services over 
the PSTN and over cable-TV networks. Within the 
timeframe of the review, the MCA expects the roll-out of 
the BWA networks to be at an advanced stage and 
predicts that BWA networks will have the capability to 
offer access services. 
Therefore, the MCA includes BWA in the same relevant 
market as fixed residential analogue and cable access 
lines. As regards BWA, the Commission notes that the 
MCA has not conducted a substitution analysis before 
defining the relevant market. 
In particular, the MCA has neither assessed whether end-
users would consider switching from a fixed narrowband 
access product to a BWA product in case of small but 
non-significant price increase, nor the functionality of the 
BWA product. 
However, the Commission recognises the fact that in this 
particular case the inclusion of this technology in the 
relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the 
scope of regulation. 
 
CS/CPS  BE/2006/0400  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National Belgacom 
transparency 
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Non-discrimination 
Wholesale Line Rental 
Price control and cost 
accounting 
Accounting separation 
Information and notification 
obligation 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
LT/2006/0411 
and 
LT/2006/0512 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  TEO LT AB  CS/CPS 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable and local 
area networks in the same 
market as fixed residential analogue and cable access 
lines 
RRT considers that cable TV networks, wireless radio,  
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Price control and cost 
accounting 
Accounting separation 
Wholesale Line Rental 
optic cable and local area networks could provide a 
potential substitute to fixed access services over PSTN 
and ISDN. Within the timeframe of the review, RRT 
expects the further growth of cable TV networks and an 
increased ability to offer access services. For the other 
alternative platforms, RRT does not provide a forecast 
that would show that, within the timeframe of the review, 
these access technologies would effectively develop as 
alternative access platforms. Also, as regards wireless 
radio, optic cable and local area networks and cable TV 
networks, the Commission notes that RRT has not 
conducted a substitution analysis before defining the 
relevant market. In particular, RRT has not assessed 
whether end users would be able to switch from the 
metallic loop to any of the other access platforms in case 
of a small but significant price increase in the metallic 
loop access prices. In order to assess the substitutability, 
RRT is invited to examine inter alia the functionality of 
these alternative access technologies and include the 
result of this analysis in its final measure. 
However, the Commission notes that, in this particular 
case, the inclusion of any of the alternative access 
technologies in the definition of the relevant market does 
not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation. 
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CS/CPS and WLR 
Non discrimination 
Transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control and cost 
accounting 
CY/2006/485 
low level 
narrowband access 
including PSTN and 
ISDN BRA  and (ii) 
high level 
narrowband access 
including ISDN 
PRA due to the 
differences in quality 
of service and speed 
national CYTA 
Prohibition of unreasonable 
bundling of products and 
services 
No comments made by the Commission 
WLR 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
Price control 
Unbundling of services 
EL/2006/0500 
(i) lower 
level narrowband 
and (ii) higher level 
narrowband access. 
 
national OTE 
Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
No comments made by the Commission 
a prohibition of excessive 
pricing 
PL/2006/0518  An access through x 
DSL included in the 
market definition 
national TP  SA 
an obligation to refrain from 
distorting the market entry of 
other undertakings 
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an obligation to refrain from 
limiting competition by fixing 
prices below the costs of their 
provision 
an obligation to refrain from 
applying preferential treatment 
to end users 
an obligation to refrain from 
obliging the end users to use 
unnecessary services 
cost orientation and cost 
accounting obligation 
an obligation to submit for approval 
prices and other conditions of 
service provision 
 
 
 
The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on: 
Lack of evidence that ISDN/PSTN access and broadband 
access in Poland are substitutable products 
LU/2007/0526 
analogue access and 
basic digital access 
included. ISDN PRA 
excluded from the 
market 
 
national EPT 
Wholesale obligations: 
1 – access (CS/CPS and WLR) 
2 – non discrimination 
3 – transparency 
3 – accounting separation 
4 – price control 
 
Retail obligations: 
1 – non discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Price control obligation 
ILR intends to base the price control obligation for WLR 
on the "retail minus" methodology. It should be recalled 
that retail access prices for residential and non residential 
customers are above the EU average in Luxemburg. A 
retail minus methodology might result in WLR prices that 
exceed costs. Given the fact that the cost orientation 
obligation at retail level is proposed to be removed, it is 
all the more important that WLR prices are set at cost. 
Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to impose a 
cost orientation obligation concerning WLR prices. This 
would ensure that users are offered attractive prices,  
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2 – transparency 
3 – price control 
whilst allowing EPT to recover its costs. 
 
1 - CS/CPS 
LV/2007/0565  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national 
Lattelecom 
 
2 – price control 
Lack of details concerning price control obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance 
legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its 
final measure the details of the price control remedy 
imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to effectively 
remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and national calls 
markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an 
obligation of accounting separation. Without such an 
obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise 
effectively any price control. Such 
an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary 
to implement effectively a 
cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the 
Access Directive 
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Market 2: Access to the public telephone network  
provided at a fixed location for non residential customers 
              
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Carrier (Pre) 
Selection  Non-discrimination Transparency  Price control / 
cost accounting  Accounting separation 
Austria***** YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  NO***  NO 
Finland YES  43  operators  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
France YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Slovenia***** YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Sweden YES  1  operator  YES**  YES  NO  NO  YES 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  NO  YES  YES  YES****  NO  
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Netherlands NO 1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Malta NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Germany NO  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Spain YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  YES**  YES**  YES  YES  YES 
Greece NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland NO  1  operator  The decision was vetoed by the Commission 
Luxembourg NO*  1  operator  YES**  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
  
* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
** Imposition of WLR              
*** Universal service-based price control obligation only             
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**** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators          
*****second market review 
              
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
EN  44    EN 
Market 2: Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for non-residential customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Non-discrimination 
2 - Publication of charges, terms and 
conditions of supply 
UK/2003/0009 
and 
UK/2003/0010 
3 segments defined: 
(i) business retail 
analogue exchange 
line services; (ii) 
business retail 
ISDN2 exchange 
line services and 
(iii) business retail 
ISDN30 exchange 
line services. 
UK (excluding the 
Hull area) and the 
Hull area 
BT and 
Kingston 
3- BT only: annual ceiling for 
charges equivalent to RPI increase 
The Commission made a comment on:  
 
Markets defined more narrowly then in the 
Recommendation: A broader market definition, in 
line with the Recommendation, is not likely to lead 
to a different SMP outcome. Therefore the 
conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not 
relevant. 
1 - Users' right to a connection to 
fixed telephone network 
2 - Obligation to publish standard 
agreement terms and tariff 
information on services  FI/2003/0021  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional  43 regional 
operators 
3 - User's right to pre-selection / 
carrier pre-selection 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies at retail level: No further obligations 
are imposed on the SMP operators at retail level in 
addition to CS/CPS and other non-SMP obligations 
based on the Universal Service Directive. NRA 
should assess the impact of regulation at wholesale 
level and of CS/CPS on the market and consider 
additional regulation at retail level.   
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1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting  
PT/2004/0054 
and 
PT/2004/0091 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National PT  Group 
4 - Accounting separation  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Wholesale line rental: Wholesale line rental is an 
appropriate remedy to address the lack of 
competition in the relevant retail market. The need 
for Wholesale Line rental should decrease, as 
competitors to the incumbent invest in their 
infrastructure. 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
2 - Wholesale line rental 
3 - Non-discrimination  
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Cost orientation 
AT/2004/0110 
AT/2005/0303 
AT/2007/0580 
In the second round 
of market review 
retail broadband 
access has been 
included 
National  Telekom 
Austria  
6 - Ex ante approval of end-users 
tariffs 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Inclusion in the access markets of broadband 
access lines over which VoB services are 
provided 
TKK includes broadband access lines over which 
VoB services are provided in the retail access 
markets essentially on the basis of the argument 
that such lines are effectively being used, inter alia, 
to make and receive calls in full connectivity with 
the PSTN network. However, the functionality of 
narrowband access lines and broadband access 
lines in general overlap only partly. Although 
broadband connections are also capable of 
facilitating delivery of telephone services, 
customers generally will not switch from a 
narrowband to a broadband connection for the sole 
purpose of accessing voice services. Consumers 
switch from narrowband to broadband connections 
primarily to get access to higher speed Internet 
services. From a functional viewpoint, broadband 
access therefore tends to be only partially 
substitutable with narrowband access lines.  
Moreover, in accordance with competition law  
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principles, product characteristics and intended use 
are insufficient to show whether two products are 
substitutes. Functional interchangeability or 
similarity in characteristics may not, in themselves, 
provide sufficient criteria, because the 
responsiveness of customers to relative price 
changes may be determined by other considerations 
as well. Before including certain broadband access 
lines within the same relevant markets as PSTN 
and ISDN access lines, TKK should therefore 
examine the prices of the various products and 
investigate what the impact would be if a 
hypothetical monopolist on the narrowband access 
markets would impose a small but significant non-
transitional price increase of 5 to 10%. Only if such 
a price increase causes customers to switch to 
broadband access so that the price increase 
becomes unprofitable, should broadband access be 
included in the relevant market.    
Even though broadband access services, however, 
may not be part of the relevant markets, such 
services, when offered by alternative operators, 
may have an impact on TA's market power since 
competitive constraints can, in particular 
circumstances, also stem from neighbouring 
markets.  TKK could therefore have taken the 
provision of broadband access lines over which 
VoB services are or can be offered into account at 
the stage of the SMP finding. 
In any event, since TA does not provide any such 
broadband access lines as TKK has included in the 
relevant market, the exclusion of such services 
from the relevant market would not affect the SMP 
finding in this case nor on the scope of the 
remedies imposed. Should TA, however, within the 
period of this review start offering broadband 
access lines over which it offers VoB services, the 
remedies currently imposed should not be extended  
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to cover such broadband access lines without TKK 
justifying on the basis of further evidence that the 
inclusion of such lines in the relevant markets is 
justified on the basis of competition law principles. 
Such a finding would be subject to the procedure 
foreseen in Article 7 Framework Directive. 
 
Efficiency of wholesale regulation  
TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant 
changes in the competitive conditions in the retail 
calls markets since the first market review. This 
calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of 
the current wholesale regulation. The Commission 
already commented upon this issue in the context 
of TKK's second market review of the fixed 
wholesale markets. With regard to the present 
notifications, the Commission services would like 
to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the 
standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether 
the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK 
considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail 
access markets, could be lowered. 
1 - Wholesale line rental (including 
reference offer and price regulated 
on a retail minus basis) 
2 - Non-discrimination  
SE/2004/0113  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National TeliaSonera 
3 - Accounting separation  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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4 - Carrier(Pre)Selection, also in 
respect of access supplied via WLR 
to another operator 
5 - Obligations to supply calls not 
covered by carrier pre-selection 
(freephone, emergency, premium 
rate calls) 
6- Provision of unbundled 
broadband access (no requirement to 
purchase telephone subscription) 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
HU/2005/0131  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional 
5 regional 
operators: 
Matáv, Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, 
Emitel, Monor 
Telefon 
Társaság  2 - Not to increase prices in excess 
to the consumer price index. 
The Commission made a comment on:   
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to 
analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: 
Retail market remedies are supposed to be imposed 
after it has been recognised that remedies imposed 
on the wholesale market do not provide for 
effective competition. When carrying out the 
review of the relevant wholesale markets, the NRA 
should assess the effectiveness of remedies 
imposed at wholesale level in addressing market 
failures in the relevant retail market.  
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1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and 
Wholesale Line Rental, including 
price control in the form of retail 
minus 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
5 - Accounting separation  
6 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
IE/2005/0159 
Access for 
residential and non-
residential 
customers are 
included in one 
market. Lower 
narrowband access 
(PSTN, FWA, 
ISDN) and higher 
narrowband access 
(ISDN2 and 
ISDN30) are in 
different markets. 
National Eircom   
7 - Not to unreasonably bundle 
services 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg on 
details of cost accounting and accounting 
separation are required to be notified to the 
Commission. 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection  SK/2005/0173  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Slovak 
Telecom 
2 - Price control (not allowed to 
charge unreasonably high or low 
prices) 
The Commission made comments on: 
  
Proper national consultation on each draft 
measure when the measure has a significant impact 
on the relevant market. Give all interested parties 
the opportunity to comment on draft measures. 
 
Implementation of price control and cost 
accounting: Details on the implementation of price 
control and cost accounting have to be specified in  
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3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Prohibition of bundling of 
products 
the final measure. Reference to Art. 17(4) of the 
Universal Service Directive.   
 
Implementation of cost orientation related to 
CS/CPS:  The Commission pointed out that cost 
orientation on CS/CPS should be implemented with 
an appropriate cost accounting method. 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
DK/2005/0184  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National TDC 
2 - Price regulation (due to the 
Universal service obligations) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and 
Wholesale Line Rental 
2- Non-discrimination 
3 - Prohibition of abusive bundling 
of access and call products 
4 - Prohibition of excessive or 
predatory pricing 
5 - Ex ante tariff information vis-à-
vis the NRA 
FR/2005/0222  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Metropolitan 
France, overseas 
territories and 
Mayotte (except 
the territory of 
Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon) 
France 
Télécom 
6 - Accounting separation  
The Commission made a comment on: 
  
Remedies and next market review: ARCEP is 
invited to ensure full, effective and appropriate 
enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 
8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and 
accordingly to commit reviewing the present 
market analysis following such enforcement, in any 
case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 
review.  
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1 - Obligation to offer wholesale line 
rental (WLR) 
 
2 - Carrier Selection (CS) and 
Carrier Pre-selection (CPS 
 
3 - Prohibition to charge excessive 
prices: price cap for subscription 
fees and maintains the cost-oriented 
price obligation with regard to the 
other end-user prices linked to 
access to the public telephone 
network. 
 
SI/2005/0231 
SI/2007/0601 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Telekom 
Slovenije 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning first market review, the Commission 
made  comments on:   
 
Remedies at retail level: When carrying out the 
forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant 
wholesale market, it is necessary to assess the 
effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at 
wholesale level in addressing market failures at 
retail level. 
 
Obligation to provide ADSL services not only to 
end-users who subscribe also to ISDN: The 
remedy imposed (non-discrimination) would be 
more appropriate if it included a general 
prohibition to oblige end-users of fixed access 
products to subscribe to a particular type of access 
product under any circumstances unless it is 
technically necessary for the provision of a given 
service. 
 
As regards the notification SI/2007/0600 (second 
market review) the Commission made no 
comments.  
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4 - Prohibition to limit competition 
by setting predatory pricing: As 
mentioned above, 
APEK maintains the method of cost 
oriented prices for those prices 
which are not 
regulated by price cap. The cost 
oriented prices methodology is based 
on fully allocated 
costs (FAC) and current cost 
accounting (CCA) 
 
5 - Obligation not to discriminate 
among end-users purchasing access 
to the fixed telephone network, 
namely to offer ADSL services to 
end-users irrespective of whether 
they also subscribe to ISDN 
services. 
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6 - Prohibition of unjustified 
bundling of services. APEK imposes 
on TS the obligation not 
to make certain services conditional 
upon the purchase of another service 
which the user does not need/want. 
 
1 – Wholesale Line Rental 
2 – non discrimination 
3 - transparency 
4 – not to unduly bundle products 
and services 
IT/2005/0260  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Telecom  Italia 
5 – price control 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 – cost accounting  NL/2005/0288 
OPTA distinguishes 
two retail access 
markets, (1) a low 
capacity access 
market that 
includes telephone 
connections with no 
more than two 
voice channels -i.e. 
analogue, 
National KPN 
2 – price regulation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Narrow market definition 
OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than 
foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, 
OPTA defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile 
calls, narrowband data services, calls to 
information numbers and calls to personal assistant  
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3 – non discrimination 
ISDN1 and ISDN 2 
connections; and 
(2) a high-capacity 
access market 
that includes those 
connections with 
more than two 
telephone lines -i.e. 
ISDN 15, 
ISNDN 20, and 
ISDN 30 
connections 
 
4 - transparency 
numbers. The Commission is not convinced that 
such a narrow market definition is justified. 
However, in these particular cases, as it does not 
have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the 
remedies imposed, the exact market definition can 
be left open. 
  
EN  55    EN 
DE/2005/0306 
DE/2006/0402 
the markets for 
access to the public 
telephone network 
at a fixed 
location as a single 
market for all 
customers using 
analogue access 
lines, ISDN lines 
and 
ISDN-PMX lines 
 
National DTAG  CS/CPS 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in 
resolving the identified market 
failure in the fixed access market 
DTAG has a market share of approximately 94% in 
the retail access market. Competitive 
pressure resulting from LLU may be limited in 
particular in certain geographic areas. On a 
prospective basis, WLR is not available in 
Germany rendering it more difficult for 
alternative operators to climb the ladder of 
investment towards full unbundling. The 
Commission considers that in view of the fact that 
DTAG hence faces limited (potential) 
competition on the retail access market, the risk of 
excessive pricing by DTAG cannot be  
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The obligation to notify new tariffs 
excluded. Ex post price control may not be 
effective in protecting consumers against that 
risk, in particular in view of the fact that the ex post 
price control foreseen in the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits 
tariffs that would be manifestly abusive. 
Therefore BNetzA should consider imposing a 
more efficient price control mechanism. 
 
Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / 
CPS obligation 
Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive9 
provides that CS and CPS must be offered on a cost 
oriented basis. On the basis of this provision and 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the 
Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 19(3) of 
the Universal Service Directive which provides that 
CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented 
basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will 
implement this obligation. 
 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission also considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and national 
calls markets, BNetzA should impose  
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on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. 
Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for 
BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. 
Such an accounting separation obligation seems 
also necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive 
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CZ/2006/0356  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National CTU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Efficiency of the proposed remedies in resolving 
identified market failures: 
CTU considers that the proposed retail remedies, in 
combination with the remedies 
imposed on related wholesale markets, in particular 
wholesale unbundled access 
to metallic loops and sub-loops, are sufficient to 
remedy the market failure on these retail markets. 
Therefore, CTU does not intend to impose any 
pricing conditions neither in relation to the 
provision of access for resale by third parties nor in 
relation to the retail access market for non-
residential customers.  
The Commission notes that the incumbent still has 
a very strong position on both retail access 
markets. 
CTU is invited to closely monitor the development 
of competition on these markets, to verify whether 
the remedies imposed at wholesale and retail level 
are effective in addressing the market failures in 
the retail access markets. In case the development 
of competitive conditions would not be 
satisfactory, CTU should consider before the end of 
the three year period of review whether to amend 
the retail remedies as currently 
proposed in this notification.  
EN  59    EN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 – accounting separation 
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3 - provision of access services to 
the public telephone network at a 
fixed location for resale 
by third parties 
 
CS/CPS 
Wholesale Line Rental 
Cost orientation 
MT/2006/0394 
The inclusion of 
Broadband Wireless 
Access (BWA). 
National Maltacom 
Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The inclusion of BWA in the same market as 
fixed residential analogue and 
cable access lines 
The MCA considers that BWA is a potential 
substitute to fixed access services over 
the PSTN and over cable-TV networks. Within the 
timeframe of the review, the MCA expects the roll-
out of the BWA networks to be at an advanced 
stage and predicts that BWA networks will have 
the capability to offer access services. 
Therefore, the MCA includes BWA in the same 
relevant market as fixed residential 
analogue and cable access lines. As regards BWA, 
the Commission notes that the MCA has not 
conducted a substitution analysis before defining  
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Non discrimination 
Transparency 
Prohibition to bundle services 
the relevant market. 
In particular, the MCA has neither assessed 
whether end-users would consider switching from a 
fixed narrowband access product to a BWA 
product in case of small but non-significant price 
increase, nor the functionality of the BWA product. 
However, the Commission recognises the fact that 
in this particular case the inclusion of this 
technology in the relevant market does not affect 
the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation. 
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DE/2005/0306 
DE/2006/0402 
the markets for 
access to the public 
telephone network 
at a fixed 
location as a single 
market for all 
customers using 
analogue access 
lines, ISDN lines 
and 
ISDN-PMX lines 
 
national DTAG  CS/CPS 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in 
resolving the identified market 
failure in the fixed access market 
DTAG has a market share of approximately 94% in 
the retail access market. Competitive 
pressure resulting from LLU may be limited in 
particular in certain geographic areas. On a 
prospective basis, WLR is not available in 
Germany rendering it more difficult for 
alternative operators to climb the ladder of 
investment towards full unbundling. The 
Commission considers that in view of the fact that 
DTAG hence faces limited (potential) 
competition on the retail access market, the risk of 
excessive pricing by DTAG cannot be 
excluded. Ex post price control may not be 
effective in protecting consumers against that 
risk, in particular in view of the fact that the ex post 
price control foreseen in the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits 
tariffs that would be manifestly abusive. 
Therefore BNetzA should consider imposing a  
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The obligation to notify new tariffs 
more efficient price control mechanism. 
 
Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / 
CPS obligation 
Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive9 
provides that CS and CPS must be offered on a cost 
oriented basis. On the basis of this provision and 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the 
Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 19(3) of 
the Universal Service Directive which provides that 
CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented 
basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will 
implement this obligation. 
 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission also considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and national 
calls markets, BNetzA should impose 
on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. 
Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for 
BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. 
Such an accounting separation obligation seems 
also necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive 
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CS/CPS 
Price control for analogue access 
lines 
Non-discrimination 
ES/2006/0336  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TESAU 
Prohibition of anti-competitive 
behaviour 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies at retail level: Article 17 of the 
Universal Service Directive provides that 
if, as a result of a market analysis carried out in 
accordance with Article 16(3) of the Framework 
Directive, an NRA determines that a given retail 
market is not effectively competitive and concludes 
that wholesale obligations imposed under the 
Access Directive or the obligation to provide CS 
and CPS do not result in the achievement of the 
regulatory objectives set out in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive, the NRA shall impose 
appropriate regulatory obligations on undertakings 
identified as having SMP on a given retail market. 
The Commission notes that CMT has not yet 
completed the review of the related wholesale 
markets, in particular markets 8 and 11 of the 
Recommendation. 
In that respect, the Commission would like to 
remind CMT that when carrying out 
the forthcoming review of the corresponding 
relevant wholesale markets, it should assess the 
impact, appropriateness and the effectiveness of 
remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in 
addressing market failures in the relevant retail 
market. Should this review lead to a need to amend 
the retail remedies as currently proposed in this 
notification, CMT is required to notify any possible  
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transparency 
Accounting separation 
resulting modification of retail 
remedies to the Commission pursuant to Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
CS/CPS 
transparency 
Non-discrimination 
Wholesale Line Rental 
Price control and cost accounting 
Accounting separation 
BE/2006/0400 
refined the non-
residential 
customers market 
into (i) analogue 
access, (ii) basic 
digital access 
(ISDN-2) and (iii) 
primary digital 
access (ISDN-30). 
. 
National Belgacom 
Information and notification 
obligation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission  
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CS/CPS 
Price control and cost accounting 
LT/2006/0412 
and 
LT/2006/0513 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  TEO LT AB 
Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable and 
local area networks in the same 
market as fixed residential analogue and cable 
access lines 
RRT considers that cable TV networks, wireless 
radio, optic cable and local area 
networks could provide a potential substitute to 
fixed access services over PSTN and 
ISDN. Within the timeframe of the review, RRT 
expects the further growth of cable 
TV networks and an increased ability to offer 
access services. For the other alternative platforms, 
RRT does not provide a forecast that would show 
that, within the timeframe of the review, these 
access technologies would effectively develop as 
alternative access platforms. Also, as regards 
wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks 
and cable TV networks, the Commission notes that 
RRT has not conducted a substitution analysis 
before defining the relevant market. In particular, 
RRT has not assessed whether end users would be 
able to switch from the metallic 
loop to any of the other access platforms in case of 
a small but significant price 
increase in the metallic loop access prices. In order  
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Wholesale Line Rental 
to assess the substitutability, RRT is invited to 
examine  inter alia the functionality of these 
alternative access technologies and include the 
result of this analysis in its final measure. 
However, the Commission notes that, in this 
particular case, the inclusion of any of 
the alternative access technologies in the definition 
of the relevant market does not affect the finding of 
SMP or the scope of regulation. 
 
CS/CPS and WLR 
Non discrimination 
Transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control and cost accounting 
CY/2006/486 
low level 
narrowband access 
including PSTN 
and ISDN BRA  
and (ii) high level 
narrowband access 
including ISDN 
PRA due to the 
differences in 
quality of service 
and speed 
national CYTA 
Prohibition of unreasonable bundling 
of products and services 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
WLR 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
Price control 
EL/2006/0501  (i) lower 
level narrowband 
and (ii) higher level 
narrowband access. 
 
national OTE 
Unbundling of services 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission  
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Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
a prohibition of excessive pricing 
an obligation to refrain from 
distorting the market entry of other 
undertakings 
an obligation to refrain from limiting 
competition by fixing prices below 
the costs of their provision 
an obligation to refrain from 
applying preferential treatment to 
end users 
an obligation to refrain from 
obliging the end users to use 
unnecessary services 
cost orientation and cost accounting 
obligation 
PL/2006/0524 
An access through x 
DSL included in the 
market definition 
national TP  SA 
an obligation to submit for approval 
prices and other conditions of 
service provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission vetoed the draft measure based 
on: 
Lack of evidence that ISDN/PSTN access and 
broadband access in Poland are substitutable 
products 
LU/2007/0527 
(i) analogue 
access, (ii) basic 
digital access, and 
(iii) primary digital 
access. 
 
national EPT 
Wholesale obligations: 
1 – access (CS/CPS and WLR) 
2 – non discrimination 
3 – transparency 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Price control obligation 
ILR intends to base the price control obligation for 
WLR on the "retail minus"  
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  3 – accounting separation 
4 – price control 
 
Retail obligations: 
1 – non discrimination 
2 – transparency 
3 – price control 
methodology. It should be recalled that retail 
access prices for residential and non residential 
customers are above the EU average in 
Luxemburg. A retail minus methodology might 
result in WLR prices that exceed costs. Given the 
fact that the cost orientation obligation at retail 
level is proposed to be removed, it is all the more 
important that WLR prices are set at cost. 
Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to 
impose a cost orientation obligation concerning 
WLR prices. This 
would ensure that users are offered attractive 
prices, whilst allowing EPT to recover its costs. 
 
LV/2007/0566  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  
Lattelecom 
 
1 - CS/CPS 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify  
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2 - Price control 
in its final measure the details of 
the price control remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and national 
calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom 
an obligation of accounting separation. Without 
such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to 
exercise effectively any price control. Such an 
accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive 
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Market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services  
provided at a fixed location for residential customers 
              
Member State  Market definition similar 
to Recommendation  SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / 
cost accounting  Accounting separation 
Austria**** YES 1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Finland YES  43  operators**  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
France YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  NO SMP FOUND 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  NO  YES  YES  YES***  NO 
Netherlands NO* 1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium NO*  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Slovenia YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Malta YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany NO*  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Denmark YES  1  operator  No remedies imposed 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Italy NO  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Greece YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxembourg YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
 
                
* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets          
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** On local calls. No SMP for national calls.           
*** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
****second round of the review 
             
 
 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007        
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Market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential 
customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
 
1 - Non-discrimination 
 
 
2 – Transparency 
 
 
3 - BT only: price control 
implying price freeze (adjusted 
for inflation) 
 
2003/0007, 
UK/2003/0008 
and 
UK/2003/0045 
Separation in local, national, 
calls to mobile phones and 
operator-assisted calls. 
Separate markets: 
Hull area and UK 
outside Hull 
Hull area: 
Kingston; UK 
outside Hull: BT 
4 - BT only: cost accounting 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other 
than the Commission and other NRAs: The 
Commission stresses the fact that any material 
modification to the notified draft measure will 
require the draft measure to be re-notified 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework 
Directive. 
 
Markets defined more narrowly than in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets: 
Oftel defined retail narrowband markets more 
narrowly than in the Recommendation on 
relevant markets. However, a broader market 
definition is not likely to lead to a different 
result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a 
conclusion on the exact scope of the markets 
is not relevant in this specific context for the 
purposes of SMP assessment. 
 
Publication of a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting  
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systems: It is necessary for a statement 
concerning compliance with the cost 
accounting system to be published annually, 
following verification by a qualified 
independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel 
with Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to 
be re-notified. 
FI/2003/0022 
and 
FI/2003/0023 
Local and national calls are 
included in separate markets. 
National calls: 
national market; 
local calls: regional 
markets 
On local calls for 
the 43 regional 
operators. No SMP 
found for national 
On local calls: 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
National calls: NRAs should assess whether  
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1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
calls 
2 - Transparency (obligation to 
publish a reference offer) 
effective competition is or is not a result of 
regulation in place and whether the status of 
competition is likely to be different in the 
absence of regulation. In this specific case, to 
what extent the competitive conditions could 
be different without CS/CPS-Regulation? 
 
Local calls: NRA's intention to impose more 
remedies on wholesale level: NRA does not 
sufficiently analyse how remedies on 
wholesale level would influence competition 
on retail level. Commission doubts that 
remedies at retail level are sufficient. 
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation (for 
geographic numbers only) and 
cost accounting  
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price affordability 
(geographic numbers only) 
PT/2004/0055, 
PT/2004/59 and 
PT/2004/0091 
Broadly similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Additionally a market for 
non-geographic (service) 
numbers. This additional 
market includes both 
residential and non-residential 
customers.  
National PT  Group 
6 -Numbering plan (non-
geographic service numbers 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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only) 
1 – price control 
AT/2004/0127 
AT/2007/0581 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
All types of calls included. 
National Telekom  Austria 
2 – accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Efficiency of wholesale regulation  
TKK's analysis does not indicate any 
significant changes in the competitive 
conditions in the retail calls markets since the 
first market review. This calls for the 
reassessment of the effectiveness of the 
current wholesale regulation. The 
Commission already commented upon this 
issue in the context of TKK's second market 
review of the fixed wholesale markets
39. With 
regard to the present notifications, the 
Commission services would like to invite 
TKK in particular to supervise closely the 
standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess 
whether the upfront payment applied by TA, 
that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to 
enter the retail access markets, could be 
lowered. 
HU/2005/0132 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. Public 
payphones and prepaid cards 
included. 
Regional 
5 regional 
operators: Matáv, 
Invitel Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, Emitel, 
Monor Telefon 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Consideration of additional retail remedies: 
In view of the continuing high market shares 
of the incumbents and their relatively high 
retail prices compared to EU best practices,  
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Társaság  the Commission invites NHH to consider 
whether the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over 
a given period are sufficient to address the 
market failure in the four retail calls markets 
under review. 
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to 
analysing the corresponding wholesale 
markets: The Commission reminds NHH that 
it should assess the effectiveness of remedies 
to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing 
market failures in the relevant retail markets. 
Should this review lead to a need to amend the 
retail remedies, particular attention should be 
paid to the possibility of a price or margin 
squeeze? 
SE/2005/0149 
 
 
Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority. 
 
 
SE/2005/195 
Similar to the 
recommendation. Explicitly 
including IP-Telephony. 
National 
No SMP found, 
due to regulation in 
the wholesale and 
retail access 
markets 
No remedies imposed  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in 
the notified markets without supporting this 
conclusion by a substitutability analysis. 
When assessing whether IP-telephony 
services are part of any of the markets for 
publicly available fixed telephony services, 
national regulatory authorities must examine -  
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taking national circumstances into account - 
the objective characteristics, prices and 
intended use of the IP-telephony services, as 
well as their demand-side and supply side 
substitution with other fixed telephony 
services. 
1 - Carrier Access and Carrier 
(Pre) Selection 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
5 - Accounting separation 
IE/2005/0160 
Residential and non-
residential together, public 
payphones excluded. 
National Eircom 
6 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg: 
The Commission reminds ComReg that draft 
measures relating to the details and 
implementation of accounting separation and 
cost accounting obligations are required to be 
notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework 
Directive 
Remedies only for PSTN 
calls, no remedies for VOIP 
calls 
FR/2005/0223  
VoIP calls offered by access 
providers ("managed VOIP") 
are included, VOIP calls by 
non-access providers are not 
included in the market. 
Metropolitan France 
and overseas 
territories except for 
the territory of 
Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon 
France Télécom 
1 - Prohibition of abusive 
bundling of access and call 
products 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the 
notified calls markets: The Commission 
recalls that, when assessing whether IP-
telephony services are part of any of the 
markets for publicly available fixed telephony 
services, national regulatory authorities must 
examine - taking national circumstances into 
account - the objective characteristics, prices 
and intended use of the IP-telephony services,  
EN  80    EN 
2 - Prohibition of excessive or 
predatory pricing 
3 - Ex ante tariff information 
vis-a-vis the NRA 
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price control on fixed to 
mobile calls 
as well as their demand-side and supply side 
substitution with other fixed telephony 
services. The Commission believes that, in the 
present case the inclusion of managed IP-
telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail calls 
markets is not inconsistent with the 
Recommendation. 
 
 
Remedies and next market review: The 
Commission considers that the decision not to 
extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. 
The Commission notes the existing wholesale 
remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as 
ARCEP’s commitment to monitor this part of 
the retail markets closely for any anti-
competitive practices and considers that 
should such practices occur, ARCEP has the 
right and the obligation to intervene as 
appropriate. The Commission invites ARCEP 
to ensure full, effective and appropriate 
enforcement of the obligations imposed in 
markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible 
timeframe, and accordingly to commit 
reviewing the present market analysis 
following such enforcement, in any case at an 
earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.  
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6 - Non-discrimination 
1 – prohibition to restrict 
competition by setting 
predatory prices 
SI/2005/0264  IP telephony excluded  National  Telecom Slovenije 
2 – price control and cost 
accounting obligation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Impact of wholesale obligations on the 
relevant retail markets: The Commission 
would like to recall APEK that in accordance 
with the Universal Service Directive  NRAs 
should intervene at retail level only if 
remedies imposed at the wholesale level 
together with the obligations to provide carrier 
selection/carrier pre-selection do not  render 
the relevant retail markets competitive. The 
Commission notes that in Slovenia there are 
no alternative operators present on the 
relevant markets yet. It furthermore 
acknowledges that the current level of retail 
prices in relation to the relevant wholesale 
prices may risk leaving too low a margin 
between the retail and wholesale prices and 
that therefore the proposed retail price control 
appears to be justified. However, the 
Commission would like to invite APEK to 
closely monitor the impact of the proposed 
wholesale obligations, in particular the 
implementation of cost-oriented wholesale 
charges and non-discrimination obligation, on 
the relevant retail markets and to reassess the 
need to intervene at retail level accordingly  
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when reviewing the notified markets. 
 
DK/2005/0268  IP telephony excluded  National  NITA  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The exclusion of IP-telephony from the 
relevant markets: The Commission 
considers that the justifications given by 
NITA for its decision to exclude IPtelephony 
from the notified markets are insufficient. 
NITA states that IP-telephony currently does 
not have the same functionalities as PSTN and 
ISDN, without describing these differences in 
functionality. When assessing whether or not 
IPtelephony should be included in any of the 
retail markets for fixed telephony services, 
NRAs must examine – taking national 
circumstances into account – the objective 
characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-
telephony services, as well as their demand-
side and supply-side substitution with other 
fixed telephony services. 
However, the possible inclusion of IP-
telephony in the notified markets would seem 
to change neither NITA’s assessment of SMP, 
nor its decision not to impose any remedies in 
these markets. NITA considers that the 
remedies imposed on PSTN wholesale 
markets (call origination, call termination and 
transit) solve the identified competition 
problems in the retail markets. Including IP-
telephony in the relevant retail markets would  
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only further reduce barriers to market entry. 
Any provider of broadband connection can, in 
principle, provide IP-telephony as an 
alternative service to PSTN or ISDN 
telephony. The Commission services also note 
the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 
and 12 in Denmark, which can be expected to 
facilitate market entry for IP-telephony 
operators. 
Monitoring of effects of wholesale 
regulation on the notified retail markets: 
Considering NITA’s intention not to impose 
any retail remedies despite the fact that TDC 
is deemed to have SMP in the two notified 
markets, it is imperative that NITA monitors 
market developments closely in order to 
verify whether the wholesale remedies 
imposed in markets 8 to 12 have the desired 
effect on the notified retail markets. Should 
any anti-competitive practices occur in these 
markets, NITA has the right and the 
obligation to intervene as appropriate. 
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1 – cost accounting and 
accounting separation 
2 – price control 
NL/2005/0289 
NL/2005/0293 
NL/2005/0294 
NL/2005/0295 
NL/2005/0296 
Separate market for fixed to 
mobile calls, narrowband data 
services, calls to information 
numbers, calls to information 
assistant numbers. 
VoB included. 
 
National  KPN 
3 – non discrimination 
The Commission made  comments on: 
 
Narrow market definition 
OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly 
than foreseen in the Recommendation. In 
particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for 
fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data 
services, calls to information numbers and 
calls to personal assistant numbers. The 
Commission is not convinced that such a 
narrow market definition is justified. 
However, in these particular cases, as it does 
not have any impact on the finding of SMP, 
nor on the remedies imposed, the exact market 
definition can be left open. 
Inclusion of VoB – appropriateness of 
remedies 
The Commission believes that in the present 
case and in the light of the market 
characteristics of the access and voice calls 
market in the Netherlands, the inclusion of 
managed VoB- telephone in the relevant retail 
access and calls markets is not inconsistent 
with the Recommendation. The regulation of 
VoB should not prevent the SMP operator 
from switching to a new, more cost-efficient, 
technology. In this context, the Commission 
notes the flexible regulatory approach 
proposed by OPTA, which is introduced via 
the price floor taking into account the 
different cost structure of the products based  
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4 - transparency 
on VoB. 
 
DE/2005/0308 
No distinction between 
residential and non-residential 
customers. 
Exclusion of F/M calls. 
national DTAG 
an obligation to notify new 
tariffs to BNetzA two months 
in advance of 
commercialisation to allow 
BNetzA to supervise the ex 
post price control obligation. 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission also considers that in order 
to effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, BNetzA should impose 
on DTAG an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it 
seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise 
effectively any price control. Such an 
accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access 
Directive 
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1 - TESAU must communicate 
to CMT any changes to 
applicable prices and 
conditions of the relevant 
services at least 10 days before 
their effective date 
of application/launch date; 
 
ES/2005/0326  IP telephony excluded  National  TESAU  2 - TESAU must make 
available to CMT (within 10 
days, on request) prices and 
conditions applicable to 
personalised offers offered by 
TESAU to those 
customers whose overall 
billing with TESAU exceeds 
€600,000 per year. 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets: The Commission considers that the 
justification given by CMT for its decision to 
exclude IP-telephony from the notified 
markets is insufficient insofar as CMT’s 
arguments are based on the fact that IP-
telephony currently does not have the same 
functionalities as (and are thus not regulated 
like) publicly available telephone services 
(provided over PSTN and ISDN). When 
assessing whether or not IP-telephony should 
be included in any of the retail markets for 
fixed telephony services, the NRA should 
duly examine – taking account of national 
circumstances – the objective characteristics, 
prices and intended use of IP-telephony 
services, as well as their demand-side and 
supply-side substitution with other fixed 
telephony services.  
 
1 - Price control 
2 – non discrimination 
SK/2006/0347  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Slovak  Telecom 
3 - Prohibition of unreasonable 
bundling of products and 
services 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
National public consultation: The 
Commission would like to remind TÚSR that 
according to Article 6 of the Framework 
Directive, NRAs must conduct a national 
consultation on each draft measure taken in 
accordance with the Framework Directive or 
the Specific Directives which have a  
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significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. 
including the market definitions, and to give 
all interested parties the opportunity to 
comment on the draft measures. 
 
1 – CS/CPS 
CZ/2006/0350  VoIP excluded  national  Cesky Telecom 
2 – accounting separation 
Impact of the proposed wholesale remedies 
CTU considers that wholesale price 
regulation7, in combination with the proposed 
retail remedies, is sufficient to remedy the 
market failure on this particular market. In 
this context, the Commission notes that the 
retail prices in the Czech Republic are high 
compared to other EU Member States8 and 
that the incumbent still has a very strong 
position on the market. 
Therefore, the Commission invites CTU to 
closely monitor the impact of the proposed 
wholesale obligations, in particular the 
implementation of cost-oriented wholesale 
charges and the non-discrimination obligation, 
on the relevant retail markets and in 
particular to complete the review and adopt 
the final measures on the related wholesale 
markets (markets 8, 9 and 10) as soon as 
possible. The full and effective enforcement 
of appropriate wholesale obligations on these 
markets is necessary to achieve CTU’s aim of 
remedying the lack of competition at the retail 
level. 
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1 – cost orientation 
2 – transparency and non - 
discrimination 
3 – cost accounting and 
accounting separation 
MT/2006/0392  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national Maltacom 
4 – measures to counter 
unreasonable bundling of 
prices 
No comments made by the Commission 
IT/2006/0407 
AGCOM defines markets for 
(i) local, (ii) national and (iii) 
fixed to mobile calls 
national Telecom  Italia  1 – non - discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Monitoring of the proportionality of retail 
regulation 
The Commission recalls that AGCOM 
imposed an asymmetric termination charge 
regulation in the related market of wholesale 
call termination following the designation of 
TI and 11 ANOs each as having SMP on their 
respective networks. The wholesale obligation 
entails  inter alia that TI will be charged 
maximum 1.54€ cent/minute for terminating a  
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2 - transparency 
3 – price control 
call on an ANOs network whereas the ANOs 
may not be charged more than 0.84€ 
cent/minute at single national commuters 
level. AGCOM intends to remove this 
asymmetry in termination charges by means 
of a 4-year glide path towards equivalent 
charges for both TI and the ANOs, but did not 
specify the detailed implementation of such 
glide path in its draft regulatory measure. In 
order to increase legal certainty for all parties 
involved, the Commission invited AGCOM to 
specify the 
glide path in its final measure and to develop a 
cost model as soon as possible for calculating 
ANO’s termination rates taking into account 
the necessity for ANOs to become efficient 
over time.11. 
The Commission notes that in the present 
retail calls market, AGCOM does not allow TI 
to differentiate its prices of local, national and 
fixed to mobile calls (residential and 
nonresidential), according to the termination 
network of the ANO.12 AGCOM maintains 
that the obligation of non-discrimination 
between generalised on-net and off-net rates is 
motivated by demands for transparency of the 
rates for the end-users and the need to avoid 
anticompetitive effects. AGCOM believes that 
TI’s dominant position in the relevant markets  
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4 – submission of other offers 
to the price test 
5 - Prohibition of unreasonable 
bundling of products and 
services 
may induce it to adopt discriminatory pricing 
strategies to the advantage of its own users 
with the dual objective of raising barriers so 
as to make market entry unprofitable for new 
entrants and of recovering market shares to 
the detriment of competitors present on the 
market. 
The Commission does not primarily object to 
retail price differentiation. However in this 
particular case it has to be noted that 95% of 
all traffic in Italy is terminated on TI’s 
network illustrating the still small size of 
ANOs. Therefore, the Commission agrees 
with AGCOM that it may be justified not to 
allow operators with a very high market share 
compared to their competitors, to price 
discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. 
At the same time, the Commission is of the 
view that operators should have the ability to 
recoup their higher regulated wholesale costs 
by setting the appropriate retail price, without 
having to have recourse to restrictive 
practices. The Commission notes that in the 
present case AGCOM stated in its draft 
regulatory measure that TI is able to recoup 
through appropriate retail prices the wholesale 
costs for terminating calls on the ANOs’ 
networks. In any event, considering the 
difference in termination rates between TI and  
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6 – cost accounting 
ANOs at wholesale level, which is expected to 
be reduced progressively over the next four 
years, the Commission invites AGCOM to 
monitor the proportionality of the retail 
regulation for local and national calls markets 
on the basis of the market’s evolution. 
 
1 – non discrimination 
2 - transparency 
3 – reporting obligation 
4 – cost accounting 
5 – accounting separation 
BE/2006/0435 
no distinction between local 
and national calls 
 
National  Belgacom 
6 – prohibition to charge 
excessive or predatory prices 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Review of the national calls markets 
The Commission takes note that the review 
period for the notified markets is set for 3 
years. 
Taking into account Belgacom's declining 
market shares in the national call markets, 
remedies proposed in the retail access markets 
(in particular wholesale line rental and carrier-
selection/carrier pre-selection) and in fixed 
wholesale markets, the Commission invites 
IBPT to review the competitive situation in 
the national call markets within a shorter 
timeframe. 
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1 – price control and cost 
accounting 
LT/2006/0425  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  TEO LT AB 
2 – accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission 
CS/CPS and WLR 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control 
CY/2006/0487 
No distinction between 
residential and non-residential 
customers 
National CYTA 
Prohibition of unreasonable 
bundling of products and 
services 
No comments made by the Commission 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
obligation to provide 
separately each component of a 
service package 
EL/2006/0503  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national OTE 
 
Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission  
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Price control 
 
an obligation not to impose 
excessively high prices; 
an obligation not to hinder 
market entry; 
 non  discrimination 
PL/2006/0528  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national TP  SA 
 an  obligation  to 
refrain from limiting 
competition by fixing prices 
below the costs of their 
provision; 
Inclusion in the final measures of the 
additional data and arguments provided to 
the Commission  
The Commission invites UKE to include the 
data and arguments that UKE provided to the 
Commission in the course of the second phase 
procedure in the final measures. UKE is 
invited to indicate in particular TP's market 
shares including calls via 0 708 numbers and 
via pre-paid calling cards in the relevant 
markets. 
 Monitoring of the market dynamics and the 
next review 
The information available suggests a certain 
dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in 
particular in the international calls markets. 
This is indicated inter alia by the increasing 
market shares of alternative providers and the 
availability of various methods of call placing  
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obligation not to force end 
customers to purchase 
unwanted services; 
an obligation of regulatory cost 
accounting and cost orientation 
based on FL-FDC; 
an obligation to present retail 
call tariffs and conditions of 
provision for UKE’s approval. 
(direct call, call selection and pre-selection, 
calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of VoIP 
services). In the short to medium term, it can 
be expected that wholesale line rental
40 
becomes operational and other wholesale 
regulation should become effective as well. In 
view thereof, UKE is invited to closely 
monitor the market trends and to undertake a 
new market analysis at the latest within one 
year following adoption of the final measures. 
Non discrimination 
 
Transparency 
 
Accounting separation 
 
LU/2006/0532  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national EPT 
Price control 
 
No comments made by the Commission  
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CS/CPS 
LV/2007/0567  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national 
Lattelecom 
 
Price control 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not 
clearly specified in its measures details of the 
imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the Commission 
would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its 
final measure the details of the price control 
remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, SPRK should impose 
on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it 
seems difficult for SPRK to exercise 
effectively any price control. Such an 
accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access 
Directive 
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Market 4: Publicly available international telephone services  
provided at a fixed location for residential customers 
              
Member State  Market definition similar to 
Recommendation  SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
        
Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / cost accounting  Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  NO SMP FOUND 
Finland YES  NO SMP FOUND 
France YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  NO SMP FOUND 
United Kingdom NO*  2 operators  NO  YES  YES  YES***  NO 
Netherlands NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
Belgium YES  NO SMP FOUND 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  
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Lithuania YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Italy YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Germany NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
Denmark NO*  1  operator  No remedies imposed 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Poland NO  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Greece NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
*Refinement,broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  /**At a prior notification the Commission issued a Veto on the Non-SMP-finding / *** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators/ 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007  
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Market 4: Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
UK/2003/0007, 
UK/2003/0008 
and 
UK/2003/0045 
Separation (i) a 
market with 
competitive input at 
wholesale level 
("category A") and 
(ii) many markets on 
a route-by-route 
basis with non-
competitive input at 
wholesale level 
("Category B"). 
Operator-assisted 
calls are not 
included (together 
Separate markets: 
Hull area and UK 
outside Hull 
Hull: Kingston; 
UK outside 
Hull: BT 
1 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other than the 
Commission and other NRAs: The Commission 
stresses the fact that any material modification to the 
notified draft measure will require the draft measure 
to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework 
Directive. 
 
Markets defined more narrowly than in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel 
defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly  
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2 - Transparency 
with national calls a 
separate market, see 
market 3). 
3 - BT only: price control implying 
price freeze (adjusted for inflation) 
than in the Recommendation. However, a broader 
market definition along the lines of the 
Recommendation on relevant markets is not likely to 
lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. 
Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the 
markets is not relevant in this specific context for the 
purposes of SMP assessment. 
 
Finding of SMP in the IDD calls markets: Oftel 
does not have sufficiently detailed market share 
information to calculate both residential and business 
market shares in each of the relevant IDD calls 
markets. However, the Commission considers the 
other, non market- share-related assumptions made 
regarding the finding of significant market power to 
be convincing. In any event, in this particular case, 
the Commission does not consider that any measure 
concerning these markets would affect trade between 
Member States.  
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4 - BT only: cost accounting 
FI/2003/0024  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP   No remedies imposed 
The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on: 
 
Lack of evidence to support the finding of the 
absence of SMP: Ficora has submitted neither 
sufficient facts nor sufficient reasoning to rebut the 
presumption of dominance in the presence of a 
market share in excess of 50%.Ficora failed to 
provide 1) any market data related to the exact degree 
of changes in market shares over the past years, 2) 
market data related to price levels and 3) market data 
related to other factors which are relevant to the 
assessment of market power. 
 
Lack of consideration of existing remedies: Ficora 
did not justify its conclusions in light of existing 
regulatory obligations, and did not consider what the 
outcome of the market analysis is likely to be in the 
absence of such obligations. Conversely, Ficora did  
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not consider how the justification for existing 
regulatory obligations, which are imposed on 
undertakings in the same or other closely related 
markets, and which may have a substantial 
competitive effect on markets for publicly available 
international telephone services provided at a fixed 
location, would be affected by the conclusions of its 
market analyses. 
FI/2005/0201  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP   No remedies imposed 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
 
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
PT/2004/0057 
and 
PT/2004/0091 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National PT  Group 
4 - Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
AT/2004/0125 
AT/2007/0582 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Public payphones 
and calling cards 
included. 
National 
No SMP: 
decreasing 
market share of 
the incumbent, 
low entry 
barriers 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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HU/2005/0133 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Public payphones 
and prepaid cards 
included. 
Regional 
5 regional 
operators: 
Matáv, Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, 
Emitel, Monor 
Telefon 
Társaság 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Consideration of additional retail remedies: In 
view of the continuing high market shares of the 
incumbents and their relatively high retail prices 
compared to EU best practices, the Commission 
invites NHH to consider whether the notified 
remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are sufficient 
to address the market failure in the four retail calls 
markets under review. 
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing 
the corresponding wholesale markets: The 
Commission reminds NHH that it should assess the 
effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale 
level in addressing market failures in the relevant 
retail markets. Should this review lead to a need to 
amend the retail remedies, particular attention should 
be paid to the possibility of a price or margin 
squeeze? 
SE/2005/0147  Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority. 
SE/2005/196 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Explicitly includes 
IP-Telephony. 
National 
No SMP found, 
due to 
regulation in the 
wholesale and 
retail access 
markets 
No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment  on:  
 
Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: 
PTS has included IP-telephony in the notified markets 
without supporting this conclusion by a 
substitutability analysis. When assessing whether IP-
telephony services are part of any of the markets for 
publicly available fixed telephony services, national  
EN  103    EN 
regulatory authorities must examine - taking national 
circumstances into account - the objective 
characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-
telephony services, as well as their demand-side and 
supply side substitution with other fixed telephony 
services. 
1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
IE/2005/0161 
Residential and non-
residential in one 
market, public cell 
phones excluded. 
National Eircom 
5 - Accounting separation  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg: on 
details of cost accounting and accounting separation: 
Possible further measures must be notified to the 
Commission.  
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6 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
Remedies only for PSTN calls, no 
remedies for VOIP calls 
1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling 
of access and call products 
2 - Prohibition of excessive or 
predatory pricing 
FR/2005/0224  VoiP calls offered 
by access providers 
("managed VoiP") 
are included, VOIP 
calls by non-access 
providers are not 
included. 
Metropolitan 
France and 
overseas 
territories except 
for the territory of 
Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon 
France Télécom 
3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-
vis the NRA 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the notified 
calls markets: The Commission recalls that, when 
assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of 
any of the markets for publicly available fixed 
telephony services, national regulatory authorities 
must examine - taking national circumstances into 
account - the objective characteristics, prices and 
intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as 
their demand-side and supply side substitution with 
other fixed telephony services. The Commission 
believes that, in the present case the inclusion of 
managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail 
calls markets is not inconsistent with the 
Recommendation. 
 
Remedies and next market review: The 
Commission considers that the decision not to extend 
PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The 
Commission notes the existing wholesale remedies on 
markets 11 and 12 as well as ARCEP’s commitment 
to monitor this part of the retail markets closely for 
any anti-competitive practices and considers that 
should such practices occur, ARCEP has the right and 
the obligation to intervene as appropriate. The 
Commission invites ARCEP to ensure full, effective  
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4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price control on fixed to mobile 
calls 
6 - Non-discrimination 
and appropriate enforcement of the obligations 
imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest 
possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit 
reviewing the present market analysis following such 
enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the 
proposed 2008 review. 
DK/2005/0269 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non residential 
customers 
National  TDC  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
The exclusion of IP-telephony from the relevant 
markets: The Commission 
considers that the justifications given by NITA for its 
decision to exclude IP telephony 
from the notified markets are insufficient. NITA 
states that IP-telephony currently does not have the 
same functionalities as PSTN and ISDN, without  
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describing these differences in functionality. When 
assessing whether or not IP telephony should be 
included in any of the retail markets for fixed 
telephony services, NRAs must examine – taking 
national circumstances into account – the objective 
characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-
telephony services, as well as their demand-side and 
supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony 
services. 
However, the possible inclusion of IP-telephony in 
the notified markets would seem to change neither 
NITA’s assessment of SMP, nor its decision not to 
impose any remedies in these markets. NITA 
considers that the remedies imposed on PSTN 
wholesale markets (call origination, call termination 
and transit) solve the identified competition problems 
in the retail markets. Including IP-telephony in the 
relevant 
retail markets would only further reduce barriers to 
market entry. Any provider of broadband connection 
can, in principle, provide IP-telephony as an 
alternative service to PSTN or ISDN telephony. The 
Commission services also note the existing wholesale 
remedies on markets 11 and 12 in Denmark, which 
can be expected to facilitate market entry for IP-
telephony operators. 
Monitoring of effects of wholesale regulation on 
the notified retail markets: 
Considering NITA’s intention not to impose any 
retail remedies despite the fact that TDC is deemed to 
have SMP in the two notified markets, it is imperative 
that NITA monitors market developments closely in 
order to verify whether the wholesale remedies 
imposed in markets 8 to 12 have the desired effect on  
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the notified retail markets. Should any anti-
competitive practices occur in these markets, NITA 
has the right and the obligation to intervene as 
appropriate. 
SI/2005/0298  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Telecom 
Slovenije 
Prohibition to restrict competition 
by setting predatory prices 
 
Prohibition to grant unjustified 
priority to certain end-customers, 
 
prohibition to implement the 
unjustified bundling of various 
services. 
 
 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant 
retail markets: The Commission recalls that in 
accordance with the Universal Service Directive10 
NRAs should intervene at retail level only if remedies 
imposed at the wholesale level, together with the 
obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier pre-
selection, do not render the relevant retail markets 
competitive. 
Therefore, the Commission would like to invite 
APEK to closely monitor the impact of the proposed 
wholesale obligations11, in particular the 
implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges 
and non-discrimination, on the relevant retail markets 
and to reassess the need to intervene at retail level 
accordingly when reviewing the notified markets. 
The exclusion of IP telephony from the relevant 
markets:  The Commission notes that APEK will 
monitor the development of IP-telephony and in its 
next market analysis (which according to national law 
is to be carried out within one year) assess whether 
IP-telephony, from a demand and supply-side 
perspective, should be included in any of the retail 
markets for fixed telephony services.  
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Taking into account the early stage of development of 
IP-telephony in Slovenia and the 
low level of broadband penetration, IP-telephony is 
not expected to have any significant impact on the 
market before APEK’s next market review. In this 
context, the Commission further notes that full and 
effective enforcement of the wholesale obligations, in 
particular those in market for LLU and market for 
wholesale bitstream access, could have an impact on 
the entry for IP-telephony operators, and therefore 
invites APEK to complete the review of the related 
market for wholesale broadband access, market 12 of 
the Recommendation, as soon as possible. 
 
NL/2005/0290  No SMP found  No comments made by the Commission 
DE/2005/0309 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non residential 
customers 
national  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Exclusion of fixed-to-mobile calls from the 
relevant markets 
BNetzA defines the calls markets more narrowly than 
foreseen in the Recommendation. 
In particular, BNetzA defines isolated markets for 
fixed-to-mobile calls. The Commission is not 
convinced that such a narrow market definition is 
justified. Since BNetzA indicates that it would 
analyse the fixed-to-mobile calls markets separately,  
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omitting a proper analysis of it in the context of the 
present notification might be acceptable. However, 
the Commission would propose to request BNetzA to 
analyse the 
separate markets for fixed-to-mobile calls and to 
propose remedies, if appropriate, within 
the shortest possible timeframe. Fixed-to-fixed calls 
and fixed-to-mobile calls are generally offered as a 
bundle, in particular by DTAG. Regulation of fixed-
to-fixed calls without regulation of fixed-to-mobile 
calls may therefore be only partly effective. 
VoIP 
When assessing IP-telephony services, national 
regulators should examine in the light of national 
circumstances objective product characteristics, 
prices and intended use of VoIP services, as well as 
their demand- and supply-side substitutability. 
Indicators such as broadband penetration rates, price 
elasticities, VoIP penetration, VoIP connection costs 
or the incumbent’s position should be taken into 
account when performing such analysis. 
The Commission takes the view that the technology 
for VoIP services is progressing 
dynamically and the large majority of those services 
will ultimately emerge as substitutes 
for traditional fixed telephony services. At present, 
unmanaged VoIP-services do 
however seem to have different product 
characteristics6, which may call for special  
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analytical diligence whenever they are proposed to be 
included in a market definition. 
Since the exclusion of unmanaged VoIP from the 
relevant markets in the present case would not have 
any impact on the SMP-finding, the issue might, 
however, be left open. 
Effective competition of international calls 
On the basis of the information provided, the 
Commission concurs with BNetzA’s finding of 
effective competition on the market for publicly 
available international telephone services. However, 
the competitive status of this market is dependent on 
the existence of mandated carrier selection/carrier 
pre-selection (“CS/CPS”) obligations. 
These obligations, which are currently imposed by 
BNetzA on DTAG on the basis of the previous legal 
framework, are to be imposed under the current 
regulatory framework on the basis of finding SMP in 
a closely related retail access market7. As BNetzA 
finds DTAG to have SMP in the retail access market 
it will maintain the obligations to provide CS/CPS. 
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1 - communication to CMT any 
changes to applicable prices and 
conditions of the relevant services 
at least 10 days before their 
effective date 
of application/launch date; 
 
ES/2005/0327  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TESAU 
2 – communication to CMT (within 
10 days, on request) of prices and 
conditions applicable to TESAU's 
personalised offers to  
customers whose overall billing 
with TESAU exceeds €600,000 per 
year. 
 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: 
The Commission considers that the 
justification given by CMT for its decision to exclude 
IP-telephony from the notified markets is insufficient 
insofar as CMT’s arguments are based on the fact that 
IP-telephony currently does not have the same 
functionalities as (and are thus not regulated like) 
publicly available telephone services (provided over 
PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP-
telephony should be included in any of the retail 
markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA should 
duly examine – taking account of national 
circumstances – the objective characteristics, prices 
and intended use of IP-telephony services, as well as 
their demand-side and supply-side substitution with 
other fixed telephony services.  
 
Price control  SK/2006/0344  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Slovak  Telecom 
Non discrimination 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
National public consultation: The Commission 
would like to remind TÚSR that according to Article 
6 of the Framework Directive, NRAs must conduct a 
national consultation on each draft measure taken in 
accordance with the Framework Directive or the 
Specific Directives which have a significant impact  
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Prohibition of unreasonable 
bundling of products and services 
on the relevant market, i.e. including the market 
definitions, and to give all interested parties the 
opportunity to comment on the draft measures 
 
Submission of all offers to 
AGCOM 
transparency  IT/2006/0398  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telecom  Italia 
Non discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission 
Price control and cost accounting 
LT/2006/0427  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  TEO LT AB 
Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission 
BE/2006/0436  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission 
CZ/2006/0444  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Cesky Telecom  Accounting separation  No comments made by the Commission 
CS/CPS and WLR 
Non-discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control 
CY/2006/0488 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non residential 
customers 
national CYTA 
Prohibition of unreasonable 
No comments made by the Commission  
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bundling of products and services 
EL/2006/0504 
(withdrawal of 
notification) 
EL/2007/0556 
(market re-
notified) 
No SMP found 
an obligation not to impose 
excessively high prices; 
an obligation not to hinder market 
entry; 
 non  discrimination 
  an obligation to refrain 
from limiting competition by fixing 
prices below the costs of their 
provision; 
PL/2006/0528  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national TP  SA 
obligation not to force end 
customers to purchase unwanted 
services; 
Inclusion in the final measures of the additional 
data and arguments provided to the Commission  
The Commission invites UKE to include the data and 
arguments that UKE provided to the Commission in 
the course of the second phase procedure in the final 
measures. UKE is invited to indicate in particular 
TP's market shares including calls via 0 708 numbers 
and via pre-paid calling cards in the relevant markets. 
 Monitoring of the market dynamics and the next 
review 
The information available suggests a certain dynamic 
in the Polish calls markets, in particular in the 
international calls markets. This is indicated inter alia 
by the increasing market shares of alternative 
providers and the availability of various methods of 
call placing (direct call, call selection and pre-
selection, calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of 
VoIP services). In the short to medium term, it can be 
expected that wholesale line rental
41 becomes 
operational and other wholesale regulation should 
become effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is  
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an obligation of regulatory cost 
accounting and cost orientation 
based on FL-FDC; 
an obligation to present retail call 
tariffs and conditions of provision 
for UKE’s approval. 
invited to closely monitor the market trends and to 
undertake a new market analysis at the latest within 
one year following adoption of the final measures. 
 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
LU/2007/0533  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National EPT 
Price control 
No comments made by the Commission 
LV/2007/0568  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national 
Lattelecom 
 
1 – CS/CPS 
Lack of details concerning price control obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in 
its final measure the details of  
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2 – price control 
the price control remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to effectively 
remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and national 
calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an 
obligation of accounting separation. Without such an 
obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise 
effectively any price control. Such 
an accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a 
cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the 
Access Directive 
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Market 5 : Publicly available local and/or national telephone services  
provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers 
              
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
        
Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / cost 
accounting  Accounting separation 
Austria YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  NO SMP FOUND 
Finland YES  43  operators**  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
France YES  1  operator  NO   YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  NO SMP FOUND 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  NO  YES  YES  YES***  NO 
Netherlands NO*  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Belgium YES  NO SMP FOUND  
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Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Italy YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Germany NO*  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES NO 
Denmark NO*  1  operator                                      No remedies imposed 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Greece YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxembourg YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
* On local calls. No SMP for national calls.            
** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators             
***second round of the review         
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Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
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Market 5: Publicly available local and/ or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for non - residential 
customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Non-discrimination 
2 - Transparency 
UK/2003/0007, 
UK/2003/0008 
Separation between 
local, national, calls 
to mobile phones 
and operator-
assisted calls. 
UK excluding 
Hull area and 
Hull area 
Hull: Kingston; 
UK excluding 
Hull: BT  
3 - BT only: price control implying price 
freeze (adjusted for inflation) 
 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other 
than the Commission and other NRAs: The 
Commission stresses the fact that any material 
modification to the notified draft measure will 
require the draft measure to be re-notified under 
Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
Markets defined more narrowly than in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel 
defined retail narrowband markets more 
narrowly than in the Recommendation on 
relevant markets. However, a broader market 
definition is not likely to lead to a different 
result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a 
conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is 
not relevant in this specific context for the  
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4 - BT only: cost accounting 
purposes of SMP assessment. 
UK/2004/0045 
(further 
amended by 
cases 
UK/2005/0217-
0218) 
See Case UK/2003/0007-0008 
Financial reporting obligations (in 
addition to the remedies imposed in Cases 
UK/2003/0007-0008). 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Publication of a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting systems: 
It is necessary for a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting system to 
be published annually, following verification by 
a qualified independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to be 
re-notified. 
FI/2003/0025  Local and national  National calls :  Local calls:  On local calls:  The Commission made comments on:  
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1 - Users' right to a connection to fixed 
telephone network 
and 
FI/2003/0026 
calls are included in 
separate markets. 
national market; 
local calls: 
regional markets 
SMP for 43 
regional 
operators. No 
SMP found 
for national 
calls. 
2 - Obligation to publish standard 
agreement terms and tariff information on 
services 
 
Relationship between existing regulation and 
finding of lack of SMP (national calls): The 
Commission invites Ficora to consider what the 
competitive conditions in the defined markets 
would be like in the absence of an obligation to 
provide CS, CPS or their equivalent. The 
Commission also prompts Ficora to make 
explicitly clear in their final measures whether 
its findings rely principally on the existing 
regulatory obligations (i.e. CS and CPS for all 
types of calls) imposed as a result of a finding of 
SMP in the retail access and local calls markets. 
 
Remedies at retail level (local calls): Ficora 
does not impose any further regulatory 
obligations on SMP undertakings at retail level, 
in addition to CS/CPS and other non-SMP 
obligations based on the Universal Service 
Directive. Therefore, the Commission has 
doubts as to whether the notified remedies over 
a given period are sufficient to remedy potential 
market failure at retail level and, in view of the 
continuing high market shares, recommends that 
Ficora also consider appropriate additional 
regulatory measures at the retail level.  
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3 - User's right to pre-selection / carrier 
pre-selection 
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation (geographic numbers 
only) and cost accounting 
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price affordability (geographic 
numbers only) 
PT/2004/0056, 
PT/2004/59 and 
PT/2004/0091 
Broadly similar to 
the 
Recommendation. 
Additionally, 
includes a market 
for non-geographic 
(service) numbers. 
This additional 
market includes 
both residential and 
non-residential 
customers.  
National PT  Group 
6 -Numbering plan (non-geographic 
service numbers only) 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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AT/2004/0126 
AT/2007/0583 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Telekom 
Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 - Price control / Cost orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Efficiency of wholesale regulation  
TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant 
changes in the competitive conditions in the 
retail calls markets since the first market review. 
This calls for the reassessment of the 
effectiveness of the current wholesale 
regulation. The Commission already commented 
upon this issue in the context of TKK's second 
market review of the fixed wholesale markets
42. 
With regard to the present notifications, the 
Commission services would like to invite TKK 
in particular to supervise closely the standard 
WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the 
upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK 
considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail 
access markets, could be lowered.  
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2- Accounting Separation  
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HU/2005/0134 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Public payphones 
and prepaid cards 
included. 
Regional 
5 regional 
operators: 
Matáv, 
Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, 
Emitel, 
Monor 
Telefon 
Társaság 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made   
comments  on: 
 
Consideration of additional retail remedies: 
In view of the continuing high market shares of 
the incumbents and their relatively high retail 
prices compared to EU best practices, the 
Commission invites NHH to consider whether 
the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over a given 
period are sufficient to address the market 
failure in the four retail calls markets under 
review. 
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to 
analysing the corresponding wholesale 
markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it 
should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be 
imposed at wholesale level in addressing market 
failures in the relevant retail markets. Should 
this review lead to a need to amend the retail 
remedies, particular attention should be paid to 
the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?  
SE/2005/0148  Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
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SE/2005/197 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
IP-Telephony 
explicitly included. 
National  No SMP  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in the 
notified markets without supporting this 
conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When 
assessing whether IP-telephony services are part 
of any of the markets for publicly available fixed 
telephony services, national regulatory 
authorities must examine - taking national 
circumstances into account - the objective 
characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-
telephony services, as well as their demand-side 
and supply side substitution with other fixed 
telephony services. 
1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
5 - Accounting separation  
IE/2005/0162 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non-residential 
markets. 
National Eircom 
6 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg: 
The Commission reminds ComReg that draft 
measures relating to the details and 
implementation of accounting separation and 
cost accounting obligations are required to be 
notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework 
Directive.  
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DK/2005/0208 
Similar to the 
Recommendation, 
VOIP excluded. 
National 
No SMP found: 
decreasing 
market share of 
the incumbent, 
falling prices, 
no significant 
entry barriers. 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
Remedies only for PSTN calls, no 
remedies for VOIP calls 
1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of 
access and call products 
FR/2005/0225   VoIP calls offered 
by broadband 
access providers 
("managed VOIP") 
included in the 
product market. 
Metropolitan 
France and 
overseas 
territories 
except for the 
territory of 
Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon 
France Télécom 
2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory 
pricing 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the 
notified calls markets: The Commission recalls 
that, when assessing whether IP-telephony 
services are part of any of the markets for 
publicly available fixed telephony services, 
national regulatory authorities must examine - 
taking national circumstances into account - the 
objective characteristics, prices and intended use 
of the IP-telephony services, as well as their 
demand-side and supply side substitution with 
other fixed telephony services. The Commission 
believes that, in the present case the inclusion of 
managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant 
retail calls markets is not inconsistent with the 
Recommendation. 
 
Remedies and next market review: The 
Commission considers that the decision not to  
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3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis 
the NRA 
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls 
extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The 
Commission notes the existing wholesale 
remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as 
ARCEP’s commitment to monitor this part of the 
retail markets closely for any anti-competitive 
practices and considers that should such practices 
occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to 
intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites 
ARCEP to ensure full, effective and appropriate 
enforcement of the obligations imposed in 
markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible 
timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing 
the present market analysis following such 
enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than 
the proposed 2008 review.  
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6 - Non-discrimination 
1 – prohibition to restrict competition by 
setting predatory prices 
SI/2005/0265  IP telephony 
excluded  National  Telecom 
Slovenije 
2 – price control and cost accounting 
obligation 
Impact of wholesale obligations on the 
relevant retail markets: The Commission 
would like to recall APEK that in accordance 
with the Universal Service Directive  NRAs 
should intervene at retail level only if remedies 
imposed at the wholesale level together with the 
obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier 
pre-selection do not  render the relevant retail 
markets competitive. The Commission notes that 
in 
Slovenia there are no alternative operators 
present on the relevant markets yet. It 
furthermore acknowledges that the current level 
of retail prices in relation to the relevant 
wholesale prices may risk leaving too low a 
margin between the retail and wholesale prices 
and that therefore the proposed retail price 
control appears to be justified. However, the 
Commission would like to invite APEK to 
closely monitor the impact of the proposed 
wholesale obligations, in particular the 
implementation of cost-oriented wholesale 
charges and non-discrimination obligation, on the 
relevant  
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retail markets and to reassess the need to 
intervene at retail level accordingly when 
reviewing the notified markets. 
 
1 – cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
NL/2005/0289 
NL/2005/0293 
NL/2005/0294 
NL/2005/0295 
NL/2005/0296 
Separate market for 
fixed to mobile 
calls, narrowband 
data services, calls 
to information 
numbers, calls to 
information 
assistant numbers. 
VoB included. 
 
National  KPN 
2 – price control 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Narrow market definition 
OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly 
than foreseen in the Recommendation. In 
particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for 
fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data services, 
calls to information numbers and calls to 
personal assistant numbers. The Commission is 
not convinced that such a narrow market 
definition is justified. However, in these 
particular cases, as it does not have any impact 
on the finding of SMP, nor on the remedies 
imposed, the exact market definition can be left 
open. 
Inclusion of VoB – appropriateness of  
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3 – non discrimination 
4 - transparency 
remedies 
The Commission believes that in the present case 
and in the light of the market characteristics of 
the access and voice calls market in the 
Netherlands, the inclusion of managed VoB- 
telephone in the relevant retail access and calls 
markets is not inconsistent with the 
Recommendation. The regulation of VoB should 
not prevent the SMP operator from switching to a 
new, more cost-efficient, technology. In this 
context, the Commission notes the flexible 
regulatory approach proposed by OPTA, which 
is introduced via the price floor taking into 
account the different cost structure of the 
products based on VoB. 
 
DE/2005/0310 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non-residential 
customers. 
Exclusion of F/M 
calls. 
national DTAG 
an obligation to notify new tariffs to 
BNetzA two months in advance of 
commercialisation to allow BNetzA to 
supervise the ex post price control 
obligation. 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission also considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, BNetzA should impose on 
DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. 
Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for 
BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. 
Such an accounting separation obligation seems 
also necessary to implement effectively a cost-
orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive.  
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1 - TESAU must communicate to CMT 
any changes to applicable prices and 
conditions of the relevant services at 
least 10 days before their effective date 
of application/launch date; 
 
ES/2005/0328  IP telephony 
excluded  National  TESAU 
2 - TESAU must make available to CMT 
(within 10 days, on request) prices and 
conditions applicable to personalised 
offers offered by TESAU to those 
customers whose overall billing with 
TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets:  The Commission considers that the 
justification given by CMT for its decision to 
exclude IP-telephony from the notified 
markets is insufficient insofar as CMT’s 
arguments are based on the fact that IP-telephony 
currently does not have the same functionalities 
as (and are thus not regulated like) publicly 
available telephone services (provided over 
PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or 
not IP-telephony should be included in any of the 
retail markets for fixed telephony services, the 
NRA should duly examine – taking account of 
national circumstances – the objective 
characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-
telephony services, as well as their demand-side 
and supply-side substitution with other fixed 
telephony services.  
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1 - Price control 
2 – non discrimination 
SK/2006/0349  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Slovak  Telekom 
3 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling 
of products and services 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
National public consultation: The Commission 
would like to remind TÚSR that 
according to Article 6 of the Framework 
Directive, NRAs must conduct a national 
consultation on each draft measure taken in 
accordance with the Framework Directive or the 
Specific Directives which have a significant 
impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the 
market definitions, and to give all interested 
parties the opportunity to comment on the draft 
measures. 
 
1 – cost orientation 
2 – transparency and non - 
discrimination 
3 – cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
MT/2006/0397  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Maltacom 
4 – measures to counter unreasonable 
bundling of prices 
No comments made by the Commission  
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1 – non discrimination 
2 - transparency 
BE/2006/0437 
no distinction 
between local and 
national calls 
 
National  Belgacom 
3 – reporting obligation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Review of the national calls markets 
The Commission takes note that the review 
period for the notified markets is set for 3 years. 
Taking into account Belgacom's declining market 
shares in the national call markets, remedies 
proposed in the retail access markets (in 
particular wholesale line rental and carrier-
selection/carrier pre-selection) and in fixed 
wholesale markets, the Commission invites IBPT 
to review the competitive situation in the national 
call markets within a shorter timeframe. 
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4 – cost accounting 
5 – accounting separation 
6 – prohibition to charge excessive or 
predatory prices 
LT/2006/0426  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  TEO LT AB  1 – price control and cost accounting  No comments made by the Commission  
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2 – accounting separation 
CZ/2006/0445  VoIP excluded  national  Cesky Telecom  Accounting separation  No comments made by the Commission 
CY/2006/0489 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non-residential 
National CYTA  CS/CPS and WLR  No comments made by the Commission  
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Non discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control 
customers 
Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of 
products and services  
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1 – non - discrimination  IT/2006/0408 
AGCOM defines 
markets for (i) local, 
(ii) national and (iii) 
fixed to mobile calls 
national Telecom  Italia 
2 - transparency 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Monitoring of the proportionality of retail 
regulation 
The Commission recalls that AGCOM imposed 
an asymmetric termination charge regulation in 
the related market of wholesale call termination 
following the designation of TI and 11 ANOs 
each as having SMP on their respective 
networks. The wholesale obligation entails inter 
alia  that TI will be charged maximum 1.54€ 
cent/minute for terminating a call on an ANOs 
network whereas the ANOs may not be charged 
more than 0.84€ cent/minute at single national 
commuters level. AGCOM intends to remove 
this asymmetry in termination charges by means 
of a 4-year glide path towards equivalent charges 
for both TI and the ANOs, but did not specify the 
detailed 
implementation of such glide path in its draft 
regulatory measure. In order to increase 
legal certainty for all parties involved, the  
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3 – price control 
Commission invited AGCOM to specify the 
glide path in its final measure and to develop a 
cost model as soon as possible for 
calculating ANO’s termination rates taking into 
account the necessity for ANOs to 
become efficient over time. 
The Commission notes that in the present retail 
calls market, AGCOM does not allow TI to 
differentiate its prices of local, national and fixed 
to mobile calls (residential and non residential), 
according to the termination network of the 
ANO. AGCOM maintains that the obligation of 
non-discrimination between generalised on-net 
and off-net rates is motivated by demands for 
transparency of the rates for the end-users and  
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4 – submission of other offers to the 
price test 
5 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling 
of products and services 
the need to avoid anticompetitive effects. 
AGCOM believes that TI’s dominant position in 
the 
relevant markets may induce it to adopt 
discriminatory pricing strategies to the advantage 
of its own users with the dual objective of raising 
barriers so as to make market entry unprofitable 
for new entrants and of recovering market shares 
to the detriment of competitors present on the 
market. 
The Commission does not primarily object to 
retail price differentiation. However in this 
particular case it has to be noted that 95% of all 
traffic in Italy is terminated on TI’s 
network illustrating the still small size of ANOs. 
Therefore, the Commission agrees with AGCOM 
that it may be justified not to allow operators 
with a very high market share compared to their 
competitors, to price discriminate between on-net 
and off-net calls. At the same time, the 
Commission is of the view that operators should 
have the ability to recoup their higher regulated 
wholesale costs by setting the appropriate retail 
price, without having to have recourse to 
restrictive practices. The Commission notes that 
in the present case AGCOM stated in its draft 
regulatory measure that TI is able to recoup 
through appropriate retail prices the wholesale 
costs for terminating calls on the ANOs’  
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6 – cost accounting 
networks. In any event, considering the 
difference in termination rates between TI and 
ANOs at wholesale level, which is expected to be 
reduced progressively over the next four years, 
the Commission invites AGCOM to monitor the 
proportionality of the retail regulation for local 
and national calls markets on the basis of the 
market’s evolution. 
 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
obligation to provide separately each 
component of a service package 
Accounting separation 
EL/2006/0505  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national OTE 
Price control 
No comments made by the Commission 
an obligation not to impose excessively 
high prices; 
an obligation not to hinder market entry; 
PL/2006/0530  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national TP  SA 
 non  discrimination 
Inclusion in the final measures of the 
additional data and arguments provided to 
the Commission  
The Commission invites UKE to include the data 
and arguments that UKE provided to the 
Commission in the course of the second phase 
procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited 
to indicate in particular TP's market shares 
including calls via 0 708 numbers and via pre-
paid calling cards in the relevant markets. 
 Monitoring of the market dynamics and the 
next review  
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  an obligation to refrain from 
limiting competition by fixing prices 
below the costs of their provision; 
obligation not to force end customers to 
purchase unwanted services; 
an obligation of regulatory cost 
accounting and cost orientation based on 
FL-FDC; 
an obligation to present retail call tariffs 
and conditions of provision for UKE’s 
approval. 
The information available suggests a certain 
dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular 
in the international calls markets. This is 
indicated inter alia by the increasing market 
shares of alternative providers and the 
availability of various methods of call placing 
(direct call, call selection and pre-selection, calls 
via 0 708 numbers, emergence of VoIP services). 
In the short to medium term, it can be expected 
that wholesale line rental
43 becomes operational 
and other wholesale regulation should become 
effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is invited 
to closely monitor the market trends and to 
undertake a new market analysis at the latest 
within one year following adoption of the final 
measures. 
 
Non discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
LU/2006/0534  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national EPT 
Price control 
No comments made by the Commission  
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1 – CS/CPS 
LV/2007/0569  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national 
Lattelecom 
 
2 – price control 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify 
in its final measure the details of 
the price control remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, SPRK should impose on 
Lattelecom an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it seems 
difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any 
price control. Such 
an accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a 
cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services 
as required by Article 19(3) of the 
Access Directive 
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1 – CS/CPS 
LV/2007/0569  Similar to the 
Recommendation  national 
Lattelecom 
 
2 – price control 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify 
in its final measure the details of 
the price control remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, SPRK should impose on 
Lattelecom an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it seems 
difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any 
price control. Such 
an accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a 
cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services 
as required by Article 19(3) of the 
Access Directive 
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Market 6: Publicly available international telephone services  
provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers 
              
Member State  Market definition similar 
to Recommendation  SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / 
cost accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria*** YES 1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  NO SMP FOUND 
Finland YES  NO SMP FOUND** 
France YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  NO SMP FOUND 
United Kingdom  NO*  1 operator  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Netherlands NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
Belgium NO*  NO SMP FOUND  
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Czech Republic  YES  NO SMP FOUND 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Italy YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Germany NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
Denmark NO*  NO SMP FOUND 
Cyprus NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Greece                                              NO SMP FOUND 
Poland YES  1  operator  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Luxembourg YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
  
*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
** At a prior notification the Commission issued a Veto on the Non-SMP-finding  
***second market review  
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Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
EN  148    EN 
Market 6: Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for non-residential 
customers 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
UK/2003/0007 
and 
UK/2003/0008 
Separation (i) a 
market with 
competitive input at 
wholesale level 
("category A") and 
(ii) many markets 
on a route-by-route 
basis with non-
competitive input at 
wholesale level 
("Category B"). 
Operator-assisted 
calls are not 
included (together 
with national calls a 
separate market, see 
market 3). 
Separate 
markets: Hull 
area and UK 
outside Hull 
Hull area: 
Kingston; UK 
outside Hull: 
No SMP 
removal of 
existing 
obligations on 
BT 
1 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other than 
the Commission and other NRAs: The 
Commission stresses the fact that any material 
modification to the notified draft measure will 
require the draft measure to be re-notified under 
Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
Markets defined more narrowly than in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel 
defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly 
than in the Recommendation. However, a broader 
market definition along the lines of the 
Recommendation on relevant markets is not likely 
to lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. 
Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of 
the markets is not relevant in this specific context 
for the purposes of SMP assessment. 
 
Finding of SMP in the IDD calls markets: Oftel 
does not have sufficiently detailed market share 
information to calculate both residential and 
business market shares in each of the relevant 
IDD calls markets. However, the Commission  
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2 - Transparency 
considers the other, non market- share-related 
assumptions made regarding the finding of 
significant market power to be convincing. In any 
event, in this particular case, the Commission 
does not consider that any measure concerning 
these markets would affect trade between Member 
States.  
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FI/2003/0027  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission vetoed the draft measure based 
on: 
 
Lack of evidence to support the finding of the 
absence of SMP: Ficora has submitted neither 
sufficient facts nor sufficient reasoning to rebut 
the presumption of dominance in the presence of a 
market share in excess of 50%.Ficora failed to 
provide 1) any market data related to the exact 
degree of changes in market shares over the past 
years, 2) market data related to price levels and 3) 
market data related to other factors which are 
relevant to the assessment of market power. 
Lack of consideration of existing remedies: 
Ficora did not justify its conclusions in light of 
existing regulatory obligations, and did not 
consider what the outcome of the market analysis 
is likely to be in the absence of such obligations. 
Conversely, Ficora did not consider how the 
justification for existing regulatory obligations, 
which are imposed on undertakings in the same or 
other closely related markets, and which may 
have a substantial competitive effect on markets 
for publicly available international telephone 
services provided at a fixed location, would be 
affected by the conclusions of its market analyses.  
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FI/2005/0202  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
PT/2004/0058 
and 
PT/2004/0091 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National PT  Group 
4 - Accounting separation  
No comments made by the Commission. 
AT/2005/0124 
AT/2007/0584 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
All types of calls 
included 
National TA  1 - Cost orientation, ex-ante approval of 
tariffs 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
Efficiency of wholesale regulation  
TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant 
changes in the competitive conditions in the retail 
calls markets since the first market review. This 
calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of 
the current wholesale regulation. The Commission 
already commented upon this issue in the context 
of TKK's second market review of the fixed 
wholesale markets. With regard to the present  
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2 - Accounting separation 
notifications, the Commission services would like 
to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely 
the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess 
whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that 
TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the 
retail access markets, could be lowered. 
HU/2005/0135 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Public payphones 
and prepaid cards 
included. 
Regional 
5 regional 
operators: 
Matáv, Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, 
Emitel, Monor 
Telefon 
Társaság 
1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Consideration of additional retail remedies: In 
view of the continuing high market shares of the 
incumbents and their relatively high retail prices 
compared to EU best practices, the Commission 
invites NHH to consider whether the notified 
remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are 
sufficient to address the market failure in the four 
retail calls markets under review. 
 
Remedies imposed at retail level prior to 
analysing the corresponding wholesale 
markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it 
should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be 
imposed at wholesale level in addressing market 
failures in the relevant retail markets. Should this 
review lead to a need to amend the retail 
remedies, particular attention should be paid to 
the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?  
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SE/2005/0146  Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority. 
SE/2005/0198 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Explicitly includes 
IP-Telephony. 
National 
No SMP 
found, due to 
regulation in 
the wholesale 
and retail 
access 
markets. 
No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment  on:  
 
Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets:  PTS has included IP-telephony in the 
notified markets without supporting this 
conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When 
assessing whether IP-telephony services are part 
of any of the markets for publicly available fixed 
telephony services, national regulatory authorities 
must examine - taking national circumstances into 
account - the objective characteristics, prices and 
intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well 
as their demand-side and supply side substitution 
with other fixed telephony services. 
1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) 
Selection 
2 - Access obligation 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency 
IE/2005/0163 
Residential and 
non-residential in 
one market 
National Eircom 
5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg: 
The Commission reminds ComReg that draft 
measures relating to the details and 
implementation of accounting separation and cost 
accounting obligations are required to be notified 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
DK /2005/0194  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National 
No SMP 
found: 
decreasing 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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VOIP excluded.  market share 
of the 
incumbent, 
falling prices, 
no significant 
entry barriers. 
Remedies only for PSTN calls, no 
remedies for VOIP calls 
1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of 
access and call products 
2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory 
pricing 
FR/2005/0226   VoIP calls offered 
by access providers 
("managed VOIP") 
are included, VOIP 
calls by non-access 
providers are not 
included into the 
market. 
Metropolitan 
France and 
overseas 
territories except 
for the territory 
of Saint-Pierre-
et-Miquelon 
France 
Télécom 
3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis 
the NRA 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the 
notified calls markets: The Commission recalls 
that, when assessing whether IP-telephony 
services are part of any of the markets for publicly 
available fixed telephony services, national 
regulatory authorities must examine - taking 
national circumstances into account - the 
objective characteristics, prices and intended use 
of the IP-telephony services, as well as their 
demand-side and supply side substitution with 
other fixed telephony services. The Commission 
believes that, in the present case the inclusion of 
managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail 
calls markets is not inconsistent with the 
Recommendation. 
 
Remedies and next market review: The 
Commission considers that the decision not to 
extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The 
Commission notes the existing wholesale 
remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as 
ARCEP’s commitment to monitor this part of the 
retail markets closely for any anti-competitive 
practices and considers that should such practices 
occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to  
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4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls 
6 - Non-discrimination 
intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites 
ARCEP to ensure full, effective and appropriate 
enforcement of the obligations imposed in 
markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible 
timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing 
the present market analysis following such 
enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than 
the proposed 2008 review. 
NL/2005/0292  No SMP found  No comments made by the Commission  
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Prohibition to restrict competition by 
setting predatory prices 
SI/2005/0299  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  Telecom 
Slovenije 
prohibition to grant unjustified priority 
to certain end-customers, 
 
Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant 
retail markets: The Commission recalls that in 
accordance with the Universal Service 
Directive10 NRAs should 
intervene at retail level only if remedies imposed 
at the wholesale level, together with 
the obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier 
pre-selection, do not render the relevant retail 
markets competitive. 
Therefore, the Commission would like to invite 
APEK to closely monitor the impact of 
the proposed wholesale obligations11, in 
particular the implementation of cost-oriented 
wholesale charges and non-discrimination, on the 
relevant retail markets and to reassess the need to 
intervene at retail level accordingly when 
reviewing the notified markets. 
The exclusion of IP telephony from the 
relevant markets: The Commission notes that 
APEK will monitor the development of IP-
telephony and in its next market analysis (which 
according to national law is to be carried out 
within one year) assess whether IP-telephony,  
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prohibition to implement the unjustified 
bundling of various services. 
 
from a demand and supply-side perspective, 
should be included in any of the retail markets for 
fixed telephony services. 
Taking into account the early stage of 
development of IP-telephony in Slovenia and the 
low level of broadband penetration, IP-telephony 
is not expected to have any significant impact on 
the market before APEK’s next market review. In 
this context, the Commission further notes that 
full and effective enforcement of the wholesale 
obligations, in particular those in market for LLU 
and market for wholesale bitstream access, could 
have an impact on the entry for IP-telephony 
operators, and therefore invites APEK to 
complete the review of the related market for 
wholesale broadband access, market 12 of the 
Recommendation, as soon as possible. 
 
DE/2005/0311 
No distinction 
between residential 
and non residential 
customers 
national  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Exclusion of fixed-to-mobile calls from the 
relevant markets 
BNetzA defines the calls markets more narrowly 
than foreseen in the Recommendation. 
In particular, BNetzA defines isolated markets for 
fixed-to-mobile calls. The Commission is not 
convinced that such a narrow market definition is 
justified. Since BNetzA indicates that it would 
analyse the fixed-to-mobile calls markets 
separately, omitting a proper analysis of it in the 
context of the present notification might be 
acceptable. However, the Commission would 
propose to request BNetzA to analyse the  
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separate markets for fixed-to-mobile calls and to 
propose remedies, if appropriate, within the 
shortest possible timeframe. Fixed-to-fixed calls 
and fixed-to-mobile calls are generally offered as 
a bundle, in particular by DTAG. Regulation of 
fixed-to-fixed calls without regulation of fixed-to-
mobile calls may therefore be only partly 
effective. 
VoIP 
When assessing IP-telephony services, national 
regulators should examine in the light of national 
circumstances objective product characteristics, 
prices and intended use of VoIP services, as well 
as their demand- and supply-side substitutability. 
Indicators such as broadband penetration rates, 
price elasticities, VoIP penetration, VoIP 
connection costs or the incumbent’s position 
should be taken into account when performing 
such analysis. 
The Commission takes the view that the 
technology for VoIP services is progressing 
dynamically and the large majority of those 
services will ultimately emerge as substitutes 
for traditional fixed telephony services. At 
present, unmanaged VoIP-services do 
however seem to have different product 
characteristics6, which may call for special 
analytical diligence whenever they are proposed 
to be included in a market definition.  
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Since the exclusion of unmanaged VoIP from the 
relevant markets in the present case would not 
have any impact on the SMP-finding, the issue 
might, however, be left open. 
Effective competition of international calls 
On the basis of the information provided, the 
Commission concurs with BNetzA’s 
finding of effective competition on the market for 
publicly available international 
telephone services. However, the competitive 
status of this market is dependent on the 
existence of mandated carrier selection/carrier 
pre-selection (“CS/CPS”) obligations. 
These obligations, which are currently imposed 
by BNetzA on DTAG on the basis of the previous 
legal framework, are to be imposed under the 
current regulatory framework on the basis of 
finding SMP in a closely related retail access 
market7. As BNetzA finds DTAG to have SMP in 
the retail access market it will maintain the 
obligations to provide CS/CPS. 
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1 - TESAU must communicate to CMT 
any changes to applicable prices and 
conditions of the relevant services at 
least 10 days before their effective date 
of application/launch date; 
 
ES/2005/0329  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TESAU  2 - TESAU must make available to 
CMT (within 10 days, on request) prices 
and 
conditions applicable to personalised 
offers offered by TESAU to those 
customers whose overall billing with 
TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 
 
Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified 
markets: The Commission considers that the 
justification given by CMT for its decision to 
exclude IP-telephony from the notified 
markets is insufficient insofar as CMT’s 
arguments are based on the fact that IP-telephony 
currently does not have the same functionalities as 
(and are thus not regulated like) publicly available 
telephone services (provided over PSTN and 
ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP-
telephony should be included in any of the retail 
markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA 
should duly examine – taking account of national 
circumstances – the objective characteristics, 
prices and intended use of IP-telephony services, 
as well as their demand-side and supply-side 
substitution with other fixed telephony services.  
 
Price control 
Non discrimination 
SK/2006/0345  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  Slovak 
Telecom 
Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of 
products and services 
National public consultation: The Commission 
would like to remind TÚSR that 
according to Article 6 of the Framework 
Directive, NRAs must conduct a national 
consultation on each draft measure taken in 
accordance with the Framework 
Directive or the Specific Directives which have a 
significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. 
including the market definitions, and to give all 
interested parties the  
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opportunity to comment on the draft measures 
 
Submission of all offers to AGCOM 
transparency  IT/2006/0399  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telecom  Italia 
Non discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission 
Price control and cost accounting 
LT/2006/0428  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  TEO LT AB 
Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission 
BE/2006/0438  No SMP found  No comments made by the Commission 
CZ/2006/0446  No SMP found  No comments made by the Commission 
CY/2006/0490  No distinction 
between residential 
national CYTA  CS/CPS and WLR  No comments made by the Commission  
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Non-discrimination 
transparency 
Accounting separation 
Price control 
and non residential 
customers 
Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of 
products and services 
EL/2006/0504 
(notification 
withdrawn) 
EL/2007/0556 
(re-notified 
market 
analysis) 
No SMP found  No comments made by the Commission  
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an obligation not to impose excessively 
high prices; 
an obligation not to hinder market entry; 
 non  discrimination 
  an obligation to refrain from 
limiting competition by fixing prices 
below the costs of their provision; 
obligation not to force end customers to 
purchase unwanted services; 
an obligation of regulatory cost 
accounting and cost orientation based on 
FL-FDC; 
PL/2007/0531  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TP  SA 
an obligation to present retail call tariffs 
and conditions of provision for UKE’s 
approval. 
Inclusion in the final measures of the 
additional data and arguments provided to the 
Commission  
The Commission invites UKE to include the data 
and arguments that UKE provided to the 
Commission in the course of the second phase 
procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited to 
indicate in particular TP's market shares including 
calls via 0 708 numbers and via pre-paid calling 
cards in the relevant markets. 
 Monitoring of the market dynamics and the 
next review 
The information available suggests a certain 
dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular 
in the international calls markets. This is indicated 
inter alia by the increasing market shares of 
alternative providers and the availability of 
various methods of call placing (direct call, call 
selection and pre-selection, calls via 0 708 
numbers, emergence of VoIP services). In the 
short to medium term, it can be expected that 
wholesale line rental
44 becomes operational and 
other wholesale regulation should become 
effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is invited 
to closely monitor the market trends and to 
undertake a new market analysis at the latest 
within one year following adoption of the final 
measures. 
Non discrimination  LU/2007/0535  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
National EPT 
transparency 
No comments made by the Commission  
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Accounting separation 
Price control 
CS/CPS 
LV/2007/0570  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Lattelekom 
Price control 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation 
The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly 
specified in its measures details of 
the imposed price control obligation. In order to 
enhance legal certainty, the 
Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify 
in its final measure the details of 
the price control remedy imposed. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
The Commission considers that in order to 
effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the retail access and local and 
national calls markets, SPRK should impose on 
Lattelecom an obligation of accounting 
separation. Without such an obligation, it seems 
difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any 
price control. Such 
an accounting separation obligation seems also 
necessary to implement effectively a 
cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as 
required by Article 19(3) of the  
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Access Directive 
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Market 7: Minimum set of leased lines  
              
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Supply of 
minimum set 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / cost 
accounting  Accounting separation 
Austria NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Finland YES  42  operators  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Hungary YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Sweden YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  NO 
The Netherlands   NO*  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Spain YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
EN  167    EN 
Italy YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Malta NO*  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
France NO*  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  YES NO  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Germany YES  1  operator  NOT YET NOTIFIED 
Cyprus YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece YES  1  operator  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Austria YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Luxemburg YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES NO  YES  YES NO 
                       
* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators              
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Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
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Market 7: The minimum set of leased lines 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community 
Consultation 
1- Supply minimum set of leased 
lines (BT & Kingston) 
2 - Not to discriminate unduly (BT & 
Kingston) 
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting (only on BT) 
4 - Publish reference offer (BT & 
Kingston) 
UK/2003/0035-
0036, 
UK/2004/0123 
(modification of 
remedies) 
Retail low 
bandwidth 
traditional 
interface leased 
lines (up to & 
incl. 8 Mbps). 
UK excluding 
Hull area and 
Hull area 
BT (UK excluding 
Hull), Kingston (Hull) 
5- Publish information on delivery 
and repair times (BT & Kingston) 
No comments made by the Commission.   
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UK/2004/0045 
(further 
amended in 
UK/2005/0217-
0218) 
See Cases UK/2003/0035-0036.  1 - Financial reporting obligations  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Publication of a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting 
systems:  It is necessary for a statement 
concerning compliance with the cost 
accounting system to be published annually, 
following verification by a qualified 
independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel 
with Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by 
interested parties in the framework of the 
national consultation will require the draft 
measure to be re-notified. 
UK/2004/0077  See Case UK/2003/0035. 
1 - Amendments to the interim 
charge control obligation imposed on 
BT 
No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2004/0123   See Case UK/2003/0035. 
Slight modification of the remedies 
already notified because of the 
establishment of the 
Telecommunications Adjudicator. 
No comments made by the Commission. 
SE/2004/0048  Similar to the  National TeliaSonera 
1- Obligation to provide the 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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minimum set of leased lines 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Cost orientation 
4 - Accounting separation 
Recommendation. 
5 -Requirement to publish a 
reference offer, delivery conditions 
and technical information 
FI/2004/0079  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional  42 local operators   1 - Obligation to provide the 
minimum set  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Regulatory obligations reminding Ficora 
of the obligations set out in Annex VII of 
the Universal Service Directive requiring 
NRAs to ensure that the provision of the 
minimum set of leased lines referred to in 
Article 18 follows the basic principles of 
non-discrimination, cost orientation and 
transparency and asking Ficora to adapt its 
proposed remedies accordingly. 
Minimum set of leased lines: 
1 - Provision of a minimum set of 
leased lines 
AT/2004/0097  Minimum set of retail 
leased lines + 
(i) all leased lines with a 
capacity of a multiple of 
64 kbit/s up to an upper 
limit of 2048 bit/s; and  
National Telekom  Austria 
2 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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 3 - Non discrimination 
4 - Publication of information with 
regard to the minimum set 
5 - Accounting separation  
Other leased lines: 
1 - Cost orientation 
(ii) unconnected copper 
double wire between 
network termination 
points, which have been 
leased by communications 
network and service 
operators 
2 - Approval of terms and conditions 
1 - Non discrimination 
2 - Cost orientation (pricing model 
based on fully distributed historic 
costs) 
3 - Transparency 
IE/2005/0137  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National   Eircom 
4 - Cost accounting and 
accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
Further consultation planned by 
ComReg: the draft measures relating to the 
details and implementation of accounting 
separation and cost accounting obligations 
are required to be notified under Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
1 - Non discrimination  PT/2005/0155 
Minimum set of retail 
leased lines + 
services supported by 
symmetric xDSL 
technologies with 
National PT  Group 
2 - Transparency 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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capacity ≤ 2 Mbps  3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
HU/2005/0167  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Matáv 
1- Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines based on non-
discrimination and transparency 
principles 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Non discrimination 
2 - Transparency 
DK/2005/0177  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National TDC 
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting (based on modified 
historic cost method) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
NL/2005/0279 
Six relevant retail national 
product markets:  
(i) analogue leased lines; 
(ii) <2Mbit/s digital   
National 
KPN on the national 
analogue leased lines; 
national leased lines 
Market for national analogue leased 
lines: 
 - price regulation.  
The Commission made a comment on: 
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leased lines; 
(ii) 2Mbit/s digital leased 
lines; 
(iv) >2Mbit/s digital 
leased lines; 
(v) data communication 
services over copper; 
(vi) data communication 
services over fibre. 
 
Market for national leased lines 
<2Mbit/s 
Minimum package obligations: 
- obligation to deliver; 
- price regulation; 
- transparency; 
Non minimum package obligations:  
- non-discrimination;  
- unbundling; 
- transparency;  
- price regulation. 
Market for international analogue 
leased lines: 
obligation to supply; 
non discrimination; 
transparency. 
 
Five international 
analogue leased lines 
markets: 
(i) international analogue 
leased lines market 
(ii) international <2Mbit/s 
digital leased lines; 
(iii) international 2Mbit/s 
digital leased lines, 
(iv) international 
>2Mbit/s digital leased 
lines, 
(v) international data 
communication services. 
 
<2Mbit/s 
 and international 
analogue leased lines 
 
Market for international analogue 
leased lines: 
- obligation to supply; 
- no discrimination; 
- transparency. 
 
Market analysis methodology: Without 
contesting OPTA conclusions as to the 
identification of retail markets which are 
not part of market 7 as defined in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets, i.e. a 
market for international analogue leased 
lines, the Commission invited OPTA to 
justify in its final measure why it considers 
the market for international analogue leased 
lines susceptible to ex ante regulation taking 
utmost account of the three criteria test.  
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IT/2005/0315 
 
 
Notification withdrawn by the NRA (re-notified under case number IT/2006/0371) 
 
 
1 - Provision of a minimum set of 
leased lines 
2 – Price cap  
3 - Cost accounting and accounting  
separation 
4 – Non discrimination 
ES/2006/0352  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Telefónica de España, 
S.A.U and Telefónica 
Servicios Audiovisuales, 
S.A.U (jointly “TESAU 
Group”)  5 - Prohibition of anticompetitive 
behaviour such as price squeeze or 
predatory pricing, abusive bundling 
(e.g. abusive bundle prices, non-
replicability of wholesale elements), 
and abusive contractual clauses (e.g. 
loyalty agreements and exclusivity 
agreements). 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
IT/2006/0371  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Telecom  Italia 
1 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines on a transparent, non-
discriminatory and cost-oriented 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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basis 
2 – Price control 
1 - Non discrimination 
2 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
3 - Transparency 
MT/2006/0373 
Minimum set of retail 
leased lines including both 
(i) retail national leased 
lines and (ii) retail 
international leased lines 
National   Maltacom  
4 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
The inclusion of international lines in the 
wholesale and retail market definitions: 
By including international lines in the retail 
markets for the provision of leased lines 
and wholesale trunk segments of leased 
lines respectively, the MCA deviates from 
the Recommendation. In its notification, the 
MCA did not conduct the three criteria test 
considering this unnecessary as in its view 
the two markets as defined in the 
Recommendation include international 
leased lines. Without contesting the MCA’s 
conclusions, the Commission invited the 
MCA to clarify in its final measure (i) that 
two new markets have been defined by 
including international lines, thereby 
deviating from the Recommendation, (ii) 
that the three criteria test has been carried 
out for these markets and (iii) that the 
cumulative criteria of this test are fulfilled.  
Remedies imposed in the market of the 
international segments of leased lines  
MCA considered that prices would 
inevitably rise if not regulated. Accordingly 
it proposed to maintain the current price  
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regulation on the retail market of the 
international leased lines (cost-oriented 
prices approved by the MCA). The 
Commission invited the MCA to consider 
whether imposing a less stringent type of 
price regulation rather than maintaining the 
current cost-oriented prices would be more 
justified and proportionate in relation to the 
achievement of the regulatory objectives - 
taking into account both the short term 
objective to protect consumers and the 
longer term objective to induce effective c 
competition.    
Minimum set of leased lines 
1 - Non discrimination; 
2 – Transparency; 
3 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
 
FR/2006/0415 
Four retail leased lines 
markets: (i) the 
minimum set, (ii) leased 
lines other than the 
minimum set, up to and 
including 2 
Mbit/s, (iii) leased lines 
above 2 Mbit/s, and (iv) 
leased lines with 
alternative 
interfaces. 
 
National France  Telecom 
Other leased lines markets: 
1- Non discrimination; 
2 – Price control (prohibition of 
predatory pricing); 
3 – Cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
The inclusion of leased lines above 2 
Mbit/s in the retail leased lines market  
The evidence provided by ARCEP in its 
notification showed that (i) the  described 
ruptures in demand and supply side 
substitutability might diminish as 
technology develop and (ii) the definition 
of the separate markets (in particular leased 
lines with traditional interfaces up to and 
including 2 Mbit/s, and leased lines with 
traditional interfaces above 2 Mbit/s) would 
not have led to different results as regards 
the finding of SMP or the fulfilment of the 
three criteria test. Moreover, the 
Commission noted that ARCEP will closely 
monitor the market and remove ex ante 
regulation in the retail market once 
effective wholesale regulation has proven 
to have a substantial impact on the  
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downstream market. 
 
1 - Non discrimination 
 
2 - Transparency 
 
3 - Price control and cost accounting 
LT/2006/0429  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  TEO LT AB 
4 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
1 - Non discrimination 
2 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines 
3 - Price control 
4 – Cost accounting 
 
CZ/2006/0447  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  Český Telecom a.s 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1- Non-discrimination 
2 – Price control (prohibition of 
predatory and excessive prices) 
3 – Obligation not to unreasonably 
bundle services  
SK/2006/0463  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Slovak  Telekom 
4 - Transparency 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Appropriate justification of remedies 
 
The data provided by TÚSR indicated that 
the competitive situation may not be 
homogeneous within the whole minimum 
set of leased lines. In particular, 
competitive constraints faced by Slovak 
Telekom seem to be more stringent in the 
provision of high capacity digital leased 
lines. 
 
Therefore, without contesting the SMP 
finding, the Commission invited TÚSR to 
reconsider before adopting the final 
measure whether the competition problems 
identified would justify a differentiated 
application of remedies for different types 
of leased lines, taking also into account the 
development of retail prices for leased lines 
within the minimum set. 
 
DE/2006/0479  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National DTAG 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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Remedies not yet notified  
 
 
 
 
1 - Non discrimination 
2 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer, including Service 
Level Agreements), 
3 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines 
4 - Price control (based on cost 
orientation) and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
CY/2006/0484  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National CYTA 
6 – Prohibition of unreasonably 
bundling products 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Non discrimination  EL/2006/0491  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
National OTE  S.A. 
2 - Transparency 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - Price control and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
Minimum set of leased lines  
1 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines on non-discriminatory 
and cost-oriented basis  
2 - Publication of information related 
to the minimum set 
3 – Obligation to submit prices and 
standard contracts conditions to TKK 
for ex-ante approval 
4 – Accounting separation 
 
AT/2006/0507 
Minimum set of leased 
lines + n*64 kbit/s leased 
lines up to 2048 kbit/s 
National  Telekom Austria AG 
Leased lines n*64 kbit/s up to 2048 
kbit/s 
 
1- Non-discrimination  
2 - Obligation not to unduly increase 
costs for end users wishing to cancel 
their TA subscription 
3 - Cost orientation and cost 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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accounting 
4 - Accounting separation 
 
 
1- Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines on non-discriminatory 
and transparent basis  
 
2 – Price control (prohibition of 
predatory and excessive prices) 
3 – Ex ante approval of pricelists and 
conditions  
 
PL/2006/0550 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
Telekomunikacja Polska 
S.A. (“TP”) 
 
4 - Transparency 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies at retail level 
UKE has not yet completed the review of 
the related wholesale market for trunk 
segments of leased lines (i.e. market 14 in 
the Recommendation). Therefore the 
Commission invites UKE to finalize this 
review as quickly as possible in order to 
ensure effective wholesale regulation if the 
wholesale trunk segments of leased lines 
market is found not to be effectively 
competitive. Moreover, UKE is invited to 
ensure full and effective implementation of 
the obligations imposed on the wholesale 
market for  terminating segments of leased 
lines (i.e. market 13 in the 
Recommendation) within the shortest 
possible timeframe.  
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5 – Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
1- Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines  
 
2  - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
BE/2006/0551  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Belgacom 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Cost accounting for wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines: 
The Commission notes that currently IBPT 
does not apply a cost accounting system for 
all products included in market 13 as 
defined by IBTP and that a consultation on 
the cost modelling methodology is planned 
to take place six months after adoption of 
the final measures in market 13. Given the 
relevance of a cost accounting system in 
relation to all products included in  market 
13 and in particular alternative interfaces, 
the Commission invites IBPT to shorten the 
timeframe for elaborating the details of the 
cost accounting model and its 
implementing measures. 
1 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines  
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency  LU/2006/0559  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National IPT 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 - Provision of the minimum set of 
leased lines  
 
2 - Transparency (publication of the 
reference offer for the minimum set 
of leased lines) 
 
LV/2007/0571  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National SIA  Lattelecom 
3 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission. 
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Market 8: Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location  
 
              
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP 
found for  Remedies imposed 
        
 Access / 
interconnection 
 
Carrier 
(Pre)Selection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency 
Price control 
/ cost 
accounting 
Accounting separation 
Austria**** YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Denmark NO*  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland YES 
46 
operators 
YES  NO 
YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
France YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany NO*  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Hungary YES 
5 
operators 
YES  NO 
NO  YES  YES**  YES  
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Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Sweden YES  1  operator  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
United Kingdom  NO* 
2 
operators 
YES  NO 
YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
The Netherlands  NO*  1 operator 
 
YES***  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator 
 
YES***  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia NO*  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Poland YES  1  operator 
 
YES***  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy YES  1  operator 
 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Malta YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece YES  1  operator  YES 
 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxemburg YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Austria YES  1  operator 
 
YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Estonia YES  1  operator 
 
YES 
 
NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  
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* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
*** Imposition of WLR  
**** second market review          
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
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Market 8 - Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1- Provide network access on 
reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Cost orientation of charges 
and cost accounting 
4- Charge control  
5 - Transparency  
6 - Accounting separation  
7 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and 
indirect access in relation to call 
origination 
UK/2003/0011-
0012 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
UK excluding 
Hull area and 
Hull area 
BT (UK excluding 
Hull), Kingston 
(Hull) 
8 - Flat rate Internet access call 
origination (FRIACO) - only on 
BT 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other than 
the Commission and other NRAs: Any material 
modification to the notified draft measure will 
require the draft measure to be re-notified under 
Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
Flat rate Internet access call origination 
(FRIACO): The Commission emphasises that in 
addition to remedy the lack of competition in the 
market identified, unmetered wholesale products, 
like FRIACO, may also be used for the provision 
of retail services other than the provision of 
unmetered Internet access.  
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UK/2004/0045 
(further 
amended in 
UK/2005/0217-
0218) 
See Cases UK/2003/0011-0012. 
Financial reporting obligations 
(in addition to the remedies 
imposed in Cases 
UK/2003/0011-0012). 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Publication of a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting systems: It 
is necessary for a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting system to be 
published annually, following verification by a 
qualified independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material modification 
to the draft measure as a consequence of 
comments made by interested parties in the 
framework of the national consultation will require 
the draft measure to be re-notified. 
UK/2004/0071   See Case UK/2003/0012.  Provision of a CPS local calls 
option service by BT Wholesale  No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2004/0072  See Case UK/2003/0012. 
 Modifications to the charge 
control obligation already 
imposed on BT in case 
UK/2003/0012. 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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UK/2004/0115 
(amended by 
UK/2005/0180) 
See Case UK/2003/0012. 
Directions on BT's ability to use 
Cancel Other functionality 
(dispute resolution) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2004/0122  See Case UK/2003/0012. 
 Modifications to BT's charge 
control obligation (details of 
measurement of compliance) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1- Revised charge control  
UK/2005/0165  See Case UK/2003/0012.  2 - Amendments to the 
requirement (i) not to unduly 
discriminate and (ii) to notify 
charges, terms and conditions. 
No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2005/0166  See Case UK/2003/0012. 
1 - Modifications to the amounts 
that BT can charge for providing 
CPS facilities 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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UK/2003/0013-
0014 (wholesale 
exchange line 
markets) 
Fixed narrowband 
wholesale 
exchange lines 
market: a new 
market. 
UK excluding 
Hull area and 
Hull area 
BT (UK excluding 
Hull), Kingston (Hull) 
1 - Wholesale line rental - only 
on BT 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Market definition for wholesale exchange line 
markets:  The Commission stated that more 
consideration could have been given to assessing 
potential merchant wholesale demand and supply 
(i.e. demand from, and supply to, independent 
purchasers of wholesale exchange lines). 
 
Wholesale line rental (WLR): The Commission 
considers that WLR may also be imposed as a 
retail remedy in the retail access markets, since it 
serves to introduce additional sources of 
competition at that level. 
Asymmetrical regulation 
between 4 groups of operators 
FI/2003/0028  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Regional 46  local  operators 
1 - Access and interconnection 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Geographic divide of the market for call 
origination: The Commission invites Ficora to 
monitor the development of the market for signs of 
a common pricing constraint which may permit the 
delineation of larger geographic markets in the 
future. 
  
EN  193    EN 
2 - Publication of delivery terms 
and tariff information 
3 - Obligations concerning 
pricing and other terms (cost 
orientation and non 
discrimination) 
4 - Cost accounting 
5 - Accounting separation 
Exemption from certain ex ante obligations: 
The imposition of different remedies on different 
operators within similarly defined markets should 
be adequately reasoned. To the extent that it would 
be considered disproportionate to impose costly 
cost orientation and cost accounting obligations on 
a small operator, the Commission is of the view 
that other forms of cost control for such operators, 
such as benchmarking against the larger operators 
who are under a cost orientation obligation, could 
be considered. 
 
Cost orientation and cost accounting 
obligations: The Commission expresses concerns 
on the approach not to specify the method on 
which cost-orientation will be assessed, which it 
believes will limit the measure’s contribution to 
consumer benefit, the enhancement of competition 
and the development of the internal market.  
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1 - Obligation to meet 
reasonable request for 
interconnection (including via 
direct connections), network 
access, network capacity 
2 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Accounting separation 
SE/2004/0049  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National    
5 - Transparency (reference 
offer) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Transparency - publication of 
a reference offer, prices, terms 
and conditions, technical 
information and relating to the 
quality of service 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4- Access on reasonable request 
5 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
PT/2004/0060, 
PT/2004/0092 
(remedies) 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National PT  Group 
6- Price control 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Asymmetrical application of remedies: The 
Commission invites the NRA to monitor closely 
the development of the cost structures of the 
operators on which the obligation to charge “fair 
and reasonable prices” is imposed and to assess 
whether its current assumptions on “fair and 
reasonable prices” will remain relevant over the 
period of the market review.  
EN  195    EN 
1 - Transparency (publication of 
reference offer, technical 
specifications); 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Obligation to provide access 
to certain network components 
SK/2004/0103  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Slovak  Telekom 
5 - Carrier selection/carrier pre-
selection (CS/CPS) 
The Commission made comments  on: 
 
CS/CPS obligation and non-imposition of cost 
orientation in the wholesale market for call 
origination: The Commission invites TÚSR to 
consider explicit imposition of cost orientation 
obligations in the wholesale call origination 
market. 
 
National public consultation: According to 
Article 6 of the Framework Directive NRAs must 
conduct a national consultation on each draft 
measure which have a significant impact on the 
relevant market, i.e. including the market 
definitions, and to give all interested parties the 
opportunity to comment on the draft measure. 
1 - access 
2 – non discrimination 
AT/2004/0105 
AT/2006/0543 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telekom  Austria 
3 – transparency (including the 
obligation to publish a Reference 
No comments made by the Commission during 
first round of market review. 
 
The Commission made the following comment 
during second market review: 
The Commission made a comment on:   
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Interconnection Offer) 
 4- cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
5 – accounting separation 
 
Reduction of minimum interconnection loads 
Minimum interconnection loads, depending on 
their level, might imply an unjustified refusal to 
supply in the markets for wholesale voice call 
origination and termination markets. The 
Commission is of the opinion that it would be 
more effective that the TKK decides upon 
minimum loads in the present SMP decision, and 
not in a dispute settlement procedure. Therefore 
the TKK is invited to address this issue in the 
present SMP decision, for instance through 
reducing the minimum number of traffic minutes 
to the extent that the minimum  interconnection 
loads would exceed the level which TA is able to 
economically and/or technically justify 
1 - Access to i) wholesale call 
origination, ii) wholesale 
purchase of services for resale, 
iii) co-location 
2 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
3 - Non-discrimination 
DK/2005/0141 
Wholesale access 
(connections) is 
included in the 
market for call 
origination on the 
public telephone 
network at a fixed 
location.  
National TDC 
4 - Reference offer 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Inclusion of wholesale access connections in the 
product market definition: The Commission 
expressed doubts that wholesale access forms part 
of the wholesale origination market (market 8). 
Access services are not substitutes but rather 
complementary to call origination services. In 
addition, the Commission noted that the proposed 
remedies do not necessarily require the delineation 
of a separate access market, since they may be 
imposed in respect of the call origination market 
alone.   
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5 - Transparency 
6 - Accounting separation 
DK/2005/0205 
(modification of 
a remedy) 
See case DK/2005/0141.  1 - Retail minus price regulation 
on Wholesale Line Rental  No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access (including 
interconnection services, 
collocation) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Price control (in relation to 
interconnection, conveyance and 
collocation) 
DE/2005/0143 
(market 
analysis), 
DE/2005/0233 
(remedies) 
DE/2005/0254 
(further 
remedies) 
Three separate 
markets for 
wholesale call 
origination: 
i) call origination for 
carrier (pre-) 
selection services; 
ii) call origination for 
value-added services 
and 
iii) call origination 
for dial-up internet 
services. 
National DT  AG 
4- obligation to make internal 
transfer prices transparent and to 
make them accessible to BNetzA 
upon request 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Remedies to be determined at a later stage: The 
Commission reminded RegTP of the need to notify 
remedies in accordance with Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive. 
 
Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross-
subsidisation arising from the operations of a 
vertically- integrated company, the Commission 
invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing 
transparency and legal certainty to consider 
imposing accounting separation as a separate 
measure.  
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1 - Transparency (reference 
offer) 
2 - Accounting separation 
3 - Obligation related to access 
and interconnection 
HU/2005/0151  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional 
5 regional operators: 
Matáv, Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató, 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési, Emitel, 
Monor Telefon 
Társaság 
4 - Price control and cost-
accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The obligation of cost orientation on the 
designated local incumbents: The Commission 
was not convinced that the fact that, Invitel, 
Hungarotel, Emitel and Monortel would be 
entitled to set their origination charges at a level 
which cannot exceed by more than 40% would 
effectively contribute to further decrease the 
relevant retail charges. 
1 - Transparency 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Provision of access to and 
use of specific network elements 
and associated 
facilities on reasonable request 
4 - Price control and cost 
accounting 
IE/2005/0190  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National eircom 
5 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultation planned by ComReg: The 
Commission reminds that draft measures relating 
to the details and implementation of accounting 
separation, cost accounting and wholesale price 
caps are required to be notified under Article 7(3) 
of the Framework Directive. 
FR/2005/0227  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Territory of 
metropolitan 
FT  1 - Access to, and use of specific 
network facilities 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
Includes also non-
switching based 
interconnection 
(mainly IP). 
France, the 
French over-
seas territories 
and Mayotte 
5 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
1 - Provision of access to and 
use of specific network elements 
and associated 
facilities on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
SI/2005/0257  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Telekom Slovenije 
 
4 - Price control and cost 
accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed price control 
obligation 
The notified draft measures provide that until the 
application of cost-oriented wholesale call 
origination and call termination charges,  Telekom 
Slovenije would be obliged to provide wholesale 
call origination and call termination services at a 
“reasonable” rate subject to APEK’s approval. The 
Commission however notes that the current level 
of these wholesale charges does not seem to be  
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5 – Accounting separation 
appropriate to foster competition, which is also 
clearly demonstrated by the current 100% market 
share of Telekom Slovenije in the two relevant 
wholesale markets. Accordingly, the application of 
the non-cost oriented wholesale charges (including 
the “reasonable” character of the wholesale 
charges to be applied during the transitional 
period) should be replaced by cost oriented 
wholesale charges within the shortest timeframe 
possible. 
 
1 – Access (including imposition 
of Wholesale Line Rental*) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
the Reference Offer) 
4 - Carrier (pre) selection 
5 – Cost orientation 
NL/2005/0286 
and 
NL/2006/0511 
(further details 
of remedy*) 
Similar to the 
Recommendation 
except for the 
exclusion of local 
conveyance  
 
National 
KPN 
 
6 - Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 - Transparency 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Provision of access to and 
use of specific network elements 
and associated 
facilities  
4 - Price control  
CZ/2006/0351  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Český Telecom 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Price regulation applied only to minute based 
prices 
Considering that the incumbent will be obliged to 
provide flat rate origination services at the 
wholesale level, and since CTU’s concerns for 
potential excessive pricing by the incumbent 
would seem to be valid also for flat rate 
services, CTU is invited to consider imposing to 
flat rate origination services a price regulation 
equivalent to that applying to services billed on a 
per-minute-basis. This will avoid relying on 
multiple dispute resolutions that could result in a 
lack of certainty in the market. 
1 – Transparency (publication of 
a Reference Offer) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Provision of access to and 
use of specific network elements 
and associated 
facilities (including imposition 
of Wholesale Line Rental*) 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
ES/2006/0355 
and 
ES/2007/0589 
(further 
remedy*)  
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National TESAU 
5 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Non-imposition of wholesale line rental remedy 
CMT does not consider 
imposing a wholesale line rental (“WLR”) 
obligation on TESAU arguing that such a remedy 
would not promote investments in infrastructure, 
in particular in local loop unbundling (“LLU”). 
The Commission welcomes CMT’s objective to 
encourage infrastructure competition but would 
like to emphasise that WLR could also support 
such competition in the short run by making it 
easier for alternative operators to climb the ladder 
of investment. The  Commission therefore 
considers that WLR can be an appropriate remedy  
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to address the lack of competition in the relevant 
retail markets. It allows the incumbent’s 
competitors to bundle their products and services 
in the retail markets as they deem most efficient, 
complementing carrier-selection/carrier-pre-
selection (“CS/CPS”). 
Therefore, taking into account the market failures 
identified at the retail level and the fact that the use 
of CS/CPS has been significantly decreasing over 
the last years in Spain, and presuming that this is 
not only due to the increasing market shares of 
alternative operators providing services on the 
basis of LLU, the Commission invites CMT to 
consider imposing a WLR remedy on TESAU 
bearing in mind that the need for market entrants 
to rely on inputs such as WLR, should decrease 
over time as their investment in alternative 
network infrastructure is increased. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
the Reference Offer) 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
LT/2006/0364 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
 
Lietuvos Telekomas 
AB 
 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission. 
LV/2006/0365 
Similar to the 
Recommendation 
except for the 
National  
1 – Access to call origination 
services and unbundled access to 
local loop 
The Commission made a comment on:   
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2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
a Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control and cost 
accounting 
exclusion of calls to 
non-geographic 
numbers. 
SIA Lattelekom 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
Obligation of local loop unbundling: 
In principle, the Commission agrees with SPRK’s 
finding that the lack of access to the end customer 
is a significant obstacle to enter the wholesale 
markets for fixed origination (and termination) and 
an impediment to the development of competitive 
electronic communication markets. However, 
wholesale unbundled access (including shared 
access) to the local loops and sub-loops for the 
purpose of providing broadband and voice services 
is identified as a separate market susceptible to ex 
ante regulation in the Commission’s 
Recommendation on the relevant markets (market 
11). Indeed, access to local loops is neither from 
the demand-side nor from the supply-side 
substitutable with wholesale call origination 
services. The Commission hence considers that 
LLU (including the publication of a reference offer 
for access to local loops) should not be imposed as 
a remedy in market 8 without prior proper analysis 
of market 11. Instead, pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Framework Directive, SPRK is invited carry out 
an analysis of the market for wholesale unbundled 
access to the local loops market in view of 
determining whether this market is effectively 
competitive and, if one or more undertakings are 
found to have SMP on this market, impose 
appropriate regulatory obligations. 
PL/2006/0380  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  
1 – Access (including the 
provision of Wholesale Line 
Rental) 
The Commission made comments on:   
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2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
a Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control and cost 
accounting 
 
 
Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A. ("TP") 
 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
Price control before approval of LRIC cost 
calculation 
UKE has not clearly specified in its measure on 
which criteria it will verify the appropriateness of 
call origination charges proposed by TP prior to 
the approval of its LRIC-based cost calculation by 
an independent auditor. 
This approach fails to provide adequate 
transparency and legal certainty for market 
players, in particular since no timing is foreseen by 
which the LRIC-based cost calculation of the SMP  
operator must be approved. 
The Commission therefore invites UKE to clarify 
in the final measure which  verification method it 
will use to approve the call origination charges 
proposed by the SMP  operator before the cost 
calculation has been  conclusively approved. The 
verification method that UKE will use in this 
interim period should ensure that the SMP 
operator, without delay, offers wholesale 
origination services at prices which allow 
competition to develop. UKE may in particular 
want to consider imposing retail-minus price 
regulation pending the approval of LRIC based 
prices. 
Wholesale Line Rental 
The Commission notes that Wholesale Line Rental 
(WLR) is imposed on TP on the basis of TP’s 
SMP status in the relevant market and understands 
that this obligation will replace any WLR  
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obligations that may have been imposed on TP 
under the old regulatory framework. 
The draft measure, however, fails to specify on 
which conditions WLR must be 
provided. When determining the conditions for the 
provision of WLR, UKE should take into account 
the objectives set out in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive, namely the promotion of 
competition as well as the encouragement of 
efficient investment. The Commission hence 
invites UKE to ensure that the imposition of   
mandated WLR which increases competition in the 
short-term does not reduce incentives for 
competitors to invest in alternative facilities that 
will secure more competition in the long-term. 
Specifically, WLR conditions must leave a 
sufficient margin with retail prices to avoid margin 
squeezes, but on the other hand must not 
discourage investments in LLU in areas where 
such investment is economically feasible. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
the Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control (based on the 
network cap) and cost 
accounting 
IT/2006/0383  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National   
Telecom Italia  
 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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6 – CS/CPS 
 
 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
MT/2006/0387 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
Maltacom 
 
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on:  
The inclusion of BWA networks in the 
wholesale call origination market 
BWA has been included in the wholesale call 
origination market without conducting a full 
substitution analysis. Furthermore, the conclusion 
that it cannot be determined whether BWA 
operators will offer voice services and hence call 
termination services over their own individual 
networks during the lifetime of this review would 
seem to cast equally doubts as to whether call 
origination services will be provided over the life 
time 
of the review. However, in this particular case the 
inclusion of BWA networks in the relevant market 
does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of 
regulation. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
a Reference Offer) 
BE/2006/0439   
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National   
Belgacom 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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  5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency including the 
obligation to disclose all 
information needed and to 
publish a Reference Offer 
(including additional facilities 
such as co-location) 
 
 
4 – price control and cost 
accounting 
CY/2006/0473 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
ATHK 
 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
1 - Access 
 
EL/2006/0493 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National 
 
OTE 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 – CS/CPS 
 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4– Transparency (including the 
obligation  
publish a Reference 
Interconnection Offer) 
 
 
5 – Price control and cost 
accounting 
 
 
 
6 – Accounting separation and 
auditing 
 
 
1 – Access and interconnection 
 
LU/2006/0541 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
EPT 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  209    EN 
 
 
3 – Transparency  
 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
 
 
5 – Accounting separation  
 
1 - access 
2 – non discrimination 
3 – transparency (including 
publication of a reference offer) 
EE/2007/0597  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National 
Elion 
 
4 – price control and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission. 
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Market 9: Call termination on individual public telephone network provided at a fixed location  
 
             
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Access / 
Interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency Price control / cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  9  operators  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES** 
Denmark YES  6  operators  YES  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES** 
Finland YES  50  operators  YES  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES** 
France YES  21  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Germany YES  53  operators*  YES  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Hungary YES  8  operators  YES**  YES**  YES  YES**  YES** 
Ireland YES  12  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Portugal YES  8  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  22  operators  YES**  YES  YES**  YES**  YES**  
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United Kingdom  YES  63 operators  YES  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES** 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
The Netherlands  NO  Several operators  YES  YES**  YES  YES**  YES** 
Czech Republic  YES  Several operators  YES  YES  YES**  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  17  operators  YES**  YES**  YES  YES**  YES** 
Italy YES  12  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Poland NO*  29  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Malta YES  2  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Belgium YES  9  operators  YES  YES  YES**  YES**  YES** 
Cyprus YES  3  operators  YES**  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Greece YES  14  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Austria YES  12  operators  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES**  YES** 
Luxemburg   YES  9 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES** 
Estonia YES  12  operators  YES**  YES  YES  YES  NO 
 * On 17 May 2005, the Commission vetoed draft measures by RegTP (now BNetzA) for not designating alternative network operators to have SMP. On 29 August 2005, 
BNetzA renotified draft measures designating the ANOs to have SMP. However, remedies notified so far cover only DT AG. 
Partially withdrawn by UKE as to call termination services to non-geographic numbers  
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** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
  
              
              
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
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Market 9 - Call termination on individual public telephone network provided at a fixed location 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Provision of call termination on 
reasonable request (on all) 
2 - Cost orientation of call 
termination charges (LRIC) and 
cost accounting (on BT and 
Kingston) 
3 - Accounting separation (on BT 
and Kingston) 
4 - Non-discrimination (on BT and 
Kingston) 
5 - Publication of a reference 
interconnection offer (RIO) (on BT 
and Kingston) 
6 - Notification of new charges 90 
days before changes become 
effective (on BT and Kingston) 
UK/2003/0003  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
BT 
Kingston 
61 other 
alternative 
network 
operators 
("ANO") 
7 - Call termination charge control 
setting the annual ceiling for 
charges at retail 
price index (RPI) increases less 
The Commission made   
a  comment on: 
 
BT’s countervailing buyer power: The Commission 
notes that a detailed assessment of the competitive 
effects of obligations to be imposed on BT as a result 
of finding BT to have SMP is important for the 
finding that all other PECNs have SMP as well.  
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10% (RPI –10) (on BT) 
 
UK/2004/0045 
(further 
amended by 
cases 
UK/2005/0217-
0218) 
See Case UK/2003/0003. 
Financial reporting obligations (in 
addition to the remedies imposed in 
Cases UK/2003/003).  
The Commission made   
comments on: 
 
Publication of a statement concerning compliance 
with the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for 
a statement concerning compliance with the cost 
accounting system to be published annually, following 
verification by a qualified independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to 
the draft measure as a consequence of comments 
made by interested parties in the framework of the 
national consultation will require the draft measure to 
be re-notified. 
UK/2004/0072  See Case UK/2003/0003.  Modifications to BT's charge 
control obligation  No comments made by the Commission 
UK/2004/0122  See Case UK/2003/0003. 
1 - Modifications to BT's charge 
control obligation (details of 
measurement of compliance) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2005/0165  See Case UK/2003/0003.  1- Revised charge control  No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Amendments to the requirement 
(i) not to unduly discriminate and 
(ii) to notify charges, terms and 
conditions. 
Asymmetrical regulation between 
4 groups of operators 
1 -Provision of interconnection 
2 - Publication of delivery terms 
and tariff information 
3 - Obligations concerning pricing 
and other terms (cost-orientation 
and non discrimination) 
4 - Cost accounting 
FI/2003/0029  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
50 SMP 
operators 
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Exemption from certain ex ante obligations: The 
impositions of different remedies on different 
operators within similarly defined markets should be 
adequately reasoned. To the extent that it would be 
considered disproportionate to impose costly cost 
orientation and cost accounting obligations on a small 
operator, the Commission is of the view that other 
forms of cost control for such operators, such as 
benchmarking against the larger operators who are 
under a cost orientation obligation, could be 
considered. 
Cost orientation and cost accounting obligations: 
The Commission expresses concerns on the approach 
not to specify the method on which cost orientation 
will be assessed, which it believes will limit the 
measure’s contribution to consumer benefit, the 
enhancement of competition and the development of 
the internal market.  
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1 - Access and interconnection: 
meet reasonable request of access 
& interconnection (all operators); 
meet reasonable request for a direct 
billing agreement (all operators); 
meet reasonable request for 
interconnection via direct 
connections (TeliaSonera, Tele2, 
Telenor); meet reasonable request 
for access to network capacity 
(only TeliaSonera) 
2 - Price regulation: cost oriented 
pricing (TeliaSonera); to charge 
reasonable & fair prices (others) 
3 - Non-discrimination 
IE/2004/0050  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
22 SMP 
operators 
4 - Accounting separation: 
accounting separation and 
obligation to submit separated 
accounts to PTS annually or on 
PTS' request (TeliaSonera, Tele2, 
Telenor); obligation to submit 
separated accounts to PTS on its 
request (others);  
No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  218    EN 
5 - Transparency: publish reference 
offer (TeliaSonera); compile and 
publish information necessary for 
interconnection, direct connections 
and direct billing purposes (Tele2, 
Telenor); compile and publish 
information necessary for 
interconnection and direct billing 
agreements (others) 
1 - Transparency 
2 - Non Discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
 
4 - Access on reasonable request 
PT/2004/0061, 
PT/2004/0092 
(remedies) 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
PT Group 
Cabovisão 
Coltel 
Jazztel 
Novis Telecom 
OniTelecom 
Refer Telecom 
Vodafone 
Telecel 
 
5 - Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Asymmetrical application of remedies: The 
Commission invites ANACOM to monitor closely the 
development of the cost structures of the operators on 
which the obligation to charge “fair and reasonable 
prices” is imposed and to assess whether its current 
assumptions on “fair and reasonable prices” will 
remain relevant over the period of the market review. 
SK/2004/0102, 
SK/2005/0187 
(further details 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
Slovak Telecom  1 - Transparency (technical 
specifications) 
The Commission made comments on: 
Implementation of the proposed cost orientation  
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2 - Non-discrimination ; 
3 - Transparency 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Obligation to provide access to 
certain network components 
of a remedy)  geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
5 - Cost orientation based on 
LRAIC 
obligation in the call termination market: The 
Commission invited TÚSR to notify pursuant to 
Article 7(3) of the framework Directive these 
implementing draft measures setting out the 
timeframe and stages applicable for the reduction of 
termination charges. By notification SK/2005/0182 
TÚSR notified these measures. 
 
National public consultation: According to Article 6 
of the Framework Directive NRAs must conduct a 
national consultation on each draft measure which has 
a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. 
including the market definitions, and to give all 
interested parties the opportunity to comment on the 
draft measure. 
Telekom Austria:  
1 - Non Discrimination 
AT/2004/0106  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Telekom Austria 
AG 
Information-
Technologie 
Austria GmbH 
Colt Telecom 
Austria GmbH 
Tele.ring 
2 -Publication of a Reference 
Interconnection Offer (“RIO”) 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 -Accounting separation 
Telekom 
Service GmbH 
Telekabel Wien 
GmbH 
eTel Austria AG 
Equant Austria 
GmbH 
UTA Telekom 
AG 
LIWEST 
Kabelmedien 
GmbH 
 
4 -Access on reasonable request  
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DE/2005/0144 
(market 
analysis),  
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
No SMP for 
alternative 
networks 
operators 
("ANO"s) 
because of 
claimed 
countervailing 
buyer power by 
DT AG 
 
The Commission vetoed  the draft measures 
concerning ANOs: 
 
No justification for the considered strict Greenfield 
approach: Any Greenfield approach must ensure that 
absence of SMP is only found and regulation only 
rolled back where markets have become sustainably 
competitive, and not where the absence of SMP is 
precisely the result of the regulation in place. This 
implies that regulation which will continue to exist 
throughout the period of the forward-looking 
assessment independently of a SMP finding on the 
market concerned, must be taken into account. 
 
No convincing evidence of absence of SMP under 
the so-called “modified Greenfield approach”: 
RegTP asserts that DTAG’s buyer power limits the 
ability of each ANO to behave independently of its 
customers and competitors (at the retail level). RegTP 
does, however, not present concrete evidence that 
DTAG has effectively exercised such buyer power. In 
view of DTAG’s own termination rates being 
regulated and given that it cannot realistically threaten 
to stop purchasing termination services, DTAG would 
therefore be deprived of any bargaining tool in the 
form of a corresponding increase in its own tariffs 
when negotiating termination rates on that ANO’s 
network. For the above reasons, the Commission 
considers that also under the modified Greenfield 
approach, RegTP has not provided convincing 
evidence to support the absence of SMP of each ANO. 
 
No analysis of ANOs’ market power vis-à-vis each 
other and vis-à-vis MNOs: RegTP has limited its  
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SMP analysis for ANOs mainly to an analysis of 
negotiation powers between DTAG and each of the 
ANOs. However, it appears that a number of direct 
interconnection agreements between ANOs exist and. 
An analysis of these agreements could have provided 
further information on the market power of ANOs.  
EN  223    EN 
DT AG: 
1 - Access (including interconnection 
services, collocation) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
DE/2005/0234 
(remedies)     DT  AG 
3 - Price control (in relation to 
interconnection, conveyance and 
collocation) 
Commission made comments on: 
 
Remedies to be determined at a later stage: 
The Commission reminded RegTP of the need 
to notify remedies in accordance with Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross-
subsidisation arising from the operations of a 
vertically- integrated company, the Commission 
invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing 
transparency and legal certainty to consider 
imposing accounting separation as a separate 
measure. 
1 - Access 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
Reference Offer) 
DE/2005/0239 
(market 
analysis, 
renotification 
following a veto 
in case 
DE/2004/0144) 
DE/2006/0343 
(remedies on 
ANOs) 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
52 ANOs 
4 – Ex post price control  
The Commission made comments on:  
Price control mechanism: The Commission 
reminds BNetzA that the provisions of the TKG 
referring to a “double dominance” test and 
restricting BNetzA’s power to impose remedies 
are currently subject to examination in the 
context of infringement proceedings in 
accordance with Article 226 of the EC Treaty. 
The Commission points out that the possibility 
of imposing ex ante price control on a wholesale 
market is provided by the Access Directive 
independently of the SMP status of the operator 
in the corresponding retail market(s). Secondly, 
the Commission invites BNetzA to monitor 
whether in the absence of ex ante price 
regulation ANOs attempt to increase their fixed 
termination rates. If this is the case BNetzA 
should reconsider imposing ex ante price control 
instead of relying on multiple dispute resolutions 
that result in a lack of certainty in the market.  
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Matáv, Inivitel, Hungarotel, Emitel 
and Monortel: 
1 - Transparency ( reference offer) 
2 - Accounting separation 
3 - Access and interconnection 
4 - Price control (4 operators are 
authorised to set their termination 
charges up to 40% higher than the level 
of the termination charges of Matáv) 
5 - Cost accounting 
Pantel, GTS Datanet and BT: 
1 – Transparency 
 
HU/2005/0152 
 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
Matáv 
Invitel 
Hungarotel 
Emitel 
Monortel 
Pantel 
GTS Datanet 
BT 
2 - Non discrimination 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The obligation of cost orientation on the 
designated local incumbents: The Commission 
is not fully convinced that allowing for the four 
local incumbents to charge 40% higher 
termination charges than Matáv (and therefore, 
the possibility for not submitting a LRIC-based 
cost model) would effectively contribute to 
further decrease the relevant wholesale charges. 
DK/2005/0171  Notification withdrawn by the NRA 
TDC: 
1- Access (requirement to provide 
network access at reasonable request) 
DK/2005/0207  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
The market 
definition includes 
dial-up internet 
calls to 
geographic 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
TDC 
TeliaSonera 
Sonofon 
Consorte 
2 - Cost orientation (LRAIC) and cost 
accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Asymmetric application of remedies: Where it 
is intended to impose different remedies on 
different operators within similarly defined 
markets, the asymmetrical application of  
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3 - Accounting separation 
 
4 - Non-discrimination 
5 - Publication of a reference offer 
 6 - Transparency 
Others: 
numbers on PSTN 
or ISDN with a 
speed of up to 128 
Kbit/s. 
Danmark 
Tele2 
Colt Telecom  
Obligation to provide network access 
on fair and reasonable terms at 
reasonable request 
remedies should be adequately reasoned. The 
Commission is of the view that NITA has not 
duly substantiated its intended decision not to 
impose certain obligations on the ANOs, e.g. 
non-discrimination. Consequently, the 
Commission would invite NITA to reconsider its 
position on this matter. 
1 - Transparency (all) 
2 - Non-discrimination (all) 
3 - Requirement to provide access to 
and use of specific network facilities on 
reasonable request (all) 
4 - Price control (eircom: FL-LRIC, 
others: benchmarking) 
IE/2005/0191  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
eircom 
Access Telecom 
Budget Telecom 
Cable & 
Wireless 
Chorus 
Communications 
Colt Telecom 
Energis 
BT Ireland 
5 - Cost-accounting (eircom) 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultation planned by ComReg: 
The Commission reminds that draft measures 
relating to the details and implementation of 
accounting separation, cost accounting and 
wholesale price caps are required to be notified 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.  
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MCI 
NTL 
Swift Call Centre 
Talk Telecom 
 
FT: 
 
1 - Access and interconnection 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Prohibition of excessive pricing 
5 – Cost-orientation and cost 
accounting (LRAIC) 
ANOs: 
1 – Access and interconnection 
FR/2005/0228  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
FT + 20 ANOs 
2 – Non-discrimination 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The exclusion of termination to non-
geographic numbers from market analysis: 
ARCEP should conduct, as soon as possible, a 
market analysis pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Framework Directive with regard to call 
termination to non-geographic numbers of non-
ISP end users.   
 
Asymmetric imposition of pricing related 
remedies: The impositions of different remedies 
on different operators within similarly defined 
markets should be adequately reasoned. To the 
extent that it would be considered 
disproportionate to impose costly cost 
orientation and cost accounting obligations on a 
small operator, the Commission is of the view 
that other forms of cost control for such 
operators, such as benchmarking against the 
larger operators who are under a cost orientation 
obligation, could be considered.  
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3 - Transparency 
4 – Prohibition of excessive pricing 
1- Non-discrimination 
2 - Transparency 
3 - Accounting separation 
ES/2005/0250  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network 
28 operators 
4 - Cost orientation of prices  
The Commission made comment on: 
Asymmetrical application and legal certainty 
of remedies:  
The Commission reiterates that obligations 
imposed under the Access Directive should be 
based on the nature of the problem identified, 
proportionate and justified in the light of the 
objectives laid down in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive. The remedies should 
provide adequate transparency and legal 
certainty for market players. 
In respect of price control obligations imposed 
on ANOs (reasonable price) the Commission 
invites CMT: 
i) to define in detail in the adopted measure the 
scope of the remedies imposed, including the 
criteria to be used in order to assess whether the 
termination prices charged by ANOs are 
reasonable, and ii) to monitor closely the 
development of the cost structures of the 
operators on which the obligation to charge 
reasonable prices is imposed, and to assess 
whether its current assumptions will remain 
relevant over the period of this market review.  
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1 – Access to particular network 
facilities and the use of these facilities 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
SI/2005/0258  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Telekom 
Slovenije 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed price control 
obligation: 
The notified draft measures provide that until 
the application of cost-oriented wholesale call 
origination and call termination charges, 
Telekom Slovenije would be obliged to provide 
wholesale call origination and call termination 
services at a “reasonable” rate subject to 
APEK’s approval. The Commission however 
notes that the current level of these wholesale 
charges does not seem to be appropriate to foster 
competition, which is also clearly demonstrated 
by the current 100% market share of Telekom 
Slovenije in the two relevant wholesale markets. 
Accordingly, the application of the non-cost 
oriented wholesale charges (including the 
“reasonable” character of the wholesale charges 
to be applied during the transitional period) 
should be replaced by cost oriented wholesale 
charges within the shortest timeframe possible. 
 
1 - Access  LT/2005/0263  Operator-specific 
relevant markets.  National 
 
LTAB 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
The Commission made comments on:  
Market definition and SMP assessment 
relating to other providers of call termination 
services in fixed networks  
The Commission notes that RRT did not define  
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3 – Transparency (publication of a 
Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
relevant markets with regard to call termination 
services provided by other operators of fixed 
networks in Lithuania. The Commission would 
like to urge RRT to conduct the market 
assessment with regard to those other operators 
who provide wholesale fixed termination 
services in Lithuania as soon as possible. If 
appropriate and justified, RRT could impose 
differentiated remedies on those operators, by 
taking into account (for example) the size of the 
undertakings. 
KPN+ANOs: 1 – Access in markets 
(i), (ii) and (iv) 
KPN: 2 - Non-discrimination in 
markets (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
KPN+ANOs: 3 – Transparency in 
markets (i), (ii) and (iii) 
KPN: 4 - Reference Offer in markets 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
KPN: 5 – price cap in all markets 
ANOs: 6 – delayed reciprocity in 
markets (i), (ii) and (iii) 
NL/2005/0284 
four distinct 
relevant product 
markets susceptible 
to  ex ante 
regulation: (i) 
termination on 
geographical 
numbers on 
individual 
telephone 
networks, (ii) 
termination on 
088-numbers 
(companies or 
institutions) on 
individual 
telephone 
networks, (iii) 
termination on 
084- and 087-
numbers (personal 
assistance services) 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
KPN + ANOs  
 
KPN: 7- Accounting separation  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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on individual 
telephone 
networks, and (iv) 
termination on 112 
number 
(emergency 
services) 
on individual 
telephone network 
 
All operators 
1 - Access 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Price control 
4 – Accounting separation  
CZ/2006/0358  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Cesky Telecom 
+ ANOs 
 
Cesky Telecom  
5 - Transparency 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
SIA Lattelekom  
1 – Access to call termination services 
and unbundled access to local loop 
LV/2006/0366  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
SIA Lattelekom 
+ 16 ANOs 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on:  
 
Obligation of local loop unbundling: 
In principle, the Commission agrees with  
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3 – Transparency 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting  
5 - Accounting separation 
ANOs 
 
1 - Transparency 
SPRK’s finding that the lack of access to the 
end customer is a significant obstacle to enter 
the wholesale markets for fixed origination 
(and termination) and an impediment to the 
development of competitive electronic 
communication markets. However, wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared access) to 
the local loops and sub-loops for the purpose of 
providing broadband and voice services is 
identified as a separate market susceptible to ex 
ante regulation in the Commission’s 
Recommendation on the relevant markets 
(market 11). Indeed, access to local loops is 
neither from the demand-side nor from the 
supply-side substitutable with wholesale call 
origination services. The Commission hence 
considers that LLU (including the publication 
of a reference offer for access to local loops) 
should not be imposed as a remedy in market 8 
without prior proper analysis of market 11. 
Instead, pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Framework Directive, SPRK is invited carry 
out an analysis of the market for wholesale 
unbundled access to the local loops market in 
view of determining whether this market is 
effectively competitive and, if one or more 
undertakings are found to have SMP on this 
market, impose appropriate regulatory 
obligations.  
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IT/2006/0384 
- call termination 
on individual 
public telephone 
networks provided 
at a fixed 
location; 
– Internet dial-up 
call termination;  
– call termination 
on international 
networks. 
Geographic 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
Telecom Italia 
("TI") + 11 
ANOs 
TI 
1 – Access 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of the 
Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control (based on network 
cap) and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation  
6 – CS/CPS 
 
The Commission made comments on: 
Legal certainty of regulatory obligations 
Obligations imposed under the Access Directive 
should be based on the nature of the problem 
identified, proportionate and justified in the light 
of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive. Where an NRA intends to 
impose different remedies on different operators 
within similarly defined markets, such 
differential treatment should be adequately 
reasoned. In order to increase legal certainty 
AGCOM should reconsider the need to specify 
the glide path preferably in the final measure. 
Moreover, in order to better safeguard the 
interest of consumers, the AGCOM is invited to 
develop a cost model as soon as possible for 
calculating ANOs’ termination rates that, while 
being based on costs takes into account the 
necessity for ANOs to become efficient over 
time. 
Obligations related to the wholesale market 
for Internet dial-up call termination 
After conducting the three criteria test, AGCOM 
concludes that this market is not susceptible to 
ex ante regulation. AGCOM therefore proposes 
to withdraw the existing regulation on this 
market. 
However, the Commission notes that AGCOM,  
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ANOs 
1 – Access 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency  
4 – Price control through imposition of 
a maximum termination rate. 
 
while proposing to withdraw the cost orientation 
obligation on TI’s dial-up termination service, 
intends to maintain the 
transparency, non-discrimination and accounting 
separation obligations at least until the review of 
the retail market for Internet dial-up access 
(which is presently regulated). 
AGCOM considers this necessary in order to 
avoid cross subsidies. Without contesting the 
conclusion reached by AGCOM on the 
wholesale market for Internet dial-up call 
termination, the Commission invites AGCOM to 
analyse its retail market for internet dial-up 
access in the shortest delay possible and notify it 
in accordance with Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive, and reminds AGCOM 
that appropriate obligations can only be imposed 
upon finding of SMP in a particular market. 
Since the market for wholesale internet dial-up 
call termination has not been found susceptible 
to ex ante regulation, AGCOM is obliged to lift 
all obligations previously imposed on this 
market. 
Withdrawal of obligations on the market for 
call termination on international 
networks 
While confirming the intention to remove the 
current regulations imposed on TI, AGCOM 
believes that it is necessary to begin an analysis 
of the international termination market in order 
to identify whether there are currently certain 
specific international directions that do not pass  
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the criteria set out in the Recommendation, due 
to specific, non transitory problems. 
The Commission reminds AGCOM to notify the 
results of such market analysis in accordance 
with Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
1 - Provision of Access on reasonable 
request. 
2 - Non-discrimination 
Deviation to the  
Recommendation: 
inclusion of call 
termination to non-
geographic 
numbers 
 
 
3 – Transparency (publication of 
Reference Access Offer) 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
PL/2006/0381 
Partially 
withdrawn by the 
NRA as to - call 
termination to 
access numbers for 
intelligent network 
services 
Geographic 
coverage of the 
incumbent 
network = 
geographic 
extent of its 
relevant market 
Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A. 
("TP") 
 
5 - Accounting separation. 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Price control before approval of LRIC cost 
calculation 
UKE has not clearly specified in its measure on 
which criteria it will verify the appropriateness 
of call termination charges proposed by TP prior 
to the approval of its LRIC-based cost 
calculation by an independent auditor. 
This approach fails to provide adequate 
transparency and legal certainty for market 
players, in particular since no timing is foreseen 
by which the LRIC-based cost calculation of the 
SMP  operator must be approved. 
The Commission therefore invites UKE to  
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including audio 
text services (0-
300, 0-400, 0-70X, 
0-80X); 
- call termination to 
numbers used for 
special subscribers 
services. 
 
clarify in the final measure which verification 
method it will use to approve the call 
termination charges proposed by the SMP 
operator before the cost calculation has been 
conclusively approved. The verification method 
that UKE will use in this interim period should 
ensure that the SMP operator, without delay, 
offers wholesale termination services at prices 
which allow competition to develop. UKE may 
in particular want to consider imposing retail-
minus price regulation pending the approval of 
LRIC based prices. 
Maltacom: 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency 
4 – Cost orientation and cost  
accounting 
 
MT/2006/0388  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
Geographic 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
 
Maltacom and 
Melita cable 
 
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on:  
 
Level of termination charges – 
implementation of cost orientation 
Currently, Maltacom is obliged to implement a 
cost-based accounting system using a fully 
allocated cost methodology on a historic cost 
base. The MCA is considering a move to a 
current cost regime, which would, according to 
the MCA, reduce the impact of legacy costs and 
thus reduce these charges but does not specify 
when such a change could be implemented. 
Considering that Maltacom’s interconnection 
charges for call termination are among the 
highest in the EU17 the Commission invites the 
MCA to revise its price control obligations as 
soon as possible in order to accelerate 
interconnection tariff reduction. As an 
intermediate solution, until a new price control  
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Melita cable 
 
 
 
1 – Access 
 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
 
 
3 – Transparency 
 
4 - Price control through imposition of 
a maximum termination rate. 
model is implemented, the MCA could 
temporarily base its price control obligations on 
international benchmarking. 
BE/2006/0440  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
Belgacom +  
Belgacom 
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1 – Access and interconnection 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
4 – Accounting separation  
ANOs 
 
1 - Access and interconnection 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
 
 
3 - Transparency 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
8 ANOs 
 
 
4- Prohibition of excessive pricing 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
CY/2006/0474  Similar to the  Geographic  ATHK,  Primetel  ATHK  The Commission made comments on:   
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1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency including the 
obligation to disclose all information 
needed and to 
publish a Reference Offer (including 
additional facilities such as co-location) 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
Primetel and 
OTEnet 
 
1 -  non-discrimination, 
2 -  transparency, 
3 - accounting separation (when the 
operator’s annual turnover reaches 50 
million €) 
Recommendation. 
 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
and 
OTEnet 
 
4 - price control (fair and reasonable 
prices 
 
Remedies imposed on D.Y. Worldnet, Callsat 
and Telepassport 
OCECPR proposes to decide, already at this 
stage, on the set of obligations to be imposed on 
the three alternative operators once they become 
active in the market for wholesale call 
termination. OCECPR’s decision is based on the 
assumption that the three operators will start to 
provide wholesale call termination within the 12 
to 18 months timeframe of the review. 
The Commission reminds OCECPR that 
remedies may only be imposed on undertakings 
which are considered to have SMP on the 
relevant market after an analysis of their 
position on that market, which normally 
presupposes that these undertakings are already 
active on the market (either by supplying the 
product internally and/or to third parties) when 
the SMP assessment is made. Therefore, the 
Commission invites OCECPR to reassess and 
notify the call termination markets of the three 
alternative operators referred to above as soon as 
they enter the market and not to adopt the 
proposed measures at this stage.  
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EL/2006/0494 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
Geographic 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
 
OTE + 13 ANOs 
 
OTE 
 
1 – Access 
 
 
2 – CS/CPS 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
 
3 – Transparency (including the 
obligation  
publish a Reference Interconnection 
Offer) 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
5 – Accounting separation and auditing 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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ANOs 
 
1- provide wholesale termination to 
other providers of public telephone 
networks; 
 
 
2 - transparency, (including an 
obligation to announce interconnection 
charges to other providers and EETT 
with a 1-month prior notice); 
 
3 - non-discrimination; 
 
 
4 - price control through the imposition 
of maximum termination and cost 
accounting. 
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LU/2006/0546  Notification withdrawn by the NRA 
 
 
1 - Access 
 
 
 
 
2- Non-discrimination 
 
 
PL/2006/0502 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
 
Geographic 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
29 ANOs 
 
 
3 - Transparency 
 
 
 
The Commission made a comment on:  
 
Non-imposition of price regulation on the 
alternative operators 
The Commission reiterates that obligations 
imposed under the Access Directive should 
be based on the nature of the problem identified, 
proportionate and justified in the light of the 
objectives laid down in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive. The remedies should 
provide adequate transparency and legal 
certainty for market players. 
Furthermore, where an NRA intends to impose 
different remedies on different operators within 
similarly defined markets, such differential 
treatment should be adequately reasoned. 
The Commission takes note of the reasons why 
UKE does not consider it necessary to 
impose price regulation on the alternative 
operators under the given national market 
circumstances, in particular the limited degree of 
asymmetry in cases where it exists, the 
decreasing termination rates of alternative 
operators even in the absence of price regulation  
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and their higher cost of terminating a call, as 
well as the significantly smaller scope of 
operation than that of the incumbent operator.  
However, the Commission invites UKE to 
closely monitor the development of 
alternative operators’ termination rates. If the 
expected trend of further price decreases does 
not materialise or if the level of asymmetry with 
TP’s termination rates increases, UKE should 
intervene and impose effective price regulation 
also on the alternative operators. Generally, the 
most appropriate means to achieve effectively 
regulated termination rates would be to base 
their calculation on a cost model that takes into 
account the necessity for alternative operators to 
become efficient over time. Given the EU-wide 
importance of such a model, UKE is invited to 
work in close co-operation with the European 
Regulators Group in order to arrive at a coherent 
approach that also takes into account the work of 
other NRAs. 
AT/2006/0544 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
 
Geographic 
coverage of  
each network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
 
Telekom Austria 
+ 11 ANOs 
Telecom Austria 
1 – Access 
 
 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
 
The Commission made a comment on:  
 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation 
According to the Recitals 5 and 6 and Article 4 
of the Access Directive, undertakings should 
negotiate their access and interconnection 
agreements in good faith. 
Nevertheless, the Commission services would 
like to reiterate that the competitive problems  
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3 – Transparency (including the 
obligation  
publish a Reference Interconnection 
Offer) 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
 
5 – Accounting separation  
 
ANOs 
 
1 – maximum termination rates based 
on benchmarking 
 
 
identified should be tackled as soon and as 
efficiently as possible in order to guarantee 
transparency and legal certainty. In particular, it 
should be recalled that the rate for regional 
termination of TA serves as a benchmark for the 
termination of  ANOs. Therefore the 
Commission invites the TKK to specify in the 
present SMP 
decision how the cost-orientation obligation of 
TA should be implemented in practice. 
Regarding the possibility of ANOs to request 
higher termination rates, the 
Commission recalls that such termination rates, 
while being based on costs, take into account the 
necessity for ANOs to become efficient over 
time. 
Reduction of minimum interconnection loads 
Minimum interconnection loads, depending on 
their level, might imply an unjustified refusal to 
supply in the markets for wholesale voice call 
origination and termination markets. The 
Commission is of the opinion that it would be 
more effective that the TKK decides upon 
minimum loads in the present SMP decision, 
and not in a dispute settlement procedure. 
Therefore the TKK is invited to address this 
issue in the present SMP decision, for instance 
through reducing the minimum number of traffic 
minutes to the extent that the minimum   
interconnection loads would exceed the level 
which TA is able to economically and/or 
technically justify.  
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EPT 
 
1 – Access and interconnection 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (including the 
obligation  
publish a Reference Offer) 
 
3 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
4 – Accounting separation  
ANOs 
 
1 - Access and interconnection 
LU/2006/0560  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
EPT 
+  
8 ANOs 
 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
 
3 - Transparency  
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
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4 - Price control (obligation to 
charge reasonable prices). 
 
 
1 – Non-discrimination 
2 – Transparency  
 
BE/2007/0588 
(related to case 
BE/2006/0440) 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
11 additional 
ANOs 
 
3 – Price control 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
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EE/2007/0598  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Elion and 11 
ANOs  1 – access (only Elion) 
Non-imposition of an access obligation on the 
market for call termination on 
ANOs' networks. 
On the market for call termination in Estonia 
SIDEAMET does not intend to 
impose an access obligation on ANOs. In its 
response to the request for 
information SIDEAMET explains that, 
according to the Estonian Electronic 
Communications Act ("EECA"), operators 
providing network services are 
required, at the request of another operator, to 
negotiate the interconnection in  
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2 – non discrimination 
good faith if this is necessary for the provision 
of communications services. 
Further to the obligation to negotiate, the EECA 
provides, according to 
SIDEAMET, that an operator may terminate 
contractual negotiations and refuse 
to enter into an access or interconnection 
agreement only if the creation of 
technical conditions for interconnection or 
access is unreasonably burdensome or 
the interconnection or access damages the 
integrity of its network, while in other 
cases an undertaking is obliged to provide 
access. SIDEAMET considers that the  
EN  248    EN 
3 - transparency 
above provisions of the EECA are sufficient in 
the case of ANOs to prevent the 
problem of access denial. 
While recognising that ANOs in general have an 
economic interest to 
interconnect, the Commission is of the view that 
any general interconnection 
obligation that might stem from the Estonian 
legislation would not resolve swiftly 
eventual access problems such as delaying 
tactics compared to a more specific 
access obligation imposed as a result of a market 
analysis. SIDEAMET itself  
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3 – price control and cost accounting 
admits that the general legislation as such is not 
sufficient to guarantee access 
when justifying the access obligation imposed 
on Elion. Therefore the 
Commission invites SIDEAMET to impose 
effective access obligations also on ANOs. 
Asymmetry of termination rates 
The Commission reiterates that obligations 
imposed under the Access Directive 
should be based on the nature of the problem 
identified, proportionate and 
justified in the light of the objectives laid down 
in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive. The remedies should provide 
adequate transparency and legal certainty 
for market players. Where an NRA intends to 
impose different remedies on 
different operators within similarly defined 
markets, such differential treatment 
should be adequately reasoned. 
In the present case the Commission notes the 
arguments put forward by 
SIDEAMET-  inter alia ANOs’ weaker 
economies of scale and scope and large  
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differences in volumes of terminated traffic – to 
justify asymmetric remedies. 
However, the fact that an operator has a smaller 
market share can only justify 
higher termination rates for a limited transitory 
period. The persistence of higher 
termination rate would not be justified after a 
period long enough for the operator 
to adapt to market conditions and become more 
efficient. 
Consequently, in order to increase legal 
certainty and to better safeguard the 
interest of consumers, the Commission invites 
SIDEAMET to consider the 
development of a cost model for the calculation 
of termination rates of ANOs, 
which, while being based on costs, takes into 
account the necessity for ANOs to 
become more efficient over time 
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Market 10: Transit services in the fixed public telephone network 
 
               
Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
 Access / 
interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency Price control / cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria* YES  No SMP found 
Finland YES  14  operators  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
France YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Hungary YES  No SMP found 
Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  No SMP found 
Sweden YES 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
United 
Kingdom NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES NO  NO  
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Netherlands NO**  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Malta NO**  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Spain YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium YES 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech 
Republic YES  No SMP found 
Slovakia YES 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus NO**  1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxemburg  Not susceptible to ex ante regulation 
Denmark  Withdrawn by the NRA 
Estonia  Withdrawn by the NRA 
* On 20 October 2004, the Commission vetoed the draft measure. TKK re-notified its market analysis. 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets 
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Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007           
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Market 10: Transit services in the fixed public telephone network 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Provision of network Access on 
reasonable request. 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
4 - Charge control  
5 - Transparency 
UK/2003/0015-
16 
Local tandem 
conveyance and 
transit on fixed 
public 
narrowband 
networks (Case 
UK/2003/0015) 
and market for 
transit services on 
fixed public 
narrowband 
networks 
(UK/2003/0016). 
National 
(excluding the 
Hull area) 
BT 
6 - Accounting separation. 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other than 
the Commission and other NRAs: Any material 
modification to the notified draft measure will 
require the draft measure to be re-notified under 
Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.  
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UK/2004/0045 
(further 
amended by 
cases 
UK/2005/0217-
0218) 
See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016. 
 Financial reporting obligations (in 
addition to the remedies imposed in 
Cases UK/2003/0015-0016).  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Publication of a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting systems: It 
is necessary for a statement concerning 
compliance with the cost accounting system to be 
published annually, following verification by a 
qualified independent body. 
 
National consultation running in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material modification 
to the draft measure as a consequence of 
comments made by interested parties in the 
framework of the national consultation will require 
the draft measure to be re-notified. 
UK/2004/0072  See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016. 
Modifications to the charge control 
obligation already imposed on BT in 
cases UK/2003/0015-0016. 
No comments made by the Commission. 
UK/2005/0164-
0165  See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016 
In relation to the market for ITC/ITT 
services, all SMP obligations imposed 
previously on BT were withdrawn 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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In the market for LTC/LTT services 
previous obligations are maintained 
(see cases UK/2003/0015-0016). In 
addition, the following amendments to 
previous obligations were made: 
1- Revised charge control  
2 - Amendments to the requirement (i) 
not to unduly discriminate and (ii) to 
notify charges, terms and conditions. 
National transit: 
not analysed  1 - Interconnection   FI/2004/0043     
 12 separate 
local transit 
markets and 
one market for 
nationwide 
transit services 
Following SMP 
operators in 
local transit 
markets: 
2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms 
and tariff information  
The Commission declared the notification 
incomplete  on the following grounds: 
 
The analysis presented by Ficora was not 
sufficiently reasoned for the purposes of allowing 
the Commission to carry out its tasks, and to 
evaluate the notified draft measures. 
 
The notification lacked the appropriate 
argumentation for excluding national transit traffic 
from the market analysis.  
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Auria Networks 
Oy, Elisa Oy, 
Kesnet Oy, KPY 
Verkot Oy, 
Kymen Puhelin 
Oy, Länsilinkki 
Oy, Mikkelin 
Puhelin Oy, 
Oulun Puhelin 
Oy, Satakunnan 
Puhelin Oy, 
Sonera Carrier 
Networks Oy, 
Soon Net Oy, 
Telepohja Oy, 
Tikka Networks 
Oy, Vaasan 
Läänin Puhelin 
Oy 
3 - Non-discrimination obligations 
concerning pricing and other terms 
FI/2004/0075   Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 12 separate 
local transit 
markets and 
one market for 
Auria Networks 
Oy, Elisa Oy, 
Kesnet Oy, KPY 
Verkot Oy, 
1 - Interconnection   No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms 
and tariff information  
nationwide 
transit services 
Kymen Puhelin 
Oy, Länsilinkki 
Oy, Mikkelin 
Puhelin Oy, 
Oulun Puhelin 
Oy, Satakunnan 
Puhelin Oy, 
Sonera Carrier 
Networks Oy, 
Soon Net Oy, 
Telepohja Oy, 
Tikka Networks 
Oy, Vaasan 
Läänin Puhelin 
Oy 
3 - Non-discrimination obligations 
concerning pricing and other terms 
1 - Obligation to meet reasonable 
requests for interconnection  
2 - Cost-orientation  
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Accounting separation  
5 - Transparency (reference offer) 
SE/2004/0051  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  TeliaSonera 
Sverige AB  
6 - Obligation to meet reasonable 
requests for direct billing and cascade 
billing agreements 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
National consultation run in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material modification 
to the draft measure as a consequence of 
comments made by interested parties in the 
framework of the national consultation will require 
the draft measure to be re-notified. 
AT/2004/0090  Market including 
self-supply 
National  No SMP found  No remedies were imposed  The Commission issued a veto decision, on the 
following grounds: insufficient evidence for the  
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AT/2007/0590 
(re-notification 
of a vetoed draft 
measure) 
through direct 
interconnection. 
inclusion of self-provision through direct 
interconnection in the market, results of the market 
analysis and on the importance of applying a 
thorough greenfield analysis. 
As regards re-notified market analysis 
(AT/2007/0590), the Commission made the 
following comment: 
Tendency towards effective competition 
Considering the specific features and 
developments as set out below of the Austrian 
wholesale market of transit services (low barriers 
to entry in view of the relatively 
limited number of local switches in TA's network 
and the existing collocation of various 
alternative operators in those switches, the existing 
degree of duplication of the TA's 
network, the presence of alternative operators 
supplying nation-wide transit services in 
competition with the incumbent and the existence 
of countervailing buying power) the 
Commission agrees with TKK’s proposal to 
withdraw ex ante regulation from that 
market. 
On the basis of the information provided by TKK, 
it would seem that there are no high  
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and non-transitory barriers to enter the transit 
market in Austria and that the market, in 
the absence of regulation, would tend towards 
effective competition within the meaning 
of the three criteria test set out in the 
Recommendation. 
The Commission services are therefore of the 
opinion, on the basis of the up-to-date 
market information provided, that the market for 
transit service in Austria does not meet 
the three criteria that render a market susceptible 
to ex ante regulation. In view thereof, the precise 
scope of the relevant market and the question 
whether TA has SMP on the relevant market can 
be left open. 
 
 
Deutsche 
Telekom AG 
1 - Access (including interconnection 
services, collocation) 
In case DE/2005/0145, the Commission made a 
comment with regard to the determination of 
remedies at a later stage. 
DE/2005/0145, 
DE/2005/0235 
(remedies) 
Five separate 
markets for transit 
services:  
i) transit services 
in the fixed public 
telephone network 
plus call 
origination for 
carrier (pre-) 
National 
No SMP was 
found in the 
market for 
transit services 
2 - Non-discrimination  In case DE/2005/0235, the Commission made a 
comment on:  
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selection services; 
ii) transit services 
in the fixed public 
telephone network 
plus origination of 
calls to value-
added services; 
iii) transit services 
in the fixed public 
telephone network 
plus call 
origination for 
dial-up internet 
services; 
iv) transit services 
in the fixed public 
telephone network 
plus call 
termination in 
national networks 
excepting calls 
originating and 
terminating in 
national mobile 
networks and 
v) transit services 
in the fixed public 
telephone network 
for calls 
originating and 
terminating in 
national mobile 
networks.  
in the fixed 
public telephone 
network for calls 
originating and 
terminating in 
national mobile 
networks, i.e., 
market 5. 
3 - Price control (in relation to 
interconnection, conveyance and 
collocation) 
Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross-
subsidisation arising from the operations of a 
vertically- integrated company, the Commission 
invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing 
transparency and legal certainty to consider 
imposing accounting separation as a separate 
measure. 
HU/2005/0153  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies were proposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  262    EN 
1 - Transparency  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Access to and use of specific 
network facilities on reasonable request 
4 - Price control and cost accounting 
IE/2005/0192  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National 
(international 
transit services 
are 
distinguished 
from the 
market for 
national transit 
services) 
Eircom  
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
Further consultations planned by ComReg: The 
draft measures relating to the details and 
implementation of the obligations of cost 
accounting, accounting separation and wholesale 
price caps are required to be notified under Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
PT/2005/0154  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies were imposed 
The Commission commented that the elements 
provided by Anacom to find that the relevant 
market would not meet the three criteria test 
should be further developed. Irrespective of 
whether, as a result of the three criteria test, the 
Portuguese market for transit services in the fixed 
public networks could be found to be susceptible 
to ex ante regulation, the market analysis in this 
particular case would still not have led to a finding 
of SMP.  
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1 - Access to, and use of specific 
network facilities 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation  
FR/2005/0229  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National France  Télécom 
5 - Price control and cost accounting 
obligations 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Non-discrimination 
2 - Transparency 
3 – Price control 
DE/2005/0255 
(remedies 
related to case 
DE/2005/0145) 
See cases DE/2005/0145 and DE/2005/0235 
 
4 - obligation to make internal transfer 
prices transparent and to make them 
accessible to BNetzA upon request 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 -  Access to and use of specific 
network facilities on reasonable request 
SI/2006/0274  Similar to the 
Recommendation, 
except for the 
exclusion of transit 
services provided 
National  Telecom 
Slovenije 
2 - Non-discrimination  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Appropriateness of remedies  
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via direct 
interconnection 
since routed 
through the 
mobile network 
without using 
switches. 
 
3 - Transparency 
 
As regards APEK’s justification for not imposing 
any price regulation, the Commission would like 
to point out that the mere fact that no complaints 
have been made concerning pricing does not 
necessarily mean that a problem of excessive 
pricing could not exist in the relevant market, in 
particular taking into account that Telekom 
Slovenije is currently in practice the only provider 
of transit services. The Commission notes the 
limited competition in the retail markets for 
telephony services in Slovenia. For a potential new 
entrant in retail markets which has not yet rolled 
out its own infrastructure, the reliance on direct 
interconnection is not likely to be feasible in the 
short term. Furthermore, full and effective 
enforcement of the wholesale obligations imposed 
in related wholesale markets have impact on the 
competitive conditions of supply at the 
downstream retail level. Therefore, the 
Commission would like to invite APEK to closely 
monitor the wholesale transit market, in particular 
with a view to potential pricing problems and to 
intervene if any such problems occur. 
NL/2006/0285 
 
three distinct 
product markets: (i) 
wholesale local 
conveyance  National KPN 
in the market for local conveyance 
services:  
1- provision of access,  
2 - non-discrimination,  
3 - provision of reference 
offer,  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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4 - cost orientation,  
5 - accounting separation 
 
in the market for regional conveyance 
services: 1 - acceptation of reasonable 
requests for access under similar 
conditions as KPN has 
provided in the past, 2 - cost orientation 
and report to OPTA of new or changed 
wholesale interregional 
services, including bundles containing 
such services 
conveyance 
services, defined as 
conveyance 
between regional 
switches, and (iii) 
wholesale 
transit services, 
defined as the 
transmission of 
traffic from one 
network to another 
network by 
a third party 
 
in the market for 
transit services: 1 - access, 2 - non-
discrimination, 3 - provision of a 
reference offer, 4 - no 
price discrimination 
1 - Access to, and use of specific 
network facilities 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Price control and cost accounting  
LT/2006/0319 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation 
National LTAB 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 - Access to, and use of specific 
network facilities 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Price control and cost accounting  
LV/2006/0367  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National SIA  Lattelekom 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of the 
Reference Offer) 
4 – Price control (based on the network 
cap) and cost accounting 
5 - Accounting separation 
IT/2006/0385 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
Telecom Italia  
 
6 – CS/CPS 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency  
MT/2006/0389 
 
2 distinct markets 
for national and 
international transit 
services 
 
National 
 
SMP found only 
in the market for 
international 
transit services: 
Maltacom  4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
Reference Offer) 
4 – Cost orientation and cost  
accounting 
 
ES/2006/0404 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
TESAU 
 
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on:  
Consideration of differentiated remedies 
The ability to provide geographically ubiquitous 
transit services in Spain still depends on the transit 
services provided by TESAU. Due to inter alia 
low traffic volumes, there are routes and services 
which are exclusively or almost exclusively 
provided by TESAU. However, at the same time 
alternative  operators appear to have gained a 
substantial share of the market in some part of the 
overall transit market, most likely corresponding to 
certain thick routes (seemingly without 
constraining TESAU’s behaviour on the thin 
routes). Therefore, the Commission would like to 
invite CMT to explore the possibility to take these 
different competitive conditions into account in 
designing the final remedies in the notified market, 
in particular as regards the scope of the cost 
orientation obligation. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
Reference Offer) 
BE/2006/0441   
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
 
National   
Belgacom 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost 
accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 – Accounting separation 
 
CZ/2006/0448 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
 
National 
 
No SMP found 
 
No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment on:  
Additional information provided: The 
Commission would like to invite CTU, in order to 
motivate its findings, to include in its final 
measure the additional 
information provided in the course of this 
procedure, relating to, inter alia, market shares 
excluding captive sales, tariffs, and provision by 
alternative operators of transit services to third 
parties. 
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency  
4 – price control and cost accounting 
SK/2006/0470 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
 
National 
 
Slovak Telecom 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access  CY/2006/0475   
 
National   
2 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 – Transparency including the 
obligation to disclose all information 
needed and to 
publish a Reference Offer (including 
additional facilities such as co-location) 
 
4 – price control and cost accounting 
2 distinct markets 
for national and 
international transit 
services 
 
ATHK 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
 
1 - Access 
 
 
2 – CS/CPS 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
EL/2006/0495 
 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National 
 
OTE 
 
3 – Transparency (including the 
obligation  
publish a Reference Interconnection 
Offer) 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
 
5 – Accounting separation and auditing 
 
LU/2006/0542 
 
Not susceptible to ex ante regulation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
DK/2006/0525  Notification withdrawn by the NRA 
EE/2007/0599 
 
Notification withdrawn by the NRA 
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Market 11: Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access)  
 
                
Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
Access / interconnection  Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / 
cost accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Denmark YES  1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland YES  44  operators  YES  YES**  YES  YES**  YES** 
France YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany YES  1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Portugal YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES** 
Italy   YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
The Netherlands  YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES NO 
Greece YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Spain YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxemburg YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Austria*** YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
EN  273    EN 
Malta YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland*** NO*  39  operators YES  YES  YES  YES  YES** 
Estonia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
                       
* Includes cable connections.              
** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
*** Second review 
              
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007           
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Market 11: Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice 
services 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case reference  Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Obligation to lease part of a local loop 
and equipment facilities (on all SMP 
operators) 
2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms 
and tariff information (on all SMP 
operators) 
3 - Obligation concerning pricing and 
other terms (cost orientation and non-
discrimination) (on certain SMP 
operators) 
4 - Cost accounting procedures (on 
certain SMP operators) 
FI/2003/0030  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  44 local markets  44 former local 
monopolies 
5 - Accounting separation (on certain 
SMP operators) 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Imposition of remedies: Where Ficora 
intends to impose different remedies on 
different operators within similarly defined 
markets the reasons for such differential 
treatment should be adequately reasoned. 
Further, Ficora should monitor market 
developments.  
 
Cost orientation and cost accounting 
obligations:  The Commission expresses 
concerns on the approach not to specify the 
method on which cost orientation will be 
assessed, which it believes will limit the 
measure’s contribution to consumer benefit, 
the enhancement of competition and the 
development of the internal market.  
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1 - Access obligations 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
IE/2004/0046  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National eircom 
5 - Price control and cost accounting 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Costing methodology for the 
implementation of the cost orientation 
obligation: In view of the relatively high 
prices and low penetration rate of LLU in 
Ireland, ComReg was invited to monitor 
market developments carefully, and especially 
(i) how the implementation of the proposed 
forward-looking long run incremental cost 
methodology would be more effective at 
addressing the lack of effective competition in 
the provision of fully unbundled lines, shared 
lines, collocation and associated facilities, 
than the current obligation of fully distributed 
costs and (ii) how and to what extent these 
would positively impact on the level of prices 
and the numbers of fully unbundled and 
shared access lines in Ireland.   
 
National consultation running in parallel 
with Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to 
be re-notified. 
SE/2004/0084  Similar to the  National  TeliaSonera AB  1 - Access obligation  No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Cost orientation (LRIC) and cost 
accounting 
3 - Non-discrimination 
Recommendation. 
4 - Transparency (reference offer) 
1 - Provision of access on reasonable 
request 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
UK/2003/0094 
The wholesale local 
access market, in 
addition to 
traditional copper 
local loops also 
including cable 
connections. 
2 separate 
markets (the UK 
excluding the 
Hull area and 
respectively the 
Hull area) 
BT (UK 
excluding the 
Hull area) and 
Kingston (the 
Hull area) 
4 - Transparency 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Product market definition, including both 
copper loop-based and cable-based 
wholesale local accesses: When including 
cable-based wholesale services in the relevant 
market, consideration should be given to the 
technical, practical and economic feasibility 
for cable operators to offer facilities 
equivalent to unbundled local loops. The 
indirect pricing constraint stemming from the 
substitutability at the retail level and the 
potential competition of cable-based 
wholesale local access could have been taken 
into account at the stage of assessment of 
SMP. Notwithstanding, while this approach 
may have led to a narrower market definition 
and there remain doubts as to whether cable-
based wholesale products (whether currently 
or prospectively) form part of the market, the 
exclusion of cable-based wholesale services 
from the market definition in this particular 
case would not have led to a different result in  
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5 - Collocation 
6 - Accounting separation (on BT only 
the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion 
on the exact scope of the market was not 
relevant for the SMP assessment. 
UK/2004/0123  See Case UK/2003/0094. 
Slight modification of the remedies 
already notified because of the 
establishment of the Telecommunications 
Adjudicator.  
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Provision of access to metallic loops 
and sub-loops on reasonable request by a 
third party 
 2 - Publication of a Reference 
Unbundling Offer within one month of 
issue of TKK’s decision 
3 - Cost-oriented prices according to the 
cost of efficient service provision 
 4 - Non-discrimination 
AT/2004/0098 
(dispute 
settlement 
AT/2005/0318) 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telekom  Austria 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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6 - Cost accounting providing for the cost 
of efficient service provision 
1 - Transparency (including the 
publication of technical specifications) 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Access to, and use of, specific 
network facilities  
SK/2004/0107  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Slovak  Telecom 
5 - Price control, including the obligation 
of cost-orientation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed cost 
orientation obligation: As TÚSR failed to 
provide adequate transparency and legal 
certainty for market players by specifying the 
details of the proposed cost orientation 
obligation, the Commission had concerns as to 
whether the proposed price control obligation 
will be effective at addressing the lack of 
effective competition in the relevant market, 
and requested that once adopted, TÚSR will 
notify the relevant implementing measures.   
 
National public consultation: NRAs must 
conduct a national consultation on each draft 
measure taken in accordance with the 
Framework Directive or the Specific 
Directives which have a significant impact on 
the relevant market. 
1 - Provide access to and use of specific 
network facilities  PT/2004/0117  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  PT Comunicações  
2 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Costing methodology for the 
implementation of the price control 
obligation: Anacom was invited to follow  
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3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
5 - Price control and cost accounting 
6 - Provide accounting information 
market developments carefully and to assess 
whether a forward looking approach long-run 
incremental cost model would not be more 
appropriate than the fully distributed historic 
costs model, originally proposed by 
ANACOM.  
DE/2004/0119, 
DE/2005/0150 
(remedies) 
The wholesale 
market for 
unbundled access 
(including shared 
access) to metallic 
loops and sub-loops 
for the purpose of 
providing broadband 
and voice services, 
also including 
unbundled access to 
local loops on the 
basis of OPAL and 
National Deutsche  Telekom 
1 - Fully unbundled access to the local 
loop in the form of a copper pair and 
shared access 
In case DE/2004/0119, the Commission made 
comments on: 
 
Consideration of fibre glass connections to 
end-users: Relying on the Recommendation 
and the SMP Guidelines, RegTP excluded 
fibre glass connections from the scope of the 
relevant market (and thus from the market 
analysis). However, to the extent that fibre 
glass connections can be used to offer 
wholesale unbundled access to local loops and  
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2 - Bundled access to the local loop in the 
form of a copper pair at the main 
distribution frame, including to the 
OPAL/ISIS variant 
ISIS2 at the main 
distribution frame or 
subloops. 
3 - Collocation 
sub-loops for the purposes of providing 
broadband and voice services, like metallic 
loops and sub-loops, they may thus, on the 
basis of specific national circumstances, form 
part of market 11. Fibre glass connections or 
part of them may also be found to belong to a 
separate market which is not in the 
Recommendation, subject to the three criteria 
test. In any event, since fibre lines are 
currently regulated in Germany, it needed to 
be emphasised that the possible maintenance, 
withdrawal or modification of current 
regulation needs to be based on a new market 
analysis in accordance with Article 16 of the 
Framework Directive.   
 
Remedies to be determined at a later stage: 
The Commission highlighted that RegTP will 
have to notify the remedies it intends to 
impose in 
the markets concerned under Article 7(3) of 
the Framework Directive. 
 
In case DE/2005/0150, the Commission made 
comments on:  
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4 - Non-discrimination 
5 - Transparency (reference unbundling 
offer) 
6 - Price control, based on the costs of the 
efficient provision of services 
 
Scope of the proposed remedies: As glass 
fibre connections in Germany may form part 
of market 11, the Commission questions 
whether the remedies notified on 25 February 
2005 in relation to that market should not also 
extend to glass fibre connections. 
 
Withdrawal by RegTP of DT’s obligation 
to provide access to its glass fibre 
connections: Despite the Commission’s 
comment in case DE/2004/0119, RegTP 
intends to withdraw DT’s existing obligation 
to provide access to its glass fibre connections 
without a market analysis as required by 
Article 27 in conjunction with Article 16 of 
the Framework Directive. In the absence of 
such a market analysis notified to it, the 
Commission is not in a position to assess the 
proposed withdrawal of existing regulation. 
Commission considers that the proposed 
withdrawal of the existing regulation for 
access to pure glass fibres is not made 
pursuant to a market analysis based on a 
market definition that has been duly notified 
to the Commission.  
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7 - Communication of the location of 
local loops and of collocation spaces to 
interested parties on request 
1 - Access on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Transparency 
4 - Cost accounting (fully distributed 
common costs) 
5 - Price control 
SI/2005/0142  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telekom  Slovenije 
6 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Choice of an appropriate cost accounting 
methodology to prevent margin squeeze: 
APEK indicated that the price for fully 
unbundled access to the local loop in Slovenia 
is substantially higher than retail access price 
and gives rise to a likely margin squeeze 
creating thus an obstacle for operators to enter 
the market and preventing the existence of 
effective competition at the retail level. APEK 
considered the forward looking LRIC cost 
accounting method to be the most appropriate 
for the evaluation of cost oriented prices for 
unbundled access to the local loops, but 
concluded, however, that this model would 
represent an excessive burden on Telekom 
Slovenije and is therefore not proportionate in 
the current conditions. However, the 
Commission had concerns as to whether the 
cost accounting methodology proposed will be 
effective at addressing the lack of effective 
competition in the relevant market, at least in 
the medium term.  
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1 - Price control and cost accounting 
obligations (prolongation by 6 months of 
the period for implementing the cost 
orientation obligation) 
SI/2005/0181  See Case SI/2005/0142. 
2 – Accounting separation obligation 
(requirement on Telekom Slovenije to 
render transparent its wholesale prices 
instead of both wholesale prices and 
internal transfer prices) 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Choice of an appropriate cost accounting 
methodology to prevent margin squeeze: In 
its revised notification APEK indicated that a 
possibility of price squeezes between the 
wholesale and retail prices of local loops 
cannot be fully excluded in Slovenia. APEK 
considered the forward looking LRIC cost 
accounting method to be the most appropriate 
for the evaluation of cost oriented prices for 
unbundled access to the local loops, but 
concluded, however, that this model would 
represent an excessive burden on Telekom 
Slovenije and is therefore not proportionate in 
the current conditions. However, the 
Commission had concerns as to whether the 
cost accounting methodology proposed will be 
effective at addressing the lack of effective 
competition in the relevant market, at least in 
the medium term. 
1 - Access 
FR/2005/0174 
(further details 
of remedies 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National France  Télécom 
2 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer) 
4 - Accounting separation 
FR/2005/0301) 
5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
1 - Requirement to provide wholesale 
unbundled access at reasonable request 
2 - Price control and cost accounting 
(LRAIC) 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Non-discrimination  
DK/2005/0176 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
The market 
comprises 
additionally the 
services provided 
in those cases 
where a retail end-
user stops using the 
narrowband service 
(voice) provided 
over the local loop, 
but still keeps his 
broadband 
connection 
provided by his 
broadband 
operator. 
National TDC 
5 - Requirement to publish a reference 
offer 
No comments made by the Commission. 
HU/2005/0185  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
5 markets 
corresponding to 
the former 
Matáv Rt., 
Invitel 
Távközlési 
1 - Transparency  The Commission made comments on: 
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2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Obligation to provide access and 
interconnection 
5 - Particular obligations concerning 
facility sharing and co-location 
concession areas 
of the former 
concession 
operators 
Szolgáltató Rt., 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési Rt., 
Emitel 
Távközlési Rt. 
Monor Telefon 
Társaság Rt.  
6 - Price control and accounting 
separation 
Non-imposition of ex ante regulatory 
obligations concerning “out of use local 
loops”: Unless it is technically not possible or 
economically not viable to unbundle a 
particular local loop that has been out of use, 
“out of use” loops should be included in the 
relevant market, and made subject to the 
remedies proposed for local loops in use. 
Choice of an appropriate cost accounting 
methodology:  NHH should follow market 
developments carefully and assess whether a 
forward looking approach long-run 
incremental cost model would not be more 
appropriate in addressing the lack of effective 
competition than the fully distributed cost 
model, originally proposed by NHH.  
1 - Access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU 
reference offer including a service level 
agreement 
(“SLA”)) 
IT/2005/0244  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telecom  Italia 
4 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 - Cost orientation (based on a network 
cap) and cost accounting 
1 - Access on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 – Transparency (publication of a reference 
offer) 
4 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
NL/2005/0280  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National KPN 
5 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Determination of the price cap: OPTA has 
devised four scenarios which are 
intended to reflect varying degrees of 
infrastructure competition. OPTA considers 
that the higher the degree of infrastructure 
competition, the 
greater should be the freedom of KPN to 
determine its own access prices. OPTA 
declares that the 2nd scenario –  prospect of 
development of infrastructure competition that 
should lead to durable competition after the 
time of revision” – is the most relevant 
scenario in this case. However, OPTA does 
not justify in concrete terms why it considers 
the 2nd scenario to be the most pertinent. In 
particular, OPTA states that wholesale access 
to cable networks, mobile networks, wireless 
networks or fibre-optic networks currently do 
not constitute substitutes to the local loop of 
KPN. In the light thereof, OPTA does not 
indicate why it believes that these 
infrastructures should lead to durable 
competition in the future. The Commission 
considers that OPTA should elaborate in its 
final measure its reasons for choosing 
the 2nd scenario.  
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Scope of accounting separation obligation: 
In order to facilitate the monitoring market for 
low quality wholesale broadband access 
(“WBA”) (case NL/2005/0281)and the 
application of competition law, OPTA should 
consider extending the scope of the 
accounting separation obligation proposed for 
the LLU-market to cover also the provision of 
low quality WBA. 
1 – Access on reasonable request 
including supplementary services such as 
co-location, 
and provision of updated information on 
the availability of network 
resources 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU 
reference offer) 
4 - Accounting separation 
CY/2006/0331  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National CYTA 
5 - Cost orientation  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 – Access on reasonable request 
including supplementary services such as 
co-location, 
and provision of updated information on 
the availability of network 
resources 
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer) 
CZ/2006/0340  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
Český Telecom  
 
4 – Price control 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 – Access on reasonable request  
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU 
reference offer including a Service Level 
Agreement ("SLA")) 
EL/2006/0353  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
OTE 
 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 – Access on reasonable request  
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU 
reference offer)  
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
 
ES/2006/0368  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
TESAU 
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
LT/2006/0391  Similar to the  National   
1 – Access on reasonable request  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU 
reference offer)  
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
Recommendation. 
 
Lietuvos 
Telekomas 
 
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 - Access on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
reference access offer) 
PL/2006/0418  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Telekomunikacja 
Polska SA 
("TP") 
4 – Price control 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Price control before approval of LRIC cost 
calculation 
UKE has not clearly specified in its measure 
the basis of the 
verification of the appropriateness of local 
loop unbundling charges proposed by TP prior 
to the approval of its FL LRIC-based cost  
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5 – Accounting separation 
calculation by an independent auditor. This 
approach might affect the transparency and 
legal certainty for market players, in particular 
since no timing is foreseen for the FL LRIC-
based cost calculation and approval thereof by 
the auditor. Therefore, UKE is invited to 
precisely clarify in the final measure which 
verification method it will use to approve the 
charges proposed by the SMP operator before 
the cost calculation has been conclusively 
approved. 
1 - Access on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
reference access offer) 
LU/2006/0509  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National EPT 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Details of the proposed price control 
obligation 
The cost-orientation obligation should be 
based on the costs of an efficient operator. 
However, the notification does not specify 
how the costs of an efficient operator will be 
calculated and which cost model will be used. 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the 
price control obligation imposed and to ensure 
legal certainty and transparency, the 
Commission invites ILR to clarify without 
delay the details and the timing of the 
implementation of the cost orientation 
obligation. 
SI/2006/0519  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National   
1 – Access on reasonable request  
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
 
Telekom 
Slovenije 
 
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 - Provision of access to metallic loops 
and sub-loops on reasonable request by a 
third party 
 2 – Transparency (Publication of a 
Reference Unbundling Offer) 
3 – Price control 
AT/2006/0537 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telekom  Austria 
 4 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 - Accounting separation 
1 – Access on reasonable request  
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency  (including the 
publication of a Reference Unbundling 
Offer) 
 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
LV/2006/0539  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
SIA Lattelekom  
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 – Access on reasonable request  
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
MT/2006/0549  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
Maltacom 
 
3 – Transparency  (including the 
publication of a Reference Offer) 
No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  294    EN 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
All 39 SMP operators: 
1 - Access on reasonable request  
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 – Transparency (publication of delivery 
terms and tariff information) 
FI/2006/0547  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  Regional 39  operators 
4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
obligations 
The Commission recalls the comment made in 
the first round notification with regard to the 
fact that FICORA did not specify the method 
on which cost orientation would be assessed. 
In the context of the adoption of the final 
measure, FICORA justified it by explaining 
that since the Finnish Communication Market 
Act leaves each operator free to select the 
cost-accounting procedures, it cannot decide 
on the cost-accounting methodology. The 
Commission continues to believe that this 
limits the measure’s contribution to consumer 
benefit, the enhancement of competition and 
the development of the internal market. 
  
EN  295    EN 
Only 15 SMP operators: 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
1 – Access and interconnection  
 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency  (including the 
publication of a Reference Offer) 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 
 
EE/2007/0577  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
 
Elion 
 
  
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
 
 
 
  
EN  296    EN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 12: Wholesale broadband access 
 
               
Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
Access / 
interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency Price control / cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Denmark YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland NO* 43  operators  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
France*** YES  1  operator YES ****  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Hungary YES  5  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Ireland NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**  YES 
Italy NO* 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Netherlands NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Austria NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Spain YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Greece YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Slovakia NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Luxembourg YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Estonia NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland***** NO*  39  operators  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
                       
* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets 
** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators.           
***Including the notification concerning the market for "Wholesale broadband access delivered at national level in France."    
**** This remedy was not imposed in the market for "Wholesale broadband access delivered at national level in France." 
*****Second review of the market    
            
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007         
EN  299    EN 
Market 12: Wholesale broadband access 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - General obligation to provide network 
access on reasonable request (both for BT 
and Kingston) 
2 -Non-discrimination (both for BT and 
Kingston) 
3 - Transparency (reference offer) (both 
for BT and Kingston) 
UK/2003/0032, 
0033 and 0034 
Wholesale 
asymmetric 
broadband 
origination (in the 
UK excluding the 
Hull area and in the 
Hull area, including 
both cable and 
PSTN networks) 
and broadband 
conveyance (in the 
UK excluding the 
Hull area). 
Two separate 
markets for 
broadband 
origination 
(UK excluding 
the Hull area 
and the Hull 
area) and one 
separate 
market for 
broadband 
conveyance 
(for the UK 
excluding the 
Hull area) 
BT (broadband 
origination and 
broadband 
conveyance in the 
UK excluding the 
Hull area) and 
Kingston 
(broadband 
origination in the 
Hull area) 
4 - Transparency (requirement to notify 
terms and conditions) (both for BT and 
Kingston) 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Product market definition of asymmetric 
broadband origination including both DSL-
and cable-based wholesale: Although it was 
not seen as possible to provide asymmetric 
broadband origination services over the cable 
networks, given the indirect pricing constraint 
exercised by cable-based services at the retail 
level, Oftel concluded that the wholesale market 
for asymmetric broadband origination includes 
both DSL-and cable-based wholesale services. 
By including cable-based wholesale broadband 
access services in the relevant market, Ofcom 
should have given greater consideration to the 
technical, practical and economic feasibility for 
cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to 
bitstream access. 
Notwithstanding, while this approach may have 
led to a narrower market definition, and there 
remained doubts as to whether cable-based 
wholesale services from the market definition  
EN  300    EN 
5 - Requirement to notify technical 
information (both for BT and Kingston) 
6 - Accounting separation (both for BT 
and Kingston) 
7 - Retail minus pricing approach for 
network access (for BT only) 
8 - Requirement to provide quality of 
service information (for BT only) 
9 - Obligations relating to new network 
access (for BT only) 
would not have lead to a different result in the 
SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on 
the exact scope of the market was not relevant 
for the purposes of the SMP assessment. 
 
National consultation run in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to be 
re-notified. 
UK/20040064  See Cases UK/2003/0032-0034.  Details of transparency obligations 
(publication of Quality of Service and 
information in the form of Key 
Performance Indicators) 
No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  301    EN 
FI/2004/0062  The market for 
wholesale broadband 
services, comprising 
bitstream services 
and services alike 
(provided by any 
technology), but 
excluding the access 
link to the customer 
premises in the 
PSTN network. 
Regional  43 local operators  1 - Obligation to lease transmission 
capacity (including necessary equipment) 
to the other operators as a wholesale 
broadband product 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Definition of wholesale broadband services 
markets: Ficora's market definition does not 
cover the access link to the customer premises. 
Therefore, in order to be able to provide 
broadband services to end-users, a third party 
must acquire a further local loop product, in 
addition to the wholesale broadband product. 
However, since the local loop product is 
regulated, and the wholesale broadband services 
markets are proposed to be regulated, the 
availability of “access to data transmission 
services to be supplied to an end user at a fixed 
location” in Finland would not be different to a 
situation where the wholesale broadband access 
market would be defined in accordance with 
market 12 of the Recommendation. 
The Commission trusted that the combination of 
regulation of unbundled local loops and the 
wholesale broadband services will provide 
access seekers with a seamless service both in  
EN  302    EN 
2 - Transparency (publish delivery terms 
and tariff information) 
respect of technology and in respect of the 
commercial contracts involved. Ficora will need 
to examine any change in the regulatory 
measures in the local loops markets also in terms 
of their impact on the market for wholesale 
broadband service and vice-versa. 
 
Prices and conditions: Regulating the 
wholesale broadband access market in a way 
which requires a third party to acquire two 
separate wholesale products may not be the most 
effective way to promote competition. Although 
the provision of two separate products instead of 
one will not lead to any competitive 
disadvantage for access seekers, Ficora should 
ensure, however, that the two wholesale 
products in combination are provided on 
conditions and at prices which are comparable to 
a situation where a regulated single wholesale 
input were available. 
  
Inclusion of cable in the definition of the  
EN  303    EN 
3 - Non-discrimination   wholesale broadband access market: Despite 
the fact that the evidence provided does not 
seem to sufficiently support the conclusion that 
wholesale broadband services provided over a 
PSTN network and a cable network belong to 
the same market, the exclusion of cable-based 
wholesale services from the market definition 
would not have led to a different result of the 
SMP analysis in this particular case. 
1 - Access obligation  SE/2004/0083  Wholesale 
broadband access in 
the form of bitstream 
access (including 
cable-TV networks 
and Local Area 
Networks). 
National Teliasonera  AB 
2 - Price regulation (retail minus) and 
cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment on:   
 
Cable-TV networks as alternative 
infrastructure for the provision of wholesale 
bitstream access: No bitstream connections are 
currently provided over cable-tv networks in 
Sweden. Consequently, PTS is invited to make 
clear in its final decision that cable-TV networks 
are excluded from the relevant product market, 
and to consider concluding that it is unlikely for  
EN  304    EN 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency (reference offer) 
cable-TV operators to enter the market for 
wholesale bitstream access in the near future. 
Potential competition from cable-TV operators 
could only constrain to a very limited extent, if 
at all, the market behaviour of the current 
providers of wholesale bitstream access. 
1 - Access to and use of specific network 
facilities 
2 - Non-discrimination 
IE/2004/0093  Bitstream access 
permitting the 
transmission of 
broadband data in 
both directions and 
other wholesale 
access provided over 
other infrastructures, 
if and when they 
offer facilities 
equivalent to 
bitstream access. 
Includes cable 
networks and Fixed 
Wireless Access 
(FWA). 
National eircom 
3 - Transparency 
The Commission made a comment on:   
 
Self-supply by cable operators and FWA 
operators in the relevant product market: 
ComReg explicitly excludes any potential direct 
constraint exercised by providers of cable- or 
Fixed Wireless Access (FWA)-based wholesale 
inputs and bases its conclusions on market 
definition entirely on an assumed indirect 
pricing constraint derived from substitutability 
at the retail level. In the presence of evidence 
excluding demand side substitutability at the 
wholesale level, such an indirect competitive 
constraint could have been taken into account 
subsequent to the definition of the relevant 
market, i.e. at the stage of assessment of SMP. 
In the case of FWA platforms, the limited 
capacity carried on these networks may even 
call into question the existence of an indirect 
pricing constraint, as one of the assumptions of 
the “indirect pricing constraint” approach is the 
ability of providers to increase output in case of  
EN  305    EN 
4- Accounting separation 
5 - Price control and cost orientation 
(pending a further decision on wholesale 
price control, retail minus pricing is 
applied) 
a retail price increase by the competing network 
operator. 
1 - Access obligation  PT/2004/0118  Wholesale 
broadband access 
services (supported 
by the PSTN and the 
cable-TV-network).  
National  The PT Group 
2 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Inclusion of cable in the definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market: Before 
including cable networks in the relevant market 
definition, the NRAs should give due 
consideration to the technical, practical and 
economic feasibility for cable operators to offer 
facilities equivalent to bitstream access. There 
are specific aspects of the Portuguese market 
which should be taken into account when 
assessing whether cable should be included in 
the market, such as the fact that the national 
cable network is to a large extent already 
upgraded to provide interactive services.  
EN  306    EN 
3 - Transparency and reference offer 
4 - Accounting separation 
5 - Price control (retail minus) and cost 
accounting 
6 - Information requirements 
The fact that one operator has previously 
requested, and been denied, access to the cable 
network might suggest that there is a certain 
degree of demand-side substitutability in the 
market. It may be questioned whether wholesale 
broadband access via the cable network should 
be included in the relevant product market. 
However, in this particular case the exclusion 
from the relevant product market of wholesale 
bitstream access provided via cable-TV 
networks would not lead to a different result in 
the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion 
on the exact scope of the relevant product 
market is not relevant for the purposes of SMP 
assessment. However, should the PT Group 
decide to divest of its cable-TV-business, the use 
of the current definition of the relevant product 
market may have a major impact on the SMP 
finding. Therefore, Anacom was asked to re-
conduct its market analysis and the proposed 
remedies in case PT Group decides to divest of 
its cable business. 
FR/2005/0175  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
Metropolitan 
France, the 
   1 - Access obligation  Publication of accounting information  
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2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency - obligation to make 
public information regarding access 
4 - Quality of service 
5 - Price control (prices should be cost-
oriented reflecting “the long-run costs of 
an efficient operator") 
And 
FR/2006/0520 
French over-
seas 
territories 
and Mayotte, 
excluding the 
territory of 
Saint-Pierre-
et-Miquelon  
6 - Accounting separation 
The Commission recalls Article 5 of the 
Accounting Recommendation, which states that 
“national regulatory authorities make relevant 
accounting information from notified operators 
available to interested parties at a sufficient 
level of detail [...] In providing information for 
these purposes, national regulatory authorities 
should have due regard for commercial 
confidentiality. 
In this respect, the publication by the notified 
operator of sufficiently detailed cost 
statements showing, for example, the average 
cost of network components will increase 
transparency and raise confidence on the part of 
competitors that there are no anticompetitive 
cross-subsidies… " Therefore, the Commission 
invites ARCEP to better substantiate the reasons 
for which it considers that accounting 
information should, or not, be published, taking 
into account commercial confidentiality. This 
consideration applies in particular for regulatory 
statements describing the cost of network 
elements. 
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FR/2005/0206  The provision of 
wholesale broadband 
access products 
delivered at a single 
national point of 
presence, regardless 
of whether (i) the 
technical interface 
u s e d  i s  I P  o r  A T M  
and (ii) the products 
are meant to be 
provided ultimately 
to residential or non-
residential customers 
at retail level, 
excluding wholesale 
access technologies 
other than DSL such 
Metropolitan 
France, the 
French over-
seas 
territories 
and Mayotte 
France Télécom  1 - A form of price control (i.e. 
“interdiction de pratiquer des tarifs 
d’éviction”) 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Market definition: In previous cases notified 
pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Framework 
Directive, the product market in question has 
been considered by some NRAs to be part of 
market 12 of the Recommendation. In the 
present case, however, and on the basis of the 
notification and the additional information 
provided by ARCEP, the Commission is of the 
view that ARCEP has demonstrated specific 
national circumstances justifying that the 
notified market constitutes a separate market 
susceptible for ex ante regulation. 
 
SMP assessment: Market shares in the present 
case may not necessarily reflect reliable  
EN  309    EN 
2 - Non-discrimination  as cable. 
3 - Accounting separation 
information on the competitive level of supply 
on the relevant market. ARCEP accords great 
importance to France Télécom’s economies of 
scale and scope following Wanadoo’s 
reintegration (i.e. to the essential role of these 
economies in France Télécom’s production cost 
structure). The Commission considers that, 
should the upstream remedies be already 
properly enforced, these economies could be 
constrained, to a certain extent. ARCEP should 
consider reflecting better this point in the final 
measure. ARCEP should also consider 
explaining in more detail in the final measure 
the obstacles that could limit a self-supplier’s 
ability to enter the market. Moreover, imminent 
structural changes and their effects on the 
competitive conditions on the market need to be 
addressed in ARCEP’s analysis. 
 
Remedies: When the obligations on LLU and 
regional bitstream will be properly enforced and 
in particular accounting separation, regulation as 
proposed in this notification would no longer be 
necessary. In this respect, given the uncertainties 
as to how market conditions will evolve beyond 
the next 12 months and the effect of upstream 
remedies being properly enforced, the 
Commission invites ARCEP (i) to ensure full 
and effective enforcement of existing LLU and 
regional bitstream obligations within the shortest 
possible timeframe; (ii) to commit reviewing the 
present market analysis once the full 
enforcement of the remedies referred to in (i)  
EN  310    EN 
4 - Obligation to formalise and transmit 
to ARCEP the tariffs and technical 
conditions of internal transactions 
between the wholesale “network” branch 
and the retail “ISP” branch. 
above is ensured and at the latest within one 
year following adoption of the final measure 
resulting from this notification, and (iii) to limit 
the validity of the obligations proposed in the 
present draft measure accordingly. 
1 - Transparency 
2 - Non-discrimination 
HU/2005/0186 
HU/2006/0363 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
5 markets 
correspondin
g to the 
former 
concession 
areas of the 
former 
concession 
operators 
Matáv Rt., Invitel 
Távközlési 
Szolgáltató Rt., 
Hungarotel 
Távközlési Rt., 
Emitel Távközlési 
Rt. Monor Telefon 
Társaság Rt. 
3 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed “retail 
minus” obligation: NHH is invited to adopt the 
draft measure setting out the details of the “retail 
minus” formula as soon as possible in order to 
provide adequate transparency and certainty for 
the market players concerned. In this respect, 
NHH is reminded that once adopted, the 
measure setting out the margin between the 
retail and wholesale offerings should be notified 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
Offerings other than local and national 
bitstream access: In case there would be 
unsatisfied market demand for other types of 
wholesale bitstream access, in particular at ATM 
level, NHH should consider the use of the  
EN  311    EN 
4 - Access and interconnection  regulatory means available to it, including 
particularly the launch of a market review 
procedure.  
5 - Price control and cost-orientation 
(local bitstream access to be provided on 
cost-oriented prices, based on FDC 
methodology; national bitstream access 
to be provided on retail minus basis) 
Provision of voice services using a bitstream 
access product: NHH should ensure that there 
are no unjustified limitations imposed by the 
SMP operators on third parties such as 
preventing them from using local bitstream 
access to offer voice services. 
DK/2005/0182   
Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority (renotified under case number DK/2005/0209) 
1 - Requirement to meet reasonable 
requests to provide wholesale access and 
co-location with associated facilities 
DK/2005/0209  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National TDC 
2 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
4 - Transparency  
5 - Price control in the form of uniform 
national pricing based on modified 
historic costs for the access products 
IT/2005/0253  services based on 
satellite technologies 
included in the 
market 
 
National Telecom  Italia  1 - obligation to supply 
wholesale broadband access on copper as 
well as on fibre optic lines 
 
Inclusion of satellite connections in the 
definition of the wholesale broadband access 
market 
The notified market definition for wholesale 
broadband services equivalent to bitstream 
services includes the provision of such services 
over alternative technologies including via 
satellite networks. 
In AGCOM’s opinion, the inclusion of a 
satellite-based wholesale product in the relevant 
market is justified by the existence of an indirect 
pricing constraint exercised by the 
corresponding retail xDSL broadband products. 
The Commission questions the inclusion of 
wholesale broadband access products based on 
satellite connections in the relevant market 
definition for the following reasons:  
EN  313    EN 
2 - transparency (publication 
of the bitstream reference interconnection 
offer 
 
- AGCOM considers that the indirect pricing 
constraint from the retail market would lead to 
the inclusion of satellite in the wholesale market. 
However, as the Commission has previously 
pointed out such an approach does not focus on 
the actual demand and supply side 
substitutability between the different wholesale 
inputs. Considering that, in this specific case, 
wholesale products over satellite are actually 
available for sale to third parties, AGCOM’s 
analysis should have focused on a detailed 
analysis of the wholesale products, including a 
comparison of the actual prices of the different 
wholesale products concerned. AGCOM has 
however not provided any analysis of the actual 
prices of these products. 
- AGCOM has also not demonstrated that 
wholesale broadband access product supplied 
via satellite connections “offers facilities 
equivalent to the bitstream access” based on  
EN  314    EN 
3 – non discrimination  xDSL technologies. 
AGCOM itself states that it is difficult to find a 
correspondence between wholesale broadband 
services based on satellite technologies and 
wholesale services based on xDSL technologies. 
Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the 
ANOs can shape the parameters of the satellite-
based service offered to end-users. Although, 
AGCOM states that in principle, ANOs could 
differentiate their retail services from the 
services offered by their wholesale suppliers, 
AGCOM does not provide any evidence 
showing that wholesale offers based on satellite 
technologies are not in reality pure “resale 
offers”, the latter being expressly excluded by 
AGCOM from the relevant market definition. 
AGCOM further does not analyse to what extent 
the difference between, from a demand side 
perspective, the purchase of mono-directional 
and bi-directional satellite wholesale products  
EN  315    EN 
4 – price control and cost accounting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 – accounting separation 
would affect the market definition. 
However, since in the light of the market 
position of satellite operators the exclusion of 
satellite wholesale access services from the 
market definition would not have led to a 
different result as 
regards the SMP analysis, the Commission 
considers that a conclusion on the exact scope of 
the market is not relevant in this particular case. 
 
  
EN  316    EN 
DE/2005/0262 
DE/2006/0457 
DE/20070576  
BNetzA 
defines two separate 
markets on 
wholesale level: 1) a 
wholesale bitstream 
access market 
with handover at 
ATM-level and 2) a 
wholesale bitstream 
access market with 
handover 
at IP-level (including 
hybrid fibre-coaxial 
network (“HFC”) 
cable broadband 
access at 
IP-level). 
 
national Deutsche 
Telecom 
1- Obligation of access for the purpose of 
interconnection and collocation. 
 
The future treatment of VDSL connections in 
the context of emerging new retail services; 
the need to base any prior exclusion of 
products from the wholesale broadband 
access markets on a proper substitutability 
test 
The Commission notes that the emergence of 
new retail services may give rise to the 
emergence of a new derived wholesale market to 
the extent that such new retail services cannot be 
provided over the existing wholesale products. 
The new retail services may in such a case 
generate a wholesale demand for broadband 
access services with different characteristics 
from the currently existing wholesale broadband 
access services. Such new wholesale 
products should not be subjected to 
inappropriate obligations. When examining 
differences between retail services, BNetzA 
should therefore examine in particular to what 
extent they necessarily require different 
wholesale inputs, before excluding the derived 
wholesale inputs from the wholesale bitstream 
access markets. In this context, the Commission 
invites BNetzA to examine to what extent the 
mere bundling of distinct retail products would 
in itself give rise to the existence of a new retail 
product belonging to a separate retail market. A 
mere upgrade of an existing service is not 
considered in itself to constitute a new market. 
The lack of substitutability of a product has to 
be established from both demand- and supply-
side perspectives before it can be excluded from 
the markets in question.  
EN  317    EN 
2 - No discrimination   
Imposition of remedies 
Given that wholesale bitstream access is not yet 
available in Germany, given that there has 
hardly been competition between broadband 
infrastructures, given that there have been a 
number of competition problems in the German 
broadband markets and that the level of 
competition in and the penetration of the 
German broadband markets are still relatively 
low, the Commission invites BNetzA to impose 
appropriate remedies in the notified markets 
without delay and to notify them to the 
Commission under Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive. In this context the 
Commission considers that BNetzA 
should ensure that no form of wholesale 
broadband access is negatively affected by DT´s 
roll out of VDSL/fibre infrastructure. 
Scope of the access obligation 
The Commission welcomes the fact that the 
access obligation as imposed by BNetzA 
includes bitstream over all variants of 
infrastructure, including ADSL2, 
ADSL2+, SDSL and VDSL unless they are not 
substitutes to other bitstream access products. 
This corresponds to the practice of all NRAs 
which have notified their analysis of the 
wholesale broadband access market so far. The 
Commission invites BNetzA to apply the 
appropriate remedies without delay.  
EN  318    EN 
3 – accounting separation  The Commission recalls that in case 
DE/2005/0262 concerning the market 
definition and analysis of the wholesale 
broadband access market in Germany it 
was originally disputed between BNetzA and the 
Commission to which extent the recently 
established VDSL connections of the incumbent 
were included in the 
relevant market. The Commission refers to the 
withdrawal of its serious doubts 
letter of 23 December 2005 where it is stated 
that bitstream access to VDSL 
connections is included in the wholesale 
bitstream access markets unless it proves 
not to be a substitute for the existing kinds of 
bitstream access. 
Against this background and in order to provide 
regulatory certainty the Commission finds it 
appropriate for BNetzA to set out explicitly that 
remedies in the present case also relate to the 
VDSL network. In view of the VDSL-based 
retail products that DT has recently launched, 
such an application of remedies should no 
longer be postponed. 
As indicated in the Commission’s serious doubts 
letter of 11 November 2005, the Commission 
has at present no indication of a lack of 
substitution between VDSL  
EN  319    EN 
4 – obligation to issue a reference offer  and other xDSL products, whether at retail or at 
wholesale level. It is recalled in 
particular that a mere upgrade of an existing 
service (such as an offering with a 
higher bandwidth) is not considered in itself to 
constitute a new market. The 
Commission hence considers that the question 
about the substitutability between 
bitstream access to VDSL connections and other 
forms of bitstream access should 
be answered positively from the outset. 
Excluding DT’s VDSL-based infrastructure 
from the access obligation would 
jeopardise the effectiveness of that obligation to 
the detriment of competition in 
the downstream market and of the consumer. In 
the presence of such exclusion, if DT upgrades 
its ADSL infrastructure in a given city to VDSL 
technology by rolling out its fibre to the remote 
concentrators or street cabinets and dismantling 
its ADSL equipment, there is a risk that end 
users in that city become unreachable for any 
alternative DSL-operator as the alternative 
operators could not rely on DT’s wholesale 
access product to provide retail broadband 
access services in that city. Even if DT were 
required to keep its ADSL infrastructure 
operational  
EN  320    EN 
5 – ex post price control  throughout Germany in parallel to its VDSL 
infrastructure being rolled out, there may be a 
risk that without giving access to its VDSL 
infrastructure. Alternative DSL-operators may 
be prevented from competing effectively with 
DT at the retail level in the relevant market. 
Finally, the requirement to take into account the 
investment undertaken by DT when upgrading 
its broadband network to VDSL technology 
should not prevent the imposed access 
obligation from covering DT’s VDSL-based 
infrastructure. 
The costs incurred by DT can and should be 
compensated for through the setting 
of an appropriate access price (including cost of 
capital), but cannot justify an 
exclusion from the access obligation. 
Therefore, when the infrastructure is in place, 
access to VDSL-based 
infrastructure is to be included in this remedy 
imposed. Any change to this access 
obligation has to be notified to the Commission 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
Stand alone bitstream access 
The Commission welcomes that in its answer to 
the request for information 
BNetzA confirms the future imposition of access  
EN  321    EN 
to stand alone bitstream. 
The Commission asks BNetzA to impose this 
remedy without delay in order to 
enable competitors to offer broadband 
connections to end customers without an 
obligation to buy a telephone connection from 
DT. This would stimulate competition in 
particular in rural areas less susceptible to local 
loop unbundling, where competition on the retail 
services is particularly weak in Germany. Such 
an offer will also provide an adequate means to 
increase competition in the retail voice markets 
via Voice over IP 
Effective price regulation 
The Commission points out that a finding of 
non-SMP on the retail broadband 
access market is not per se sufficient to remove 
the ex ante price control obligation at the 
wholesale level. 
In line with the practice of other Member States 
and given DT’s refusal to offer 
bitstream access in the past, the Commission 
notes that ex-post price control is not 
appropriate to remedy the competition problem 
identified in the wholesale 
market in question. The Commission underlines 
moreover that when assessing 
the incumbent’s market power at retail level, it  
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should be taken into account that 
part of the retail market share of alternative 
operators represents pure reselling of 
DT’s broadband access products. 
Concerning the implementation of the ex ante 
price control, the Commission invites BNetzA to 
indicate in the definitive measure which method 
the price control will be based upon in order to 
ensure transparency and legal certainty in the 
market. The Commission notes that the German 
law provides that price control can be 
implemented in form of cost-orientation or 
benchmarking. In this context, the Commission 
is concerned that benchmarking may not allow 
for the 
specific national circumstances that may have an 
impact on costs to be taken into 
account, in particular network topology and 
differences in the point of interconnection. 
Benchmarking may also not ensure an 
appropriate margin with the retail prices 
applicable in the German market, on the one 
hand, and with the regulated local loop 
unbundling rates in Germany, on the other hand, 
which margins are essential to encourage 
alternative operators to climb the ladder of 
investment and to avoid a price squeeze between 
the various rungs of the ladder. 
Therefore, the Commission asks BNetzA to 
impose either retail minus or costoriented 
price control. If BNetzA chooses cost- 
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orientation, it is invited, in order to increase 
transparency, to communicate to the market 
players a cost model on which cost-orientation 
will be based. 
Notification of remedies concerning ATM 
bitstream access to be submitted 
without further delay 
The Commission reminds BNetzA that bitstream 
access has already been 
available in the vast majority of EU Member 
States for a number of years. 
BNetzA notified the market definition and 
market analysis of the bitstream market only in 
October 2005 after a reminder from the 
Commission services. The Commission notes 
that eight months have elapsed since the 
Commission's withdrawal of serious doubts in 
this case asks BNetzA to notify the related 
remedies for ATM bitstream access without 
further delay. 
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1 - requirement to: (i) meet reasonable 
requests to provide access to specific 
network 
elements and/or facilities; (ii) negotiate in 
good faith with other undertakings, not 
to withdraw access already granted; and 
(iii) provide all other measures necessary 
for the provision of broadband access to 
end-users; 
 
 
2 - price control and cost accounting: 
 
 
3 – accounting separation 
4 – non discrimination 
 
LT/2005/0267  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national Lietuvos 
Telekomas AB 
5 – transparency 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
NL/2005/0281  OPTA differentiates 
between the market 
for WBA with high 
national  KPN on the 
market for high 
1 – access  The inclusion of low quality WBA provided 
over cable networks in the  
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2 – non discrimination 
 
 
NL/2006/0377 
quality WBA and the 
market for WBA 
with low quality 
WBA 
 
quality WBA 
3 – obligation to publish a reference offer 
definition of the relevant product market 
In its notification, OPTA considers that the 
pricing constraint exercised by cable-based 
broadband services at the retail level has a 
sufficiently significant impact at the 
wholesale level to justify its inclusion in the 
WBA market. 
OPTA’s approach to defining a wholesale 
market on the basis of the competitive 
conditions in the corresponding retail market is 
not in principle inconsistent with the 
methodology set out in the Recommendation 
and in the Commission’s Guidelines on market 
analysis and the assessment of SMP. 
However, for the definition of the relevant 
market, demand side substitution represents the 
most immediate and effective disciplinary force 
on the suppliers of a given product, in particular 
in relation to their pricing decisions. Basically, 
the exercise of market definition consists in 
identifying the effective alternative sources of 
supply for the customers of the undertakings 
involved.16 OPTA does not provide evidence of 
any direct demand side substitution, and states 
that to its knowledge there has been no 
switching at the wholesale level between neither 
DSL-operators and cable operators, nor between 
DSL-operators mutually. Such demand side 
substitution would rest on the assumption that 
operators currently buying DSL based wholesale 
bitstream products could readily switch to a 
bitstream product offered on an alternative 
technological platform, i.e. a cable network, in  
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response to a price rise of the DSL based 
product. In practice, such switching could be 
restricted by considerable switching costs. Such 
switching costs should have been assessed by 
OPTA prior to the inclusion of a cable based 
bitstream product into the relevant market. 
Even if one were to ignore actual switching 
possibilities for existing wholesale 
customers and focus on substitutability between 
both products for new entrants (which have not 
committed to either DSL or cable infrastructure 
yet), there appear to be limits in the 
substitutability between both products. Cable-
based WBA products in the Netherlands offer a 
much more limited coverage than the DSL-
based WBA product of KPN or, for example, 
Versatel. This appears to restrict substitutability 
from the 
demand perspective (having to combine WBA 
products from different cable suppliers may not 
only increase transaction costs but also network 
and product integration 
costs). Despite having been available, according 
to OPTA, for several years, ISPs using third 
party access based on cable represent today only 
[…]% of the retail market. 
Furthermore it must be noted that even if some 
degree of substitution between both 
products may exist for new entrants, this would 
not protect existing customers of KPN as KPN is 
in a position to price discriminate between new 
entrants and existing customers. KPN may very  
EN  327    EN 
well price its WBA product competitively in 
order to attract new customers, while raising its 
price for existing customers once these 
customers, due to the high switching costs, have 
become tied to KPN. 
Also from the supply-side, substitution is limited 
as a cable operator cannot readily switch to 
supplying DSL-based WBA and vice versa. 
Possibly aware of these limitations as regards 
direct substitutability, OPTA bases its finding of 
a single wholesale market for DSL and cable 
based bitstream products on an assumed indirect 
pricing constraint derived from substitutability 
between cable and DSL at the retail level. The 
Commission considers that such an indirect 
competitive 
constraint should not have been taken into 
account at the stage of the definition of the 
relevant market. Moreover, for the theory of 
indirect pricing constraint to be applied at all, it 
would have to be shown that i) ISPs do not 
absorb such a price rise at the wholesale level 
but were forced to raise prices at the retail level, 
that ii) even in case ISPs pass on the price 
increase, all or most of the customers of the ISPs 
forced to raise prices would switch to retail 
cable operators and not, for example, to the 
retail arm of 
the WBA provider, in particular if the latter does 
not raise its own retail prices. This has not been 
demonstrated by OPTA. Account should, for 
example, have been taken  
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of demand elasticity in order to substantiate the 
claim of an indirect pricing constraint 
coming from demand side substitution at the 
retail level. In this respect it is also noteworthy 
that KPN applies distinct tariffs for its WBA 
product in so-called A-zones and B-zones,21 
despite cable operators being present in both 
zones and retail prices being uniform throughout 
the country. 
For the reasons indicated above, the 
Commission has strong concerns as to whether 
low quality WBA provided over cable and DSL 
form part of the same market.22 
The finding of no SMP on the market as 
defined by OPTA 
Even if one were to accept OPTA’s broad 
market definition, including cable-based WBA 
in the relevant market, the Commission has 
strong concerns about OPTA’s finding that KPN 
would not hold SMP. On such a broadly defined 
market, KPN’s market share would be 44%. 
KPN’s market share has increased strongly over 
the past four years (coming from 3% in January 
2001). Even if KPN’s share of both DSL and 
cable based broadband connections seems to 
have decreased by […] percentage points in the 
past five months, OPTA expects that KPN’s 
market share will grow to 48% in 2008; 
according to the alternative operators, KPN’s 
market share would exceed 50% in Q1 2006. 
The market share of KPN’s largest competitor 
(UPC) is substantially lower, around 13%.23  
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Additional elements seem to point in the 
direction of KPN having SMP. OPTA 
recognizes for example that KPN controls 
infrastructure which cannot easily be 
duplicated. Alternative operators are investing in 
alternative infrastructure, but KPN is the only 
operator which has ensured national coverage. 
Competing DSL operators have today 
maximally […]% of the investment in place to 
ensure national coverage ([…]), even though 
this investment enables them to cover 60-70% of 
Dutch households. Competing cable operators 
have maximally […]% of the investment in 
place to ensure national coverage (UPC) and 
cover maximally […]% of Dutch households. 
OPTA also recognizes that KPN has advantages 
of scale and scope, linked to the high level of 
fixed costs and the broad product portfolio of 
KPN enabling it to distribute fixed costs over 
various retail products. OPTA indicates that 
these advantages of scale and scope may reduce 
over time (especially taking into account that the 
wholesale input – access to the local loop – is 
provided to alternative operators at cost-oriented 
prices), but in view of the fact that KPN’s retail 
market share is expected to increase on the retail 
Internet access market and remains very high on 
certain neighbouring markets (such as retail 
calls) it is uncertain that these advantages will 
disappear over the period of the review. OPTA 
furthermore recognises that the barriers to enter 
the WBA market are high, but indicates that this 
has not impeded alternative operators to become 
active on this market and gain substantial market  
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share (15% combined on the market including 
cable; 25% combined  on DSL-based WBA 
only). The Commission points out that KPN’s 
market position has to be assessed against the 
position of each of its 
competitors taken individually; moreover, the 
presence of alternative operators on the market 
does not exclude that barriers to entry are high. 
For the reasons indicated above, the 
Commission has strong concerns as to whether 
KPN does not have SMP in the market for low 
quality WBA. 
The non-imposition of ex ante regulation in 
the market for low quality 
WBA 
With regard to the particular features of the 
Dutch market (i.e. high broadband 
penetration; high penetration of cable 
infrastructure; high penetration of alternative, 
LLU-based DSL operators in the absence of 
regulation of low quality WBA24; 
competitive retail broadband market) taken 
cumulatively, the Commission does not 
contest OPTA’s proposal at this stage not to 
impose ex ante regulation to the low 
quality WBA market in the Netherlands. On the 
basis of the information provided by  
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OPTA, it would seem that behind the high 
barriers to entry, the market for wholesale DSL-
based bitstream access tends  towards an 
effectively competitive outcome (within 
the meaning of the three criteria test set out in 
the Recommendation)25, even in the absence of 
regulation on the low quality WBA market. In 
particular, the fact that LLU 
is already in place in the Netherlands with 
coverage up to 70% of the population, 
which is expected to increase to 85% in 2006, 
enables alternative operators to provide a 
wholesale DSL-based bitstream product in 
competition with KPN. In addition, the 
competition between cable operators and DSL-
based operators on the retail internet access 
market further reduces the need for ex ante 
regulation of the low quality WBA market in the 
specific case of the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, since the above assessment is 
based on a likely market tendency over the 
period of the review, the Commission asks 
OPTA to carefully monitor market 
developments, to re-conduct a market analysis 
and to notify its results within one year from the 
date of this letter. In monitoring market 
developments, OPTA should closely examine 
whether KPN is not leveraging its market power 
on the low quality WBA market into 
downstream markets where it is present as well 
(in particular into the retail internet access 
market and the retail calls markets), for example  
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by refusing to supply low quality WBA in 
response to a reasonable request, by supplying 
low quality WBA on discriminatory terms (for 
example, by making the provision of low quality 
WBA conditional upon an undertaking on the 
part of purchasers not to invest in LLU) or by 
raising the price of low quality WBA. OPTA 
should also monitor whether KPN is not 
engaging in anti-competitive behaviour such as 
predatory pricing or price squeeze in order to 
protect its position on the low-quality WBA 
market, in particular in those areas where LLU 
is in place. 
OPTA should also consider imposing 
accounting separation on KPN on the basis of 
finding SMP in the market for local loop 
unbundling that would also cover the provision 
of low quality WBA in order to facilitate the 
above monitoring and the 
application of competition law 
The non-imposition of accounting separation 
in the market for high quality WBA 
The Commission invites OPTA to impose the 
obligation of accounting separation on KPN in 
the market for high quality WBA in order to be 
able to monitor KPN’s compliance with the non-
discrimination obligation. Such remedy should 
ensure that KPN makes transparent its wholesale 
prices and its internal transfer prices for high 
quality WBA. 
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1 - access 
2 – non-discrimination 
AT/2005/0312  inclusion of WBA 
provided over cable 
networks 
 
national Telekom  Austria 
3 – price control 
The inclusion of WBA provided over cable 
networks in the definition of the relevant 
product market: TKK bases its conclusion to 
include cable-based 
broadband access into the same product market 
as DSL-based wholesale access on 
the existence of a cable-based wholesale offer 
and the consideration that the pricing 
constraint exercised by cable-based broadband 
services at the retail level has a 
sufficiently significant impact at the wholesale 
level to justify its inclusion in the WBA market. 
TKK’s approach to defining a wholesale market 
on the basis of the competitive conditions in the 
corresponding retail market is not in principle 
inconsistent with the methodology set out in the 
Recommendation and in the Commission’s 
Guidelines on market analysis and the  
EN  334    EN 
4 – reference offer  assessment of SMP. 
However, for the definition of the relevant 
market, demand side substitution represents the 
most immediate and effective disciplinary force 
on the suppliers of a given product, in particular 
in relation to their pricing decisions. Basically, 
the 
exercise of market definition consists in 
identifying the effective alternative sources 
of supply for the customers of the undertakings 
involved. TKK does not provide evidence of any 
direct demand side substitution but admits that 
the demand and supply side substitution at the 
wholesale level is limited. TKK does not 
provide any evidence on switching at the 
wholesale level between DSL-operators and 
cable operators and states that due to limited 
coverage of individual cable networks, the  
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5 – cost accounting  possibilities of ISPs to switch from a DSL-based 
wholesale products to cable-based 
products are limited. In addition the switching 
costs should have been assessed by TKK prior to 
the inclusion of a cable based bitstream product 
into the relevant 
market. Considering the limitations as regards 
direct substitutability, TKK bases its finding of a 
single wholesale market for DSL and cable-
based bitstream products mainly on an assumed 
indirect pricing constraint derived from 
substitutability between cable 
and DSL at the retail  level. The Commission 
considers that such an indirect competitive 
constraint should not have been taken into 
account at the stage of the definition of the 
relevant market. Rather it should have been 
taken into account at the SMP assessment stage.  
EN  336    EN 
6 – accounting separation  Moreover, for the indirect pricing constraint to 
be effective it would have to be shown that i) 
ISPs do not absorb such a price rise at the 
wholesale level but are forced to raise prices at 
the retail level and that ii) even in case ISPs pass 
on the price increase, a significant number of 
customers of the ISPs forced to raise prices 
would switch to retail cable operators and not, 
for example, to the retail arm of the WBA 
provider, in particular if the latter does not raise 
its own retail prices.15 This has not been 
demonstrated by TKK. Account should, for 
example, have been taken of demand elasticity 
in order to substantiate the claim of an indirect 
pricing constraint coming from demand side 
substitution at the retail level. 
For the reasons indicated above, the 
Commission is of the view that TKK has not 
provided sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that WBA provided over cable form 
part of the same market. 
In case of a “DSL-only” market definition, 
Telekom Austria’s market share would 
be around 87% of DSL based broadband 
connections. Therefore, while there remain 
doubts as to whether cable-based WBA or other 
technologies form part of the 
relevant market, their exclusion from the market 
definition would not have led to a 
different result in the SMP analysis. 
Consequently, the Commission considers that a  
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conclusion on the exact scope of the market is 
not relevant in the present case for the purposes 
of SMP assessment. 
 
1 - Provision on reasonable request of 
bitstream access to interested parties, 
including 
supplementary services such as co-
location; 
 
CY/2006/0332  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
National CYTA 
2 - Transparency and publication of 
Bitstream Reference Offer; 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 – non discrimination 
4 – accounting separation 
5 – price control 
1 - requirement to meet reasonable 
requests for wholesale access to bitstream 
products, 
use of certain network elements and 
related facilities; 
 
SI/2006/0346  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national Telekom 
Slovenije 
2 – non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - transparency, including a requirement 
to publish a reference offer; 
 
4 – price control and cost accounting 
5 – accounting separation 
ES/2006/0370  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national TESAU  1  -  access  Definition of the relevant product market 
The Spanish market is characterised by the 
existence of two categories of 
wholesale broadband access products offered by  
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2 – transparency and obligation to publish 
a reference offer 
the incumbent: (i) the regional 
wholesale product (GigADSL) which delivers 
traffic at 109 regional POI and (ii) the national 
wholesale product (ADSL-IP) which delivers 
traffic at 1 national POI. 
Both products fall under the definition of 
bitstream and are candidates for ex-ante 
regulation. 
CMT considers that the national and the regional 
wholesale offers are substitutable 
in a prospective manner, despite the important 
investments for the regional offer on behalf of a 
new entrant in order to reach TESAU’s 109 POI 
(compared to the 
national offer). 
The Commission notes that in a previous case 
notified to the Commission6, this 
market has been segmented in two product 
markets: (i) the regional wholesale 
market or the market for bitstream access market 
with handover at the ATMbackbone 
and (ii) the national wholesale market or the 
market for bitstream access market with 
handover at the IP-backbone. The Commission 
also notes that the number of POI for the 
regional offer in Spain is among the highest in 
EU. The higher the number of POI necessary to 
reach in order to have national coverage, the  
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3 – price control  higher is the barrier to entry for new entrants. 
The Commission considers that the actual 
characteristics and the conditions of the 
Spanish broadband market could potentially 
justify a refinement of the wholesale 
market for broadband access in two relevant 
product markets. 
Notwithstanding, while this approach may have 
led to a narrower market definition, the 
refinement of the definition of the market at 
hand in this particular case would not have led 
to a different result in the SMP analysis. 
Consequently, the Commission considers that a 
conclusion on the exact scope of the market is 
not relevant in the present case for the purposes 
of SMP assessment. 
De facto limitation of the remedies to ADSL 
technology 
Despite the fact that CMT includes all xDSL 
technologies (ADSL, ADSL2, ADSL2+, VDSL, 
etc) in the relevant product market on which it 
finds TESAU to have SMP and despite the fact 
that TESAU bases its different retail services 
(internet access, TV over DSL, VoIP) on its 
DSL infrastructure, CMT intends to oblige 
TESAU to provide access only in order to 
guarantee the replicability of retail broadband 
internet access services in Spain. 
The Commission would like to underline that 
any wholesale broadband access  
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4 – non-discrimination  product that the remedies oblige TESAU to 
provide shall be made available 
regardless of the use that the buyer of such a 
service wishes to make of it (internet 
access, VoIP or TV over DSL). 
As a principle the same remedies imposed by 
CMT should cover the entire relevant market on 
which TESAU is found to have SMP (i.e. 
including ADSL to VDSL) if 
CMT cannot justify in accordance with Article 
8(4) of the Access Directive9 and in 
the light of the regulatory objectives laid down 
in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive why the remedies cover only part of 
the market and how such remedies 
nevertheless remedy the market failure 
identified. 
Considering the information provided and the 
competition problems identified by 
CMT it would seem proportionate in this case to 
ensure access to all infrastructures 
including TESAU’s ADSL, ADSL 2+ and future 
VDSL infrastructure, unless the 
products delivered over these infrastructures do 
clearly not act as substitutes to the retail 
products derived from the wholesale bitstream  
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market. 
Asymmetrical application of remedies 
CMT indicates in its draft measure that it may 
introduce some asymmetry in the 
remedies imposed on TESAU, based, inter alia, 
on geographic criteria. CMT 
explains that it would take into account the 
particular conditions of the relevant 
market with respect to the development of local 
loop unbundling in order not to 
impose unjustified or disproportionate 
requirements on TESAU. 
In its reply to the request for information, CMT 
explained that the asymmetry 
relate in particular to the price control 
obligation. CMT considers that the retail minus 
methodology should take into account the fact 
that the operator designated as having SMP 
faces greater competition constraints in the areas 
where some alternative operators use local loop 
unbundling. Geographical criteria might be 
used, to model the cost structure of the efficient 
operator, with the aim of allowing Telefónica to 
align appropriately on the prices of its 
competitors and sending 
signals to new entrants about the need to 
develop alternative infrastructure ensuring  
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sustainable competition in the long term. 
However, the Commission notes that although 
the number of unbundled local loops 
significantly increased during 2005 it still 
remains relatively low in relation to the 
incumbent’s activated ADSL lines (less than 
3%). In addition, when analysing the 
potential competition in the relevant market 
from operators using local loop unbundling, 
CMT refers to a series of disputes between 
TESAU and its competitors regarding delaying 
tactics in the provision of the services relating to 
local loop unbundling. CMT considers that a 
high number of those conflicts of access are the 
result of a multitude of TESAU’s practices. 
In that context, the mere fact that some 
alternative operators are connected to some 
of TESAU’s local exchanges does not mean that 
they are able to switch rapidly 
from a wholesale broadband access offer to the 
offer of unbundling of the local loop. 
Consequently, the geographical approach that 
CMT would use in implementing the margin 
squeeze test on TESAU’s retail tariffs might 
deliver inappropriate results. The remedy 
envisaged would then fail to tackle the problem 
identified (margin squeeze) and would not be 
proportionate, nor justified (contrary to the 
principles and objectives laid down in the 
Access Directive).  
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Therefore, the Commission invites CMT to re-
consider its geographical approach 
to the margin squeeze test and, in any event, to 
submit to consultation such remedies and 
thereafter notify them the Commission. 
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EL/2006/0372  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national OTE  1  -  access  The Margin squeeze test 
EETT proposes to subject OTE’s wholesale 
broadband prices to a “retail-minus” based 
on the costs of a reasonably efficient operator 
using the DCF methodology. In this context the 
Commission would like to point out the 
following as regards the different methodologies 
for assessing profitability in a margin squeeze 
test. 
There are basically two main different 
methodologies for assessing such profitability: 
a) Matching every year (or in shorter periods) 
the observed revenues and costs 
extracted from the undertaking’s accounts in 
which investment expenditure have been 
amortised over appropriate periods. 
b) Aggregating the future revenues and costs of 
the company during an adequate 
period (generally the lifetime of the 
infrastructure) in order to arrive at a single  
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2 – non-discrimination 
3 - transparency 
measure, the net present value (“NPV”). Such 
method, referred to as DCF only looks at the 
profitability of a business over the adequate 
period (several years) and does not specify how 
costs should be recovered in distinct sub-
periods. 
The Commission invites EETT to avoid the 
following shortcomings in the DCF 
methodology when used to detect a potential 
margin squeeze: 
− Firstly, the outcome of the test risks relying on 
unreasonable forecasts about the ability of a new 
entrant to benefit from an increasing margin 
over time, thus leading 
to a “false positive” result. 
− Secondly, the DCF method would only show 
whether OTE is expected to earn a 
positive NPV over the period employed for the 
analysis, but it would not specify how 
costs should be recovered in distinct sub-
periods. Consequently, a positive NPV 
could be interpreted not as evidence of absence 
of an anticompetitive price squeeze but, quite on 
the contrary, as an evidence of a successful 
exclusion making possible the recoupment of the 
initial losses.  
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4 – accounting separation 
5 – price control and cost accounting 
− The use of the DCF method to detect a 
possible margin squeeze would allow a 
dominant firm such as OTE to incur substantial 
initial losses (that would be 
compensated for in the future) while its 
competitors may not be able to absorb losses 
during several years. 
Therefore, EETT should to ensure that a positive 
outcome for the margin squeeze 
analysis does not depend on unrealistic 
assumptions about the ability of a new entrant to 
benefit from an increasing margin over time. In 
other words, the Commission invites EETT to 
ensure that assumptions on future costs and 
prices included in the analysis for future years 
are plausible and are sustainable in a 
competitive market. 
The Commission also invites EETT to submit 
the retail minus model based on a DCF 
methodology to national consultation, and to 
notify it to the Commission. 
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1 – access 
 
 
2 – transparency 
 
 
3 – non-discrimination 
 
 
CZ/2006/0449  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national Cesky  Telecom 
4 –accounting separation 
Access obligation at the IP level only 
In the framework of the access obligation, CTU 
only requires CTc to provide access to 
alternative operators at the IP level, which is an 
option where the alternative operator cannot 
alter the parameters of the BRAS (broadband 
remote access server), which is operated by the 
incumbent, and has, therefore, very limited 
possibilities to determine the characteristics of 
the bitstream and differentiate the services 
provided to its customers. CTU does not intend 
to mandate more advanced forms of bitstream 
access, i.e. access at the ATM or corresponding 
technology level and/or access at the DSLAM 
level. 
The Commission would like to recall that when 
determining the appropriate access level to be 
mandated, the NRAs must balance the technical 
and operational conditions resulting from the 
incumbent’s network architecture with the level 
of 
competition in the market. The assessment 
regarding the appropriate point of 
access should also take into account the 
perspective of the beneficiaries and the 
forms of access sought. By enabling alternative 
operators to choose from different access levels, 
infrastructure competition is promoted as it 
enables them to climb up the ladder of 
investment by migrating from one form of 
access to the next higher step, investing more 
and more in their own infrastructure.  
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The Commission is not convinced that CTU’s 
arguments regarding non-imposition of the 
ATM and/or DSLAM access are satisfactory. 
First of all, CTU should have analysed the 
architecture of the incumbent’s network to 
establish whether the prevailing technical and 
operational conditions make the provision of the 
ATM and/or DSLAM access possible. The fact 
alone that CTc considers a specific technology 
as outdated and is not willing to invest therein is 
in itself not sufficient for drawing a conclusion 
that mandating access over the technology 
concerned would be disproportionate. 
Concerning the DSLAM access, it should 
be noted that local loop unbundling is generally 
not to be considered as a 
substitute in view of the additional costs to be 
made by an alternative operator 
when purchasing LLU. Further, the Commission 
notes that one alternative operator specifically 
requested CTU within the national consultation 
procedure to determine concrete forms of 
mandated access, including the DSLAM access, 
ATM access and access at the IP level. CTU did 
not adequately respond to this 
request. 
Given CTc’s very high market share as well as 
the fact that in terms of self supplied 
broadband access its market share has been  
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growing over the recent years, the Commission 
invites CTU to impose on CTc an obligation to 
provide also more advanced forms of bitstream 
access at connection points further down in the 
network, which allow third parties to 
differentiate their services more from 
those of the incumbent than access at IP level, 
without requiring them to build out 
their infrastructure at local exchange level. The 
Commission notes in this regard that a vast 
majority of Member States have granted access 
to bitstream at the ATM level in addition to 
access at IP level. 
No price regulation 
CTU does not propose any price regulation, 
which it justifies by the fact that both 
wholesale and retail prices have been falling 
over the recent years due to indirect 
pressure exercised by the competitive retail 
broadband access market. 
As regards the competitive pressure from 
alternative infrastructures at retail level, 
the market analysis indicates, however, that 
xDSL is rapidly gaining market share 
at the expense of cable (the geographical 
coverage of which is limited) and WiFi. 
The Commission notes, moreover, that whereas  
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it is true that prices have been 
falling, it is also true that, as the data provided in 
the market analysis show, the 
margin between the wholesale and retail prices 
applied by the incumbent has decreased 
significantly over the analysed period. Further, 
CTU states in the market analysis that recurring 
special offers by the incumbent at the retail 
level, which were not matched by adequate 
wholesale offers, are among the reasons that 
have lead to a situation where, unlike in other 
Member States, CTc’s market share in terms of 
self-supplied broadband access has been steadily 
rising over the recent years. Despite these facts, 
CTU does not address the apparent margin 
squeeze problem in the market analysis and does 
not consider imposing price regulation, such as a 
retail-minus remedy. 
In the reply to RFI, CTU provides more recent 
data showing that as of February 
2006 for certain products11 the margin 
increased to 31% and as of July 2006 to 
41%. Whereas these data may indicate that the 
apparent margin squeeze problem 
observed over the recent years currently 
becomes less significant, the 
Commission notes that a broader analysis of 
data relating to all broadband access services 
provided by the incumbent would be necessary 
to determine whether or not a potential margin 
squeeze continues to distort competition at the  
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wholesale market. Moreover, without effective 
price regulation in place, normally retail minus, 
it cannot be excluded that CTc’s future pricing 
policy may result into a decreasing margin 
again. 
The Commission is not convinced that the non-
discrimination obligation as such, even if 
coupled with accounting separation obligation, 
can effectively remedy the market failure 
identified. Therefore, CTU is invited to impose 
an appropriate price control mechanism such as 
retail minus. 
 
SK/2006/0465  TÚSR 
analyses the relevant 
market on the basis 
of competitive 
conditions in the 
retail market 
taking also 
alternative 
technologies into 
account. Slovak 
Telekom is only 
active on DSL 
based services 
national  Slovak Telekom  1 - access  Defining the scope of the access obligation 
imposed 
It is not clear from the notification and the 
additional information provided at which 
level of the network Slovak Telekom will be 
required to provide access to alternative 
operators. It is therefore not clear whether, inter 
alia, TÚSR intends to mandate – apart from 
access at IP level – also more advanced forms of 
bitstream access, i.e. access at the ATM or 
corresponding technology level8 and/or access 
at the DSLAM level. 
The Commission recalls that access at 
(managed) IP level should enable alternative  
EN  354    EN 
2 - transparency   
3 – non-discrimination 
operators to offer bitstream access with 
relatively moderate investments. However this is 
an option where the alternative operator cannot 
alter the parameters of the 
BRAS (broadband remote access server), which 
is operated by the incumbent, and has, therefore, 
very limited possibilities to determine the 
characteristics of the bitstream and differentiate 
the services provided to its customers. 
The Commission recalls furthermore that when 
determining an appropriate access level to be 
mandated, the NRAs must take account of the 
technical and operational conditions resulting 
from the incumbent’s network architecture as 
well as of the 
level of competition in the market. The 
assessment regarding the appropriate point of 
access should be made from the perspective of 
the beneficiaries, who should be able to define 
the product. By enabling the alternative 
operators to choose from different access levels, 
infrastructure competition is promoted as these 
can climb up the ladder of investment by 
migrating from one form of access to the next 
higher 
step, adding more own value when going deeper 
in the value chain and investing 
more and more in their own infrastructure. 
Against this background, TÚSR should therefore  
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4 – accounting separation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 – ex ante price control 
 
analyse, before adopting its final measure, the 
architecture of the incumbent’s network to 
establish whether the prevailing technical and 
operational conditions make the provision of the 
ATM and/or DSLAM access possible. Given 
Slovak Telekom’s very high market share, the 
Commission invites TÚSR to consider imposing 
the obligation on the incumbent to provide 
bitstream access in the form of IP, ATM and 
possibly also DSLAM 
access. 
 
 
1 - access  PL/2006/0472  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national Telekomunikacja 
Polska SA 
2 – non-discrimination 
Defining the scope of the obligations imposed 
In the draft measure as notified, UKE did not 
clearly identify the precise scope of the 
remedies. Taking into account the additional 
information provided by UKE in response to the 
request for information, the Commission invites 
UKE to specify in the definitive measure in 
particular at which level in its network TP is 
obliged to provide access (ATM, DSLAM, 
IP,…) and for which bitstream access products 
TP is obliged to prepare a reference offer, to 
keep separate accounts and to charge cost  
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3 - transparency 
4 – accounting separation 
5 – price control 
oriented prices. In case the access obligation and 
related remedies do not apply to access at 
DSLAM and/or IP-level in the same way as they 
apply to access at ATM-level, UKE should for 
the sake of transparency and legal certainty of 
all operators clarify what TP's obligation to 
accept reasonable requests to access at the 
DSLAM and IP level in practice entails. 
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LU/2006/0510  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national EPT  1  -  access  Access obligation 
The Commission takes note of ILR's 
justifications, that are based inter alia on the 
specific network topology in Luxembourg, for 
limiting the access obligation to IPbased 
access. It does also note that Cegecom is 
providing wholesale broadband 
access on the basis of unbundled local loops. 
However, the Commission notes that retail 
broadband prices in Luxembourg remain 
relatively high. 
The obligations imposed under the Access 
Directive should be based on the nature 
of the problem identified, proportionate and 
justified in the light of the objectives  
EN  358    EN 
2 – non-discrimination  laid down in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive. The access obligation imposed 
by ILR should be effective in ensuring effective 
competition in the broadband market, in 
ensuring that users derive maximum benefit in 
terms of choice, price and quality and in 
encouraging efficient investment in 
infrastructure. In light thereof, and if retail 
prices remain high despite the wholesale 
measures imposed, ILR should consider 
imposing access also at a lower level than IP11, 
in particular taking into account the fact that 
there is demand for access at levels which allow 
a more substantial differentiation of the retail 
services. 
Stand alone bitstream access 
The Commission notes that there is a demand 
for a stand alone bitstream which  
EN  359    EN 
3 - transparency  would enable competitors to offer broadband 
connections to end customers without an 
obligation to buy a telephone connection from 
EPT. Such a product would 
stimulate competition in areas, where 
competition on the retail services is particularly 
weak. It may also provide an adequate means to 
increase competition 
in the retail voice markets via Voice over IP. 
Therefore, the Commission invites 
ILR to design the access obligation to enable 
both the delivery of a broadband 
access to Internet only, and the bundled delivery 
of a broadband access and voice 
services or video services. 
Price control obligation  
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4 – accounting separation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 – price control 
 
 
ILR proposes to implement the price control 
obligation on the basis of a "retailminus" 
methodology. The Commission notes however 
that the "retail-minus" approach may not be 
effective in this particular case. 
Indeed, as indicated by ILR, the prices applied 
by EPT at retail level are above the 
prices in neighbouring Member States (without 
such price distinctions being 
caused prima facie by objective cost 
differences). The application of retail minus 
methodology may consequently not lead to 
effectively regulated wholesale prices. 
Under these circumstances, the Commission 
invites ILR to impose an obligation of price 
control based on costs. Such an obligation would 
ensure both the equality in the conditions of 
competition between alternative operators 
(buyers of the wholesale offers) and EPT as 
retail provider, as well as guarantee attractive 
prices for consumers. Indeed, wholesale pricing 
based on costs allows the SMP operator to 
recover its costs while allowing alternative 
operators, which have not yet 
reached the same critical weight, the benefit of 
its economies of scale. 
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1 - access  EE/2006/0522  Sideamet includes 
cable TV networks in 
the market definition 
on the basis of retail 
demand-side 
substitutability, as in 
densely populated 
areas cable exists in 
parallel with 
the PSTN network 
and may act as a 
substitute 
 
national Elion 
2 - transparency 
Inclusion of Cable infrastructure into the 
market definition 
Sideamet's market definition includes services 
provided over the cable TV network. 
The Commission would like to draw Sideamet's 
attention to the definition of 
wholesale broadband access as provided in the 
Annex to the Recommendation, which 
covers both PSTN-based bitstream access and 
“wholesale access provided over other 
infrastructures, if and when they offer facilities 
equivalent to bit-stream access.” It  follows 
thereof that, before including cable TV networks 
in the relevant market 
definition, the NRAs should give due 
consideration to the technical, practical and 
economic feasibility for cable operators to offer 
facilities equivalent to bitstream 
access. 
Sideamet has not assessed in sufficient detail 
demand-substitutability considerations at the  
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3 – non discrimination 
4 – accounting separation 
wholesale level. Furthermore, the above test 
whether cable offers facilities equivalent to bit-
stream access has not been carried out. It may 
therefore be questioned at this stage whether 
these conditions are met and whether broadband 
access via the cable networks can indeed be 
included in the relevant product market. 
However, in this case the inclusion or exclusion 
of bitstream access provided via cable TV 
networks from the relevant product market of 
wholesale bitstream access would not lead to a 
different result in the SMP analysis. 
Consequently, the Commission considers that a 
conclusion on the exact scope of the 
relevant product market is not relevant for the 
purposes of SMP assessment. 
Timeframe for the review 
Sideamet intends to review the notified market 
in three years. The Commission 
considers this timeframe to be unreasonably 
long, especially taking into account that 
Sideamet itself refers to changing terms of 
competition at the retail level. Therefore, the  
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5 – price control  Commission would invite Sideamet to consider 
a shorter review period. 
 
1 – access 
 
2 – transparency 
 
3 – non-discrimination 
 
4 – accounting separation 
 
LV/2006/0540  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
national Lattelekom 
5 – price control 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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FI/2006/0548  FICORA confirms 
the conclusion 
reached 
in its previous market 
review that the 
market includes 
wholesale broadband 
services 
provided over the 
PSTN and cable 
network. 
 
regional 39  operators  1 - obligation to lease transmission 
capacity (including necessary equipment) 
to the other 
operators as a wholesale broadband 
access; 
 
Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
obligations 
The Commission recalls the comment made in 
the first round notification with regard 
to the fact that FICORA did not specify the 
method on which cost orientation would 
be assessed. In the context of the adoption of the 
final measure, FICORA justified it 
by explaining that since the Finnish 
Communication Market Act leaves each 
operator free to select the cost-accounting 
procedures, it cannot decide on the cost-
accounting methodology. The Commission 
continues to believe that this limits the 
measure’s contribution to consumer benefit, the 
enhancement of competition and the 
development of the internal market. 
Lack of price regulation for wholesale 
bitstream access 
FICORA does not propose any price control 
obligation in the wholesale broadband 
access market. However, there are a number of  
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2 – transparency 
 
 
 
 
factors raised by FICORA that may call for price 
regulation. First, FICORA indicates that prices 
have recently increased in the retail market. 
Secondly, FICORA indicates that the national 
competition authority has been investigating 
potential price squeezes in the broadband market 
since 2003. Price squeezes can be avoided 
through effective wholesale price regulation. 
FICORA also recognises that the prices for 
wholesale broadband access 
vary greatly from one region to the other. This 
coupled with the fact that especially in 
sparsely populated areas wholesale broadband 
access from the SMP operator remains the only 
cost-effective way of competing in the retail 
market raises concerns that without proper price 
regulation it is difficult for a new entrant to 
build a competitive retail offer on a nationwide 
basis. Against this background the Commission 
invites FICORA to consider imposing 
appropriate price regulation in the wholesale 
broadband access market. 
Inclusion of cable in the definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market 
The Commission reiterates its comment made in 
the first round notification about the 
concerns related to the inclusion of cable into 
the market definition for wholesale 
broadband access. However, the Commission 
maintains that the conclusion on the exact scope 
of the market is not relevant in the present case  
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for the purposes of the SMP assessment. 
 
       3 – non-discrimination    
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Market 13: Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines 
 
               
Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
Access / 
interconnection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency  Price control / 
cost accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland YES  43  operators  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Hungary YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sweden YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
United Kingdom  NO**  2 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES*  YES* 
Austria ***  YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Belgium YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Cyprus  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Czech Republic  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Denmark  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
France  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece  NO** 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Lithuania  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxemburg  NO** 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Malta  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Netherlands  NO** 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Poland  NO** 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia  NO** 1  operator YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Spain  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
*** Second round  
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Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007           
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Market 13: Terminating segments of leased lines 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for Remedies Imposed  Results of Community 
Consultation 
1 - Provision of network access on 
reasonable request 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Basis of charges obligation (cost 
orientation and a cost accounting system ) 
4 -Transparency (reference offer and 
technical information) 
UK/2003/0037-
0038 
Refinement of the 
market definition 
in the 
Recommendation, 
four wholesale 
markets in the UK 
excluding the Hull 
area and in the 
Hull area:  
– wholesale low 
bandwidth 
traditional 
interface 
symmetric 
broadband 
origination (up to 
and including 
8Mbit/s); 
– wholesale high 
bandwidth 
traditional 
interface 
symmetric 
broadband 
National market 
with local 
characteristics 
(UK excluding 
the Hull area and 
the Hull area) 
BT (with the 
exception of the 
very high capacity 
segment, where no 
SMP was found) 
and Kingston (with 
the exception of the 
very high capacity 
segment 
5 - Price control (BT only) 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Market definition: On the basis of the 
existence of different competitive 
conditions, Oftel has refined the leased 
line product markets as defined in the 
Recommendation, allowing proposing the 
removal of existing regulation on the 
market for very high bandwidth circuits. 
Oftel has defined a national market with 
local characteristics taking account of 
certain variations in the level of 
competition in different areas. Oftel's 
analysis is consistent with the 
methodology set out in the 
Recommendation and in the 
Commission's Guidelines on market 
analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power. Ofcom is invited to 
monitor closely the market developments 
and examine whether the proposed 
wholesale obligations (and in particular 
the ability for tariffs for wholesale trunk  
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6 - Accounting separation (BT only) 
7 - Requirement to provide advance 
notification of changes to (or introduction 
of) prices, terms and conditions (BT only) 
8 - Requirement to provide quality of 
service information (BT only) 
origination (above 
8Mbit/s up to and 
including 
155Mbit/s);  
– wholesale very 
high bandwidth 
traditional 
interface 
symmetric 
broadband 
origination (above 
155Mbit/s) in the 
UK excluding the 
Hull area;  
– wholesale 
alternative 
interface 
symmetric 
broadband 
origination. 
9 - Obligations relating to requests for new 
network access (BT only) 
segments to be geographically de-
averaged) change the geographic 
variations to such a degree as to make the 
definition of an alternative geographic 
market more appropriate in the future. 
 
National consultation run in parallel 
with Article 7 consultation: Any 
material modification to the draft measure 
as a consequence of comments made by 
interested parties in the framework of the 
national consultation will require the draft 
measure to be re-notified. 
UK/2004/0077  See Cases UK/2003/0037-0038.  Amendments to the interim charge control 
obligations imposed on BT  No comments made by the Commission.  
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UK/2004/0123  See Cases UK/2003/0037-0038. 
Slight modification of the remedies already 
notified because of the establishment of the 
Telecommunications Adjudicator.  
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Obligation to provide line rental of a 
leased line 
2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms and 
tariff information  FI/2004/0080 
Leased lines 
including a 
connection to the 
end-user (similar to 
the 
Recommendation). 
Regional 43  operators 
3 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Provision of access to terminating 
segments on reasonable request  
2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting 
3 - Non-discrimination 
4 - Transparency (reference offer) 
AT/2004/00100  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telekom  Austria 
5 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment 
encouraging TKK to make clear that the 
proposed remedies would apply to all 
products within the relevant market and 
that the specific obligations set down in 
national legislation relating to leased lines 
used for the purpose of network 
interconnection are above and beyond 
those proposed for this market.  
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1 - Transparency 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Access obligation 
HU/2005/0168  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Matáv  Rt. 
5 - Price control (retail minus) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access obligation 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency  
4 - Accounting separation 
IE/2005/0139  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National eircom 
5 - Price control and cost accounting 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The further consultation planned by 
ComReg: The draft measures relating to 
the details and implementation of the 
accounting separation and cost 
accounting obligations are required to be 
notified under Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive. 
1 - Access obligation  PT/2005/0156  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
(in addition to 
traditional 
terminating leased 
National PT  Comunicaçõnes 
2 - Non-discrimination 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
lines, the market 
definition covers 
also symmetric 
xDSL technologies 
with capacity up to 
and including 2 
Mbps). 
5 - Price control (cost orientation and retail 
minus) and cost accounting 
1 - Provision of terminating segments on 
reasonable request 
2 - Price regulation of certain terminating 
segments (cost-orientation based on fully 
distributed costs) 
3 - Obligation to interconnect networks on 
reasonable request 
4 - Notification of price changes and 
submission of accounts statements 
5 - Non-discrimination 
6 - Publication of important terms and 
conditions 
SE/2005/0200 
Facilities providing 
for transparent 
symmetric 
transmission 
capacity between 
network 
termination points 
which do not 
include on-demand 
switching 
(similar to the 
Recommendation). 
National TeliaSonera 
7 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Market share data: The market share 
data collected by PTS indicate an 
aggregated market share with regard to all 
types of wholesale leased lines i.e. 
terminating and trunk segments 
considered jointly. When notifying the 
market for trunk segments, PTS is 
encouraged to provide more specific 
figures or estimations for that market, 
excluding terminating segments. 
SI/2005/0219  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
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DK/2005/0245 
Similar to the 
Recommendation 
 
National TDC  A/S 
1 - Requirement to provide wholesale 
access to terminating segments of leased 
lines 
regardless of transmission capacity and 
underlying technology and co-location on 
reasonable request; 
2 - Price control (based on modified historic 
costs); 
3 - Cost accounting; 
4 - Non-discrimination; 
5 - Requirement to publish a reference 
offer; 
6 - Accounting separation 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Conditions of competition in low and 
high bandwidth terminating segments, 
and 
scope of remedies: Since NITA indicates 
that there are different competitive 
conditions for high and low capacity 
terminating segments of leased lines, the 
Commission invited NITA to consider 
whether such different conditions would 
justify 
a differentiation of the remedies imposed 
on the operator designated as having 
SMP. 
 
NL/2005/0282 
Three separate 
markets: 
(i) wholesale 
terminating 
segments of leased 
lines of <2Mbit/s; 
(ii) wholesale 
terminating 
segments of leased 
lines of 2Mbit/s;  
National KPN   
wholesale terminating segments of leased 
lines of <2Mbit/s 
1- Access, 
2 - Non-discrimination, 
3 - Obligation not to unreasonably bundle 
services, 
4 – Transparency (publication of a reference 
offer) 
5 - Price regulation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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6 - Accounting separation 
 
wholesale terminating segments of leased 
lines of 2Mbit/s 
1- Access, 
 
 
 
2 - Non-discrimination, 
 
3 - Transparency (publication of a reference 
offer) 
4 - Price regulation 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
(iii) wholesale 
terminating 
segments of leased 
lines of >2Mbit/s 
 
wholesale terminating segments of leased 
lines of >2Mbit/s 
 
1 – Access obligation 
IT/2005/0272  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National Telecom  Italia   
1- Access and use of specific 
network resources, 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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2 - Non-discrimination, 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer) 
4 – Price control (based on a network 
cap mechanism) and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
1- Access and use of specific 
network resources, 
 
2 - Non-discrimination, 
3 – Transparency, 
SI/2005/0305  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National 
Telekom 
Slovenije 
 
4 – Price control 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1- Access, 
 
MT/2006/0374  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National 
 
 Maltacom  
  
2 - Non-discrimination, 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 – Transparency,  
4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 - Access, including the obligation to 
maintain the wholesale offers currently in 
place 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (including the publication 
of service quality indicators and a reference 
offer) 
4 - Price control 
 
FR/2006/0416  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National France  Telecom 
5 - Accounting separation 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Remedies for terminating segments of 
leased lines 
ARCEP proposed to differentiate 
remedies relating to price control for 
terminating segments of leased lines, 
depending on bandwidths.  
Although the Commission does not object 
to the imposition of a differentiated set of 
remedies in the market for terminating 
segments of leased lines, such differential 
treatment should be adequately reasoned. 
Further, Article 8.2 (c) of the Framework 
Directive states that NRAs shall 
encourage efficient investment in 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the roll-out 
of new infrastructure for all terminating 
segments which require a bandwidth of 
more than 10 Mbit/s might not be  
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economically viable in all geographic 
areas, in particular in rural areas. 
Therefore the Commission invited 
ARCEP to consider extending the 
obligation not to charge excessive prices 
imposed on the market for trunk 
segments also to terminating segments of 
leased lines above 10 Mbit/s. 
1 - Access obligation 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
SK/2006/0386 
The market 
definition includes 
loops provided via 
metallic, optical as 
well as wireless 
networks (such as 
fixed wireless 
access networks 
(“FWA””) and 
microwave 
networks) 
 
National Slovak  Telekom 
5 – Price cap and cost orientation: prices 
cannot exceed a maximum level and shall 
be oriented to costs on the basis of the fully 
allocated historical costs method) 
The Commission made comments on: 
Inclusion of optical and wireless 
networks in the market for wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines 
Despite the absence of the demand- and 
supply-side substitutability analysis based 
on competition law that would justify the 
inclusion of these technologies in a single 
market for wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines, the exclusion of 
these technologies from the market 
definition would not have affected the 
finding of SMP or the scope of 
regulation.  
Parallel imposition of cost orientation 
obligation and price cap 
In accordance with Article 13 of the 
Access Directive, where an operator has 
an obligation regarding the cost 
orientation of its prices, the burden of 
proof that prices are based on costs, 
including a reasonable rate of return on 
investment, shall lie with the operator 
concerned. TÚSR may require Slovak 
Telekom to provide full justification for  
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its prices, and may, where appropriate, 
require prices to be adjusted. However, 
this is without prejudice to the possibility 
for Slovak Telekom to adopt prices that 
are higher than currently valid prices, 
provided of course, that the adopted 
prices are derived from fully justified and 
relevant costs. This may be the case, in 
particular, if there is reliable evidence 
from cost accounting analysis as 
approved by TÚSR that the price cap 
would result in a price level below the 
efficient costs of the underlying network 
elements and the services being requested 
including a reasonable rate of return. 
1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of 
special facilities) 
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency (publication of a reference 
offer, including Service Level Agreements) 
 
4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 
 
EL/2006/0422 
Two separate 
relevant markets: (i)  
up to and including 
2 Mbps; (ii) above 
2 Mbps. 
 
National OTE 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
CY/2006/0482  Similar to the  National CYTA  1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of  No comments made by the Commission.  
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special facilities) 
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency  
4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and cost accounting 
 
Recommendation 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
1 - Access  
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency  
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
LT/2006/0430 
Similar to 
Recommendation. 
Two separate 
markets:  
(i) low speed 
terminating 
segments of leased 
lines (leased lines 
below 2048 kbps 
including 2048 
kbps), and 
(ii) high speed 
terminating 
segments of leased 
National 
TEO LT AB 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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lines (leased lines 
above 2048 kbps). 
 
1 - Access  
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency  
CZ/2006/0450  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National  Český Telecom 
a.s. 
4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and accounting separation 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access  
2 - Non discrimination  
ES/2006/0458  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National TESAU 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
Reference offer) 
The Commission made comments on: 
Limitation of the scope of the remedies 
in the market of terminating leased 
lines to services based on traditional 
interfaces 
Although CMT includes both traditional 
interfaces and Ethernet technologies in 
the market for wholesale terminating  
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4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and accounting separation 
 
5 - Obligation to report the quality 
parameters for the supply of the 
relevant services. 
 
leased lines, it proposes to limit the scope 
of the remedies to the services based on 
traditional interfaces. The Commission 
notes that some alternative operators 
raised concerns during the national 
consultation regarding their inability to 
compete with TESAU’s retail offers 
based on Ethernet technology on the basis 
of the already existing wholesale products 
of TESAU. 
In accordance with Article 8(4) of the 
Access Directive, the obligations imposed 
on SMP operators shall be based on the 
nature of the problem identified, 
proportionate and justified in the light of 
the regulatory objectives laid down in 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
In the light hereof, the Commission 
invites CMT to assess, before adopting 
the final measure, whether alternative 
operators can compete efficiently with 
TESAU in the retail market – both from a 
technical and an economic point of view 
considering the high prices for 
terminating segments in Spain and the 
lack of wholesale offers with speeds 
corresponding to those Ethernet services 
offered by TESAU at retail level – on the 
basis of the wholesale products actually 
offered by TESAU. In the case such 
analysis would show that alternative 
operators are not able to efficiently 
compete at retail level on the basis of the 
existing wholesale offers, the 
Commission invites CMT to reconsider  
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the scope of the remedies. 
DE/2006/0480  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
AT/2006/0508  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National Telekom  Austria 
Terminating segments of leased lines with 
bandwidth up to 155 Mbit/s and with a 
bandwidth < 34 Mbit/s 
only in the 9 capital cities of the 
Austrian Länder 
 
1 - Access 
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
Reference offer) 
4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and cost accounting 
5 - Accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 - Access 
 
2 - Non discrimination  
 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
Reference offer) 
4 – Price control and cost accounting 
PL/2006/0516 
Leased 
lines connecting the 
end customer with 
the Point of 
Presence (PoP) of 
the requesting 
operator in the 
network of an 
operator providing 
leased lines. 
National 
Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A. ("TP 
SA") 
5 - Accounting separation 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Market definition 
As a consequence of the market definition 
the exact boundaries of the market for 
trunk and terminating segments are not 
stable, as they will depend (in each case) 
on the location of the PoP of an 
alternative operator within the network of 
TP SA. 
Assuming that different alternative 
operators interconnect at different points 
and at different levels in TP SA’s 
network, the same network components 
of TP SA’s network may be characterised 
as trunk or terminating segments  
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depending on the customer. 
Such market definition does not have an 
impact on the SMP assessment in this 
market, but it may have some undesirable 
side-effects if UKE would find it 
appropriate to impose less stringent 
regulation in the market for trunk 
segments of leased lines or would find 
that market to be competitive. In such 
circumstances, alternative operators may 
be discouraged from interconnecting with 
TP SA at a lower (i.e. local) level in the 
network, as interconnection at higher (i.e. 
regional or national) level would enable 
them to benefit more from the (stricter) 
regulated terminating segments. 
Most other Member States have defined 
terminating segments of leased lines as 
leased lines between the end customer 
and the nearest 
point of interconnection offered  in the 
incumbent’s network, independently of 
whether the alternative operator 
effectively makes use of that offer. 
1 - Access obligation 
2 - Non-discrimination 
BE/2006/0552  Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
National Belgacom 
3 - Transparency  
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Cost accounting for wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines: 
The Commission notes that currently 
IBPT does not apply a cost accounting 
system for all products included in  
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4 - Price control and cost accounting 
market 1316 as defined by IBTP and that 
a consultation on the cost modelling 
methodology is planned to take place six 
months after adoption of the final 
measures in market 13. Given the 
relevance of a cost accounting system in 
relation to all products included in market 
13 and in particular alternative interfaces, 
the Commission invites IBPT to shorten 
the timeframe for elaborating the details 
of the cost accounting model and its 
implementing measures.  
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1 - Access obligation  LU/2006/0561 
One product market 
including 
terminating and 
trunk segments of 
leased lines 
 
National EPT 
2 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Lack of sufficient evidence for not 
separating the markets for terminating 
and 
trunk segments of leased lines 
ILR proposes to define one single 
wholesale market for terminating 
segments and trunk segments. ILR 
justifies this approach in particular with 
the absence of the emergence of a trunk 
leased lines market given 
that the tarification system of EPT does 
not provide incentives to alternative 
operators to duplicate the infrastructure 
between the points of presence of EPT 
(five points of interconnection). The 
Commission however takes the view that 
the market delineation should be based on 
a thorough assessment of demand and 
supply side substitutability. In this respect 
the inclusion of the trunk segment into the 
terminating segment of the leased lines 
market is not well justified. In particular, 
the Commission is not convinced about 
ILR's argument to define one market on 
the 
basis of supply side substitutability given 
that operators offering the trunk segment 
would still need to duplicate relevant 
infrastructure if they wanted to offer 
terminating segments as well.  
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3 - Transparency (publication of a reference 
offer) 
4 - Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
Notwithstanding that further evidence 
should have been provided by ILR that 
trunk and terminating segments of leased 
lines are (currently or prospectively) in 
the same market, the SMP analysis of the 
trunk segment of the leased lines market 
would not 
have led to a different result. 
Consequently, the Commission considers 
that in the present case a conclusion on 
the exact scope of the market is not 
critical for the 
designation of SMP. Furthermore, the 
Commission notes that ILR intends to 
modify the tariff structure of EPT such as 
to allow for the emergence of a trunk 
leased line market. If, as a consequence of 
the modification of the tariff structure, 
ILR observes 
the development of a product offer in the 
trunk part of the wholesale leased line 
market, the Commission invites ILR to 
reassess the market boundaries and to 
analyse the competition conditions for the 
market(s) identified without delay. 
1 - Access  
LV/2006/0572  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National 
SIA Lattelecom 
 
2 - Non discrimination  
No comments made by the Commission.  
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3 - Transparency (publication of a 
Reference offer) 
4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) 
and cost accounting 
 
5 - Accounting separation   
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Market 14: Wholesale trunk segments of leased lines 
 
                       
Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
Access / 
interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency  Price control / cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  No SMP found 
Finland YES  No SMP found 
Hungary YES  No SMP found 
Ireland YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Portugal YES  1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
United Kingdom  YES  1 operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Austria ***  YES  No SMP found 
Belgium YES  No SMP found 
Cyprus  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  YES  No SMP found 
Denmark  YES  No SMP found  
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France  NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Greece  YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Italy  NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Latvia  YES  No SMP found 
Lithuania  NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Luxemburg  NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Malta  NO** 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
The Netherlands  YES  No SMP found 
Slovenia  YES  No SMP found 
Spain  YES 1  operator  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Sweden    No SMP found 
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets  
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March  2007        
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Market 14: Wholesale trunk segments of leased lines - notifications assessed until 30 September 2005 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Obligation to provide network access 
on reasonable request 
2 - Requirement not to discriminate 
unduly 
3 - Basis of charges obligation (cost 
orientation and a cost accounting system ) 
4 -Transparency (reference offer and 
technical information) 
5 - Price control 
UK/2003/0039  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National BT   
6 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made comments on:   
 
Market definition: The Commission invites 
Ofcom to monitor closely the market 
developments and examine whether the 
proposed wholesale obligations (and in 
particular the ability for tariffs for wholesale 
trunk segments to be geographically de-
averaged) change the geographic variations to 
such a degree as to make the definition of an 
alternative geographic market more appropriate 
in the future. 
 
National consultation run in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to be 
re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework  
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7 - Requirement to provide advance 
notification of changes to (or introduction 
of) prices, terms and conditions; 
8 - Requirement to provide quality of 
service information 
9 - Obligations relating to requests for 
new network access 
Directive. 
UK/2004/0123  See Cases UK/2003/0037-0038. 
Slight modification of the remedies 
already notified because of the 
establishment of the Telecommunications 
Adjudicator.  
No comments made by the Commission. 
FI/2004/0081  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National   No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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AT/2004/0074  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
HU/2005/0169  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access obligation 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
IE/2005/0140  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National eircom 
4 - Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultation planned by ComReg: 
ComReg states in its draft measures that a 
further consultation will be held on the details 
and implementation of accounting separation 
and cost accounting obligations. The 
Commission services would like to remind 
ComReg that draft measures relating to these 
regulatory obligations are required to be notified 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.  
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5 - Price control and cost accounting 
1 – Access obligation 
2 – Non-discrimination 
3 – Transparency 
4 – Accounting separation 
PT/2005/0157  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  PT 
Comunicaçõnes  
5 – Price control 
No comments made by the Commission. 
SI/2005/0220  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
NL/2005/0283 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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1- Access and use of specific 
network resources, 
 
 
 
2 – Non-discrimination 
 
3 – Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer) 
 
 
 
4 - Price control (based on a network cap 
mechanism and cost accounting 
 
 
IT/2005/0273 
Analogue and 
digital circuits from 
2 Mbps to 2,5 Gbps 
 
National  Telecom Italia 
("TI") 
  
5- Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Exclusion of trunk segments below 2 Mbps 
from the definition of market for trunk 
segments of leased lines 
AGCOM hereafter concludes that circuits with 
transmission capacities below 2 Mbps only 
constitutes a marginal part of the market, and that 
consequently the wholesale market for trunk 
segments of leased lines should not include 
circuits below such capacities. AGCOM does not 
provide any further argumentation as to why trunk 
segments below 2 Mbps, from a demand-side or a 
supply-side perspective, should be excluded from 
the relevant market.   
The Commission considers that the fact that trunk 
segments with transmission capacities below 2 
Mbps only constitute a marginal part of the whole 
offer in the trunk market does not seem sufficient 
to exclude such segments from the market 
definition. Therefore, the Commission would like 
to invite AGCOM to reconsider its conclusion and 
include circuits 
with transmission capacities below 2 Mbps in the 
definition of the relevant market in its 
final measure.  In any event, as the Commission 
has previously pointed out in other cases, it does 
not consider that in these particular circumstances 
the exclusion of such marginal segment from the 
definition of the relevant market would affect trade  
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between Member States within the meaning of 
Article 7 (4) and recital 38 of the Framework 
Directive. Such measure is not likely to have an 
influence on the pattern of trade between Member 
States in a manner which might create a barrier to 
the single market. Therefore, the Commission has 
limited its reaction to the above comment. 
 
SE/2005/0341 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Additional information provided: The 
Commission would like to encourage PTS to 
consider strengthening the motivation of its final 
decision by including the additional information 
provided to the Commission in the course of this 
procedure, mainly relating to the availability of 
alternative supply at the regional exchanges and 
the absence of significant switching costs.  
 
Susceptibility to ex ante regulation: On the 
basis of the information provided by PTS, the 
Commission considers that the market under 
consideration does not meet the three criteria test 
and hence is not susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
In particular, the market seems to exhibit 
relatively low barriers to entry, due inter alia to 
the widespread existence of dark fibre 
infrastructure which can be utilized by alternative 
operators as a wholesale input to provide trunk 
segments of leased lines. Alternative operators 
have moreover entered the market and are 
capturing customers from TeliaSonera, which is 
reflected in decreasing market shares of 
TeliaSonera and a competitive constraint being  
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exercised on the pricing behaviour of 
TeliaSonera. Under those circumstances, it might 
be concluded that the market tends towards 
effective competition.  
 
Non-SMP finding: The factual data provided by 
PTS are insufficient for the Commission to reach a 
definitive view on whether TeliaSonera has SMP 
on the relevant market or not (in particular the 
market share information, market share trends and 
pricing data are too vague). However, the 
Commission is of the view that a detailed SMP 
analysis with more factual evidence would not 
have led to a different regulatory outcome in this 
particular case since in any event the market for 
trunk segments of leased lines in Sweden does not 
exhibit the features that make it susceptible to ex 
ante regulation.   
SI/2005/0362 
Similar to the 
Recommendation. 
 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
SK/2006/0414  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
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1 - Access, including the obligation to 
maintain the wholesale offers currently in 
place 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency (including the 
publication of service quality indicators 
and a reference offer) 
FR/2006/0417 
Two markets for 
trunk segments of 
leased lines:  
(i) intra-territory 
trunk segments and 
(ii) inter-territory 
trunk segments. 
 
in and 
between: 
mainland 
France, the 
French 
overseas 
departments  
and Mayotte 
France 
Telecom 
4 - Price control 
- the prohibition of predatory prices for 
all services in the wholesale markets; 
-   a cost orientation obligation for (i) 
terminal segments of leased lines below 
10 Mbit/s, (ii) the connecting links 
between cable landing points and the first 
node of leased lines, and (iii) the inter-
territory trunk segments linking mainland 
France and Réunion; 
- the prohibition to charge excessive 
prices for all intra-territory and inter-
territory trunk segments (with the 
exception of the segments linking 
mainland France and Réunion); 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 - Accounting separation 
1- Access, 
 
2 - Non-discrimination, 
3 – Transparency,  
4 – Cost orientation, 
MT/2006/0375  International 
segments included 
National 
 
 Maltacom  
  
5 – Cost accounting and accounting 
separation 
 
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
The inclusion of international lines in the 
wholesale and retail market definitions: By 
including international lines in the retail markets 
for the provision of leased lines and wholesale 
trunk segments of leased lines respectively, the 
MCA deviates from the Recommendation. In its 
notification, the MCA did not conduct the three 
criteria test considering this unnecessary as in its 
view the two markets as defined in the 
Recommendation include international leased 
lines. Without contesting the MCA’s conclusions, 
the Commission invited the MCA to clarify in its 
final measure (i) that two new markets have been 
defined by including international lines, thereby 
deviating from the Recommendation, (ii) that the 
three criteria test has been carried out for these 
markets and (iii) that the cumulative criteria of this 
test are fulfilled.  
Remedies imposed in the market of the 
international segments of leased lines  
MCA considered that prices would inevitably rise 
if not regulated. Accordingly it proposed to 
maintain the current price regulation on the retail 
market of the international leased lines (cost-
oriented prices approved by the MCA). The 
Commission invited the MCA to consider whether 
imposing a less stringent type of price regulation 
rather than maintaining the current cost-oriented 
prices would be more justified and proportionate  
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in relation to the achievement of the regulatory 
objectives - taking into account both the short term 
objective to protect consumers and the longer term 
objective to induce effective competition.    
 
1 - Access (as well as co-location and use 
of special facilities) 
2 - Non discrimination 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer, including Service Level 
Agreements) 
 
4 –Cost orientation and cost accounting 
 
EL/2006/0423  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National OTE 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access  
2 - Non discrimination  
LT/2006/0431  Two markets for 
trunk segments of 
leased lines:  
(i) national 
trunk segments and 
(ii) international 
trunk segments. 
National   
TEO LT AB 
 
3 - Transparency  
The Commission made a comment  on: 
 
The wholesale market for international leased 
lines 
RRT defines and analyses a separate wholesale 
market for international trunk segments of leased 
lines (i.e. trunk leased lines with one point in  
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4 – Price control and cost accounting 
 
 
5 – Accounting separation 
 
Lithuania and the other point abroad), which 
deviates from the Recommendation. NRAs may 
identify markets that differ from those of the 
Recommendation, but they should carry out the 
three criteria test, i.e that: (1) there are high and 
non-transitory entry barriers, (2) the structure of 
the market does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon and 
(3) the application of competition law alone would 
not adequately address the market failure(s) 
concerned. 
In its notification, RRT does not conduct the three 
criteria test for the international trunk leased lines 
market taking the specific national circumstances 
into account. However, since RRT does not find 
any undertaking to have SMP on this market, the 
possible exclusion of the relevant market from 
market analysis on the basis of the three criteria 
test would not have led to a different regulatory 
outcome in this particular case. 
1 - Access (as well as co-location and use 
of special facilities) 
2 - Non discrimination  
3 - Transparency  
CY/2006/0483  Similar to the 
Recommendation 
(including trunk 
segments of partial 
leased lines and 
backhaul services 
connecting with the  
international 
submarine cable 
systems reaching 
Cyprus) 
National CYTA 
4 – Price control (based on cost 
orientation) and cost accounting 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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5 – Accounting separation 
 
CZ/2006/0451  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National No  SMP  found 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No remedies imposed 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access  
ES/2006/0459  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National TESAU 
2 - Transparency (publication of a 
Reference offer)  
No comments made by the Commission. 
DE/2006/0481  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
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AT/2006/0467  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National No  SMP  found 
 
 
 
 
No remedies imposed 
No comments made by the Commission. 
BE/2006/0553  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National No  SMP  found 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No remedies imposed 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Access obligation 
2 - Non-discrimination 
LU/2006/0562  One product market 
including 
terminating and 
trunk segments of 
leased lines 
 
National EPT 
3 - Transparency (publication of a 
reference offer) 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Lack of sufficient evidence for not separating 
the markets for terminating and trunk 
segments of leased lines 
ILR proposes to define one single wholesale 
market for terminating segments and trunk 
segments. ILR justifies this approach in particular 
with the absence of the emergence of a trunk  
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4 - Price control (based on cost 
orientation) and cost accounting 
5 – Accounting separation 
leased lines market given 
that the tarification system of EPT does not 
provide incentives to alternative operators to 
duplicate the infrastructure between the points of 
presence of EPT (five points of interconnection). 
The Commission however takes the view that the 
market delineation should be based on a thorough 
assessment of demand and supply side 
substitutability. In this respect the inclusion of the 
trunk segment into the terminating segment of the 
leased lines market is not well justified. In 
particular, the Commission is not convinced about 
ILR's argument to define one market on the 
basis of supply side substitutability given that 
operators offering the trunk segment would still 
need to duplicate relevant infrastructure if they 
wanted to offer terminating segments as well. 
Notwithstanding that further evidence should have 
been provided by ILR that trunk and terminating 
segments of leased lines are (currently or 
prospectively) in the same market, the SMP 
analysis of the trunk segment of the leased lines 
market would not 
have led to a different result. Consequently, the 
Commission considers that in the present case a 
conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not 
critical for the designation of SMP. Furthermore, 
the Commission notes that ILR intends to modify 
the tariff structure of EPT such as to allow for the 
emergence of a trunk leased line market. If, as a 
consequence of the modification of the tariff 
structure, ILR observes the development of a 
product offer in the trunk part of the wholesale 
leased line market, the Commission invites ILR to  
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reassess the market boundaries and to analyse the 
competition conditions for the market(s) identified 
without delay. 
LV/2006/0573  Similar to the 
Recommendation  National No  SMP  found 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No remedies imposed 
No comments made by the Commission. 
DK/2007/0586  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
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Market 15: Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks 
 
              
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
Access / 
interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency Price control / cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES  No SMP found 
Finland YES  No SMP found* 
Hungary** YES  No SMP found 
Ireland YES 
2 operators (joint 
SMP)  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Slovenia YES  1  operator  YES  YES  NO   YES  NO 
Sweden YES  No SMP found 
United 
Kingdom  YES  No SMP found 
Luxembourg YES  No SMP found 
Denmark YES  No SMP found  
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Netherlands YES  No SMP found 
Czech 
Republic YES  No SMP found 
Spain YES 
3 operators (joint 
SMP)  YES NO  NO  YES NO 
Italy YES  No SMP found 
Malta YES 
2 operators 
(joint SMP)  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Cyprus YES 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovakia YES  No SMP found 
Lithuania YES  No SMP found 
Greece YES  No SMP found 
Latvia YES  No SMP found 
* In its notification FI/2004/0082, Ficora proposed to designate one operator with SMP. The notified draft measure was vetoed by the Commission on 5 October 2004. On 
13 October 2004, following the veto decision, Ficora adopted a final measure taking into account the Commission veto decision and concluded that the market is effectively 
competitive. Therefore, there is no operator with SMP in the market. 
** second round of a market review 
                       
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007          
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Market 15: Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks 
Overview of notifications assessed until 28 February 2007 
Case 
reference
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definitio
n 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
UK/2003/0001 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Reliance on comments from parties other than 
the Commission and other NRAs: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a result of 
comments from third parties will require re-
notification. 
 
Inclusion of 3G telephony in the market 
definition: Market definition should be 
technology-neutral. 3G voice and SMS services 
offered at present or in the near future are, from 
demand-side perspective, not distinguishable from 
their 2G equivalents, and appear to be part of the 
same relevant market. 
 
Market share analysis: The use of derived market 
shares is broadly in line with the Commission's 
practice when assessing hypothetical markets or 
markets with a high degree of vertical integration. 
When calculating market shares, preference 
should be given to volume based as opposed to  
EN  411    EN 
value-based calculation. 
 
Use of international benchmarking and 
concentration measures: The fact that the UK 
market has a lower Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index 
("HHI") score than markets in other Member 
States is not in itself an indication of its propensity 
towards or away from collective dominance. 
AT/2004/0063 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Monitoring of the market: Opinions from 
competitors and the conduct of undertakings 
should be monitored very closely and be 
taken into consideration when assessing this 
market in a future review. 
National consultation running in parallel 
with Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to 
be re-notified.  
EN  412    EN 
1 - Obligation to relinquish access 
rights  FI/2004/0082 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National 
Sonera Mobile 
Networks 
Oy* 
2 - Interconnection  
  The Commission vetoed the draft measure 
based on : 
 
Lack of taking into consideration the apparent 
market dynamics: Even though there is 
currently no regulatory obligation for mobile 
network operators ("MNOs") to provide 
access, both service providers ("SPs") and 
mobile virtual network operators ("MVNOs") 
have been able to conclude agreements on a 
commercial basis with each of the three 
nationwide-operating MNOs. 
 
Lack of evidence of capacity constraints: There 
is not sufficient evidence as to the existence 
of barriers to expansion in the relevant 
market. 
 
Lack of evidence as to high switching costs and 
the absence of countervailing buying 
power: The incentives of MNOs to bear the 
costs of switching themselves was not 
considered. The largest SP has made an 
MVNO agreement with two MNOs. SPs ask 
for competing offers from different MNOs. 
 
Undue weight given to evidence of network  
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3 - Non-discrimination (pricing and 
other terms) 
4 - Obligation to negotiate on national 
roaming with a network operator 
that has a license for a third 
generation mobile network 
effects, economies of scale and scope, and 
substantial financial advantages: Differences in 
capacity utilisation do not offer a sustainable 
competitive advantage to an operator and can be 
overcome by attracting a larger number of 
customers onto existing capacity. Network effects 
are claimed to be particularly strong due to 
differences in prices for on-net and off-net calls, 
which are mainly relevant for the assessment of 
the retail mobile market. Concerning financial 
advantages, TeliaSonera’s competitors are also 
parts of large vertically and horizontally 
integrated telecommunications groups. 
*) On 13 October 2004, following the veto decision, Ficora adopted a final measure taking into account the Commission veto decision of 5 October 2004 and concluded 
that the market is effectively competitive. Therefore, there is no operator with SMP in the market. 
HU/2004/0096 
HU/2007/0594 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Absence of analysis of the wholesale    market:  
EN  414    EN 
The fact that at the wholesale level no 
transactions are taking place on the merchant 
market does not exclude the possibility to 
analyse the relevant market. NHH is invited to 
monitor the relevant market, especially with 
regard to the fact that it can be presumed that 
within the timeframe of its review market 
players will appear on the demand side of the 
relevant market. 
HU/2004/0108 
(Re-
notificatio
n related 
to 
HU/2004/0
096) 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Comment made in previous case: As the re-
notified draft measure does not contain any 
changes of substance, the comment made in 
case HU/2004/0096 remains valid in the 
context of this case. 
IE/2004/0121 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  Vodafone and 02 
(joint SMP) 
1 - Provision of network access 
following a reasonable request by 
an access seeker 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Analysis based on the retail market: Where all 
supply on the relevant market is captive, the 
structure of supply at the wholesale level can 
be derived from supply at the retail level. 
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2 - Non-discrimination obligation 
 
3 - Price control - cost orientation and 
cost accounting 
4 - Accounting separation 
Fringe competitors: ComReg should monitor the 
effective developments of the emergent 
competitors very closely in the near future 
and, when appropriate, review its SMP 
analysis and the regulatory measures imposed. 
For a competitor to be able to disrupt tacit 
collusion, it is not necessary to be a strong 
competitor of the tacitly colluding parties. 
 
Further consultation planned by ComReg: Draft 
measures relating to price control and cost 
accounting obligations are required to be 
notified. 
 
ational consultation run in parallel with Article 7 
consultation:  Any material modification to the 
draft measure as a consequence of comments 
made by interested parties in the framework of the 
national consultation will require the draft 
measure to be re-notified. 
FR/2005/0179 
 
Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
  
EN  416    EN 
SE/2005/0203 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
1 -Provision of access in response to a 
reasonable request 
2 –Obligation of non-discrimination 
SI/2005/0230 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National Mobitel 
3 –Price control 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Effectiveness of the proposed wholesale 
remedies in light of the competitive 
situation at the retail level: Remedies 
imposed on the mobile access and call 
origination market should be complemented 
as soon as possible by effective regulation of 
the wholesale markets for call termination on 
mobile networks. The Commission stresses 
the importance of measures taken under 
competition law to avoid restrictions of 
competition at retail level. 
 
Implementation of the proposed price control 
obligation: Price regulation should be applied 
only if commercial negotiations between 
parties do not result in an agreement.  The 
benchmark analysis for termination rates does 
not seem to form an appropriate point of 
reference for assessing the reasonability of 
wholesale access and call origination prices. 
SK/2006/0248  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
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LU/2005/0320  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
DK/2005/0243 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National 
 
No SMP found 
 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
NL/2005/0242 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National 
 
No SMP found 
 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
SK/2005/0248  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority  
EN  418    EN 
IT/2005/0259 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments on: 
Close monitoring of market developments 
It is only recently that the market has started 
showing evidence of a more competitive 
functioning. In fact, in its reply to the 
Commission’s request for information, 
AGCOM provided more recent market data in 
order to further substantiate its conclusions as 
to the improvements of market conditions. 
The further information supplied to the 
Commission by AGCOM shows that i) the 
third MNO (in terms of market share) has 
decreased prices in a considerable manner in 
2004 and its prices are no longer aligned with 
the prices of the first and second MNOs, and 
that ii) the fourth MNO has increased its 
market share (4,6 million customers according 
to recent data for 2005), to the detriment 
especially of the larger MNOs. Overall, the 
recent data supplied by AGCOM show that at 
least since 2003 onwards, there have been 
some positive developments in terms of price 
evolution and market shares. 
Given that these are recent market developments 
and that MNOs have so far not granted access 
to MVNOs so that these could have been in a 
position to offer competitive retail services 
like convergent fixed/mobile services, the 
Commission strongly recommends and invites 
AGCOM to closely monitor the market so as 
to identify whether the market irreversibly 
tends towards a competitive structure in 
which any tacitly co-ordinated outcome is 
unlikely to happen.  
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Finally the Commission invites AGCOM to 
analyse the wholesale market of access and 
call origination for non-geographic numbers 
and notify it according to Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive in the earliest possible 
timeframe. 
Assessment of the notification and the 
additional information provided 
The Commission reiterates that the assessment of a 
notified draft measure should be based on the 
most recent information and data available. 
Therefore, AGCOM should complement its 
final measure with the more recent 
information supplied to the Commission in its 
reply to the latter’s request for information 
Access 
ES/2005/0330 
 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on 
National 
 
 
Telefónica, 
Vodafone 
and Amena 
 
Obligation to charge reasonable prices 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The competitive conditions at the retail level 
CMT does not find collective dominance at the 
retail level and states that the retail 
market for mobile telephony services develops in a 
“competitive environment”. 
Nonetheless, CMT also argues that there is a 
“failure of competition” in the retail 
market and identifies certain market 
“defficiencies”, such as: i) the high level of 
prices, ii) the limited evolution of prices, iii) 
parallel marketing strategies as well as 
iv) high levels of profitability sustained by the 
three operators over a longer period of time.  
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It should be noted that in order to find joint SMP in 
the wholesale market of mobile 
access and call origination, it is not indispensable 
to find joint SMP at the retail level. 
Retail market conditions may inform an NRA of 
the structure of the wholesale 
market, but they may and need not in themselves 
be conclusive as regards the finding of SMP 
at the wholesale level. However, in order to 
render credible the finding of collusion at the 
wholesale level CMT had to demonstrate that 
the level of rents at the retail level is 
sufficiently high to provide incentives to 
collectively refuse access to third operators. If 
at the retail level there were no rents to 
protect, then the incentive of mobile network 
operators not to grant access to MVNOs is 
difficult to demonstrate. 
A finding of collective dominance raises 
particularly complex issues of an economic 
nature notwithstanding the guidance given 
both in the regulatory framework and the 
recent case law of the EU. Within that 
framework, for a finding of collective 
dominance to be sustained, there must be an 
incentive not to depart from the common 
policy. 
CMT’s analysis of the dynamics of the retail 
market mainly relies on the evolution of 
Average Revenue per Minute (ARPM) data 
on an aggregate basis. While such data is both 
valuable and informative, data regarding the 
evolution of prices on a less aggregate basis 
would provide a better indication of the 
dynamic of the retail market given the fact  
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that operators are not always equally 
represented in the individual market segments 
(e.g. pre-pay/post-pay, high, medium, or low 
usage).  
The Commission would therefore invite CMT to 
monitor for the purpose of a future 
market review the evolution of retail prices by 
market segment and/or customer 
profiles. 
In the present case the Commission nonetheless 
notes that the retail market appears to be 
characterised by a number of structural 
features, such as the high level of prices, the 
limited evolution of prices, and most notably 
high levels of profitability sustained by the 
three operators which appear to provide 
sufficient incentives to the three 
operators, Telefónica, Vodafone and Amena, to 
collectively refuse access to MVNOs at the 
wholesale level. 
The focal point 
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, 
for a finding of collective 
dominance in the form of tacit collusion, members 
of the dominant oligopoly must be aware, 
sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way 
in which the other members’market conduct is 
evolving. The degree of transparency is 
important for the purpose of permitting each 
member of the oligopoly to detect deviation 
from the common policy and to ascertain 
whether it is necessary to react to any such 
deviations by punishing them.  
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CMT defines one focal point consisting in the 
denial of wholesale access to third 
parties. The Commission services consider that this 
focal point is transparent and that non 
deviator MNOs can easily detect any 
deviation resulting in the entry of a new 
competitor at the retail level. 
CMT does not explicitly identify a focal point at 
the retail level which, although not 
indispensable, could have further supported the 
finding of sustainable coordinated outcome at 
wholesale level since it may allow operators 
to directly observe the commercial 
implications of their conduct at the retail 
level. CMT has, nevertheless, demonstrated 
an alignment of commercial strategies of the 
three operators Telefónica, 
Vodafone and Amena and that it seems plausible 
that a deviation of any one operator towards a 
more aggressive (and less profitable) price 
competition should be easily detected by the 
non-deviating MNOs. 
The retaliation mechanism 
For a finding of collective dominance, there must 
be an incentive not to depart from the 
common policy. Demonstrating the possibility 
and sustainability of a common line of action 
presupposes, in particular, proof of the 
existence of efficient, credible retaliatory 
measures against any company that deviates 
from the common policy/strategy (i.e. the 
focal point). For a retaliation mechanism to be 
credible, it needs to be easily and quickly 
implemented.  
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CMT considers that the most credible retaliation 
would occur at wholesale level. If an MNO 
were to grant network access, the other firms 
could retaliate by granting access to another 
MVNO. 
The Commission notes that the networks of all 
three MNOs are dimensioned to support only 
forecasted traffic in the short to medium term. 
However, according to CMT, all three MNOs 
appear to have sufficient spectrum enabling 
them to adapt rapidly the capacity of the 
network to the evolution of the traffic.  Hence 
the retaliation mechanism can be 
implemented as there is scope for increasing 
capacity in a short period of time for all the 
MNOs. 
It appears that signing an access contract may, 
however, require negotiation on 
pricing, commercial and technical terms of supply. 
In consequence retaliation may be 
less immediate and the “cheating” firm may 
benefit from a certain first-mover 
advantage. 
CMT could have provided further evidence which 
would have allowed it to assess whether such 
mechanism would be more immediate and is 
sufficiently strong to discipline the deviating 
firm. Specifically, NRAs are invited to assess 
in a market review whether the non deviator 
MNOs could easily conclude a contract with a 
MVNO, whose entry and specific commercial 
strategy is likely to discipline the deviator 
MNO. 
As regards retaliation at the retail level, CMT  
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suggests that non deviator MNOs could start a 
price war in the retail market or, more 
generally, deviate from the principles of the 
commercial strategy followed by all three 
MNOs to date (complex and non transparent 
pricing schemes, high prices subsidised 
handsets). 
The Commission considers that a reduction of 
retail prices through specific offers (be it 
through effective reduction of the nominal 
prices or through a more aggressive 
promotion policy) and also the deviation from 
the common principles of the commercial 
strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect 
on the deviating firm. In particular, such 
retaliation mechanism appears to be quickly 
implemented based on the level of number 
portability in Spain. 
Portability and churn rates show that a high 
proportion of consumers are able to 
switch from one operator to another in the Spanish 
market. Data on the extent of 
SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the 
various market segments could have 
further substantiated the assumed responsiveness 
of consumers to price changes, and hence the 
credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the 
retail level. 
Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out 
above it seems plausible that the 
initial deviation and the subsequent response of the 
non deviator MNOs could result in a new 
market equilibrium featuring lower retail 
prices and subsequent lower profitability with  
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no increase of market share for individual 
MNOs. These mechanisms at the retail level 
can be considered as credible tools of 
retaliation. 
Close monitoring of the market and entry of the 
fourth MNO 
The Commission emphasises that the fourth 
network licence was already granted in March 
2000 to Xfera but the company has not yet 
entered the market. The Commission invites 
the Spanish authorities to explore appropriate 
measures in order to ensure efficient use of 
the available spectrum with a view to enhance 
competition in the retail market. CMT should 
closely monitor the effects of a possible entry 
of Xfera in 2006 on the future sustainability 
of the collectively dominant position. Any 
concrete evidence of developments in the 
retail market not linked to the regulatory 
measures in the relevant market that would 
cast doubt on the sustainability of the 
collectively dominant position will require a 
review of the relevant market. The 
Commission recalls that any market review 
should be notified in accordance with Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive.   
Assessment of the notification and the 
additional information provided by CMT 
The additional information provided by CMT 
(relating to, inter alia, price trends, 
profitability measures, the unsatisfactory level 
of wholesale demand, the description of the 
retaliation mechanism) has been crucial in the 
Commission’s assessment of CMT’s 
notification.  
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Therefore, CMT should complement its final 
measure with the more recent information 
supplied to the Commission in its replies to 
the request for information. In any event, 
CMT should base its final measure on the 
most recent available information. 
CY/2006/0333 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National CYTA 
1 - carrier selection;  
 
2 – provision of call origination 
services (to carrier select 
operators) under the conditions of 
transparency, non-discrimination, 
price control and cost accounting;  
3 - accounting separation;  
 
4 - obligation to provide co-location; 
  5 - obligation to provide national 
roaming. 
 
Effectiveness of remedies in the mobile access 
and call origination market 
The retail mobile market in Cyprus has been 
opened for competition only in September 
2004. It still is in the early stage of transition 
from a monopoly situation to a competitive 
situation, with the incumbent operator having 
a market share well above 90%. The new 
entrant, Areeba, has entered the market 
relatively recently and is still rolling out its 
network. 
Under such circumstances OCECPR argues that it 
would be ineffective at this stage to oblige 
CYTA to provide MVNOs access to its 
network, since this would undermine 
Areeba’s chances to develop into a 
sustainable competing MNO on the market.  
Indeed, in a market which is more or less 
mature, the arrival of MVNOs would make it 
more difficult for Areeba to acquire the 
necessary customer base to support the further 
roll out of its network. 
In absence of mandatory MVNO access, however, 
OCECPR should ensure through stringent and 
effective wholesale regulation that the two 
MNOs currently on the market in Cyprus are 
able to compete at arms length. In particular, 
the Commission would like to invite 
OCECPR to impose price regulation with  
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regard to the roaming services which CYTA 
is obliged to offer to Areeba16. Such price 
regulation should, in the opinion of the 
Commission, ensure cost-orientation and an 
appropriate margin between CYTA’s retail 
tariffs and its wholesale national roaming 
tariffs. 
Exclusion of 3G termination from the voice call 
termination markets 
OCECPR justifies the exclusion of 3G termination 
from the voice call termination markets by the 
fact that at the time of the analysis both 
MNOs terminated calls to their respective 
networks using a 2G interface only. The 
Commission would like to remind OCECPR 
in this context that market definition should 
be technology-neutral, i.e. based on the nature 
of the products or services provided, not on 
the technological platform used to provide 
them. To the extent that a MNO operates both 
a 2G and a 3G network, there seems to be 
substitution from the supply-side between 2G 
and 3G termination services (at least for calls 
to customers with a dual mode handset). In 
such a case, both services would also from the 
demand-side appear to be substitutable.  
Therefore, the Commission would like to 
invite OCECPR to reconsider whether on a 
forward-looking basis 3G termination services 
do not already at this stage belong to the same 
market as 2G services, or at least to monitor 
closely the market and to analyse 3G 
termination services as soon as these services 
become available in Cyprus. An additional 
market analysis and/or separate remedies 
imposed for 3G termination services should 
be notified to the Commission under Article 
7(3) of the Framework Directive.  
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LU/2006/0369 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission 
PL/2006/0378  Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority 
CZ/2006/0405 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National 
 
No SMP found. 
 
No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
LT/2006/0406 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission 
SK/2006/0442 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comments on: 
Absence of analysis of the wholesale market 
While TÙSR concludes that it is impossible to 
assess the degree of market power on the 
market for wholesale mobile call origination 
and access, the Commission points out that 
the fact that at the wholesale level no 
transactions are taking place on the merchant  
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market (i.e. no sales to independent third 
parties) does not exclude the possibility to 
analyse the relevant market. In fact, the 
absence of such transactions merely indicates 
that all supply on the relevant market, as 
defined by TÙSR, is captive, i.e. provided 
internally by vertically integrated mobile 
network operators. In such a case the structure 
of supply at the wholesale level (e.g. market 
shares of the undertakings active on the 
relevant market) may be derived from supply 
at the retail level, and the relevant market 
would need to be analysed on the basis of the 
competitive conditions at the retail level. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the information 
provided by TÙSR regarding the retail 
market, the Commission considers that the 
conclusions reached by TUSR in the draft 
measure remain unaffected. 
Monitoring of market developments 
TÙSR’s conclusion on the absence of collective 
dominance is mainly based on the absence of 
pent-up demand at the wholesale level. 
Indeed, TUSR considers that even though some 
companies might have shown a potential 
interest in concluding MVNO agreements, 
this was never proven by starting binding 
negotiations. The Commission takes note that 
in those circumstances TÙSR has no 
indication of a tacitly coordinated refusal to 
provide access which could support a finding 
of collective dominance. It observes that there 
are moreover a number of indications that T-
Mobile and Orange may not have parallel 
interest in refusing access should a reasonable 
demand arise, such as the significantly 
different profitability margins of both 
operators.  
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However, in the light of potential future 
developments in the market, such as the 
market entry of a third operator which may give 
rise in the short term to a demand for national 
roaming, the Commission invites TÙSR to 
closely monitor the market developments. 
Should pent-up demand for MVNO or 
roaming access arise in the future and should 
there be indication of rents to be protected at 
retail level, then TÙSR is invited to review 
the relevant market.  
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MT/2006/0443 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National 
Vodafone Malta 
Ltd and 
MobIsle 
Communicati
ons Ltd ("Go 
mobile") 
 
1 – access 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The competitive conditions at retail level 
Although MCA does not find collective dominance 
at retail level, MCA states that Vodafone and 
go mobile have incentives to limit 
competition on the retail market.  MCA 
considers that i) the high level of prices 
compared to other EU countries, ii) the fact 
that nominal prices have remained stable 
since 2004, and iii) retail rates which are on 
average three times higher than wholesale 
rates point to high levels of profitability by 
the two operators, which is “not consistent 
with an effectively competitive market”. 
It should be noted that a finding of joint SMP at 
retail level is not indispensable in order to 
find joint SMP in the wholesale market of 
mobile access and call origination. Retail 
market conditions may, however, inform an 
NRA of the structure of the wholesale market, 
but they may and need not in themselves be 
conclusive as regards the finding of SMP at 
wholesale level. In order to render the finding 
of collusion at wholesale level credible, MCA 
had to demonstrate that the level of rents at  
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2 – non discrimination 
retail level are sufficiently high to provide 
incentives to collectively refuse access to 
third operators at wholesale level. 
MCA’s analysis has shown that this appears to be 
the case in Malta thus far, given in particular 
that the high price level and the limited 
evolution of prices have resulted in high 
levels of profitability of the two MNOs. MCA 
points out, however, that the impact of 
recently launched cheap on-net tariffs on the 
overall revenues of both operators still needs 
to be examined. Further, full number 
portability, introduced in March 2006, might 
alter the equilibrium on the retail market 
during the timeframe of the market review. 
The Commission therefore invites MCA to 
monitor the aforementioned developments 
closely for the purpose of a future market 
review. 
 
The existence of pent-up demand 
The Commission understands from the notification 
and in particular from the additional 
information provided that there is actual and 
credible demand for access which so far has 
remained unsatisfied. It invites MCA to  
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3 - transparency 
substantiate this point further in its definitive 
measure with reference to the concrete 
demand formulated and a description of the 
response by the MNOs. 
 
The retaliation mechanism 
Given that both Vodafone and go mobile dispose 
of excess capacity throughout the year, MCA 
considers that two retaliation mechanisms 
exist at wholesale level in the event of a 
deviation from the focal point (through the 
granting of network access to a MVNO). The 
non-deviating MNO could • either attract the 
MVNO hosted by the deviating MNO to the 
network of the non-deviating MNO; or • host 
another MVNO on its network. 
The Commission services would like to remind 
MCA that the first option is only credible if 
(i) the hosting agreement between the 
deviating MNO and its MVNO contains no 
exclusivity clauses and that (ii) transaction 
costs (including costs of negotiations with the 
non-deviating MNO) might deter the MNVO 
from switching the hosting MNO. 
Regarding the second option, it should be recalled 
that according to the MCA, it takes 6 month  
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4 – price control and cost accounting 
to conclude a MVNO agreement, provided 
that the MNO is willing to negotiate on 
reasonable terms. Since retaliation does not 
occur immediately (unless the non-deviating 
MNO has already progressed far in ongoing 
negotiations with another MVNO), the 
deviating MNO might enjoy a first mover 
advantage. The Commission invites MCA to 
substantiate in further detail why this first 
mover advantage would not suffice to render 
the retaliation mechanism at wholesale level 
incredible. 
The Commission notes, however, that the non-
deviating MNO could also retaliate at retail 
level by decreasing its prices. In the past, 
price reductions by one MNO (since 2004 
only through special offers) were matched by 
the other MNO within a few days. It can be 
expected that the same would be true in the 
event a MNO deviated from the common 
policy. As the retail market in Malta is 
relatively mature, the MVNO hosted by the 
deviating MNO would most likely be obliged 
to offer prices below the levels of the two 
existing MNOs in order to attract customers.  
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5 – accounting separation 
The non deviating MNO would respond by 
decreasing its own prices to prevent its 
customers from switching to the MVNO of 
the deviating MNO. Market shares would 
remain the same, albeit at lower prices. Given 
that this outcome would lower the 
profitability levels of the MNOs, the 
retaliation mechanism at retail level 
constitutes a credible incentive not to deviate 
from the common policy. 
Market entry of a third MNO 
MCA states in its reply to the RFI that the entry of 
a third operator with a successful strategy 
could possibly destabilise the market 
equilibrium that allows Vodafone and go 
mobile high levels of profitability. The 
Commission notes that a third operator has 
requested frequencies and invites MCA to 
monitor closely the impact of a possible 
market entry of a third operator on the future 
sustainability of the collectively dominant 
position. 
ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE MARKET NOT LINKED TO THE REGULATORY 
MEASURES IMPOSED THAT WOULD CAST DOUBT 
ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE COLLECTIVELY 
DOMINANT POSITION WILL REQUIRE A REVIEW OF 
THE RELEVANT MARKET. 
EL/2006/0492 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission  
EN  436    EN 
LV/2006/0545 
Similar to the 
Recommendati
on. 
National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission  
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   Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
access/interconnection  Non-
discrimination  Transparency 
Price control / 
cost 
accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria YES 6  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Denmark YES  5  operators YES YES YES YES* NO 
France YES  8  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Greece YES 4  operators YES YES YES YES* NO 
Hungary YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Ireland YES 4  operators YES YES YES YES* YES* 
Lithuania YES  3  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Malta YES  2  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Netherlands YES 6  operators YES YES YES YES* NO 
Portugal YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Slovakia YES 2  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Sweden YES 5  operators YES YES YES YES* YES* 
United Kingdom YES 6  operators YES* YES* YES YES* NO 
Belgium YES 3  operators YES YES* YES YES YES*  
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Luxembourg YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Finland** YES  3  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Germany YES  4  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Poland YES  3  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Greece YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Italy YES  4  operators YES YES YES YES* NO 
Hungary YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES YES 
Latvia YES  4  operators YES* YES YES YES* YES* 
Spain YES  3  operators YES NO NO YES YES 
Cyprus YES 2  operators YES YES YES* YES* YES* 
Estonia YES 3  operators YES YES YES YES NO 
Slovenia YES 3  operators YES* YES* YES YES* YES* 
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court  annulled the decisions issued by Ficora on 6 February 2004 (notified the Commission and registered under the ref. number: 
FI/2003/0031 relating to the position of significant market power 
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Market 16: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product 
Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
1 - Interconnection   FI/2003/0031   Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Sonera Mobile 
Networks Oy 
Radiolinja Origo Oy 
Finnet Verkot Oy 
Ålands Mobiltelefon 
Ab 
2 - Transparency - publish delivery 
terms and tariff information 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The limitation of the remedies to the 
termination of calls originating on mobile 
networks in Finland or originating abroad: 
The remedies imposed should not be limited on 
the basis of the originating network. By limiting 
the remedies as is proposed, Ficora does not 
base the remedy on the nature of the problem 
identified. It is recognized that the basis for 
excluding calls originating on a fixed network in 
Finland from the proposed remedies is the 
Finnish Communications Act. The primacy of 
Community law requires any provision of 
national law which contravenes a Community 
rule to be disapplied.  
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3 - Obligations concerning pricing 
and other terms - Non-discrimination 
4 - Use of cost accounting procedure 
5 - Accounting separation 
Ålands Mobiltelefon Ab: only the 
first 2 remedies and non-
discrimination 
 
The asymmetrical application of certain 
remedies, which are imposed on three SMP 
operators but not on Ålands Mobiltelefon Ab: 
In circumstances where it is likely that the 
market failure identified will be the same in all 
markets, where a NRA intends to impose 
different remedies on different operators within 
similarly defined markets, such differential 
treatment should be adequately reasoned. 
 
Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
obligations: Where each operator is to select the 
cost-accounting procedures it wishes to use, this 
limits the measures’ contribution to consumer 
benefit, the enhancement of competition and the 
development of the internal market.  
EN  441    EN 
1 - Provision of network access 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Control of charges 
4 - Transparency - to publish access 
contracts 
UK/2003/0040  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of each 
network = 
geographic 
extent of each 
relevant market 
Hutchison 3G UK Ltd 
O2 Ltd  
Orange plc  
T Mobile Ltd  
Vodafone Ltd  
Inquam Telecom 
Holdings Ltd 
5 -Transparency - to publish charges 
and an advanced notice of changes to 
charges 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
The appropriateness of the proposed set of 
obligations: Termination of voice calls on 3G 
networks is not as such to be considered as a 
novel service or a newly emerging market. It 
might be appropriate for Ofcom to impose in 
certain transparency obligations on “3”, O2, 
Orange, T-Mobile and Vodafone regarding 3G 
termination. 
 
Designation of Inquam as an operator having 
SMP: As Inquam’s subscribers are 
predominantly small- and medium-sized 
enterprises sensitive to the cost of customers 
calling them, this could limit Inquam’s freedom 
to set termination charges at an excessive level. 
 
National consultation run in parallel with 
Article 7 consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to be 
re-notified.  
EN  442    EN 
Hutchinson 3G UK and Inquam 
Telecom Holdings Ltd.: only the 
obligation to publish charges and an 
advanced notice of changes to 
charges. 
 
UK/2004/0087 
(Remedies 
related to case 
UK/2003/0040) 
See case UK/2004/0040.  Amendment of the charge controls 
set for 2G voice call termination.   No comments made by the Commission 
UK/2005/0199 
(Remedies 
related to case 
UK/2003/0040) 
See case UK/2004/0041. 
Prolongation of the charge control 
imposed on Vodafone, O2, Orange 
and T-Mobile, foreseen to expire on 
31 March 2006, until 31 March 
2007. 
No comments made by the Commission 
1 - Provision of network access and 
interconnection on reasonable 
request  
2 - Transparency 
3- Non-discrimination 
SE/2004/0052  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
TeliaSonera Sverige 
AB  
Tele2 
Vodafone Sverige 
AB  
Hi3G Access AB  
Telenor Mobile  4 - Accounting separation  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Asymmetrical application of remedies: PTS is 
invited to monitor closely the development of 
the cost structures of the operators on which the 
obligation to charge ‘fair and reasonable prices’ 
is imposed and to assess whether its current 
assumptions on ‘fair and reasonable prices’ will 
remain relevant over the period of the market 
review.  
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5 - Control of charges and cost 
orientation obligation (LRIC Model) 
6 - Accounting separation obligation 
(provide PTS with specified cost and 
revenues for interconnection 
services, including internal prices) 
7 - Obligation to apply a fair and 
reasonable price 
Sweden AB  
Asymmetrical application of 
remedies: remedies 1 - 3 for all five 
operators, 4 & 5 to TeliaSonera, 
Tele2 & Vodafone and 6 & 7 to 
Hi3G/3 and Djuice 
 
Parallel consultation: Any material 
modification to the draft measure as a 
consequence of comments made by interested 
parties in the framework of the national 
consultation will require the draft measure to be 
re-notified. 
 
1- Access (all operators) 
2 - Non-discrimination (all 
operators) 
3 - Cost orientation (all operators) 
4 - Cost accounting (Vodafone and 
O2) 
IE/2004/0073, 
IE/2005/0216 
(remedies) 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Vodafone Ireland 
Ltd 
O2 Ireland Ltd 
Meteor Mobile 
Communications Ltd 
Hutchison 3G 
Ireland Ltd 
 
5 - Accounting separation (Vodafone 
and O2) 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
The further consultation planned by 
ComReg: The draft measures relating to the 
details and implementation of the accounting 
separation and cost accounting obligations are 
required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive.  
EN  444    EN 
EL/2004/0078  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Cosmote SA 
Info-Quest AEBE  
Stet Hellas SA  
Vodafone-Panafon 
SA 
1 - Price control: cost orientation for 
the first 3 operators but only an 
obligation of fair and reasonable 
price for Q-Telecom 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Formal notification ahead of transposition: 
EETT is entitled to carry out any market 
analysis prior to transposition of the EU 
regulatory framework into national law. The 
validity of the outcome of the present 
assessment is based on the assumption of a 
correct transposition of the EU regulatory 
framework into national law to the extent that 
the provisions concerned by this assessment are 
relevant. 
 
Asymmetrical application of remedies: EETT 
is invited to monitor closely the development of 
the cost structures of the operators on which the 
obligation to charge “fair and reasonable prices” 
is imposed and to assess whether its current 
assumptions on “fair and reasonable prices” will 
remain relevant over the period of the market 
review. 
 
Obligation of non-discrimination in respect of 
GSM gateways: EETT is invited to demonstrate 
that the non-discrimination obligation in respect 
of GSM gateways either pertains to the finding 
of SMP in the relevant product market or is 
sufficiently justified as an essential element 
without which the proposed obligation of cost-
orientation imposed on the relevant market 
would be ineffective. 
 
National consultation on details of generic  
EN  445    EN 
remedies:  When an NRA intends to provide 
details linked to a generic ex-ante regulatory 
obligation, 
interested parties should be given the 
opportunity to comment on the draft measure 
within a reasonable period.  
EN  446    EN 
1 - Price control obligations: 
obligation of cost orientation for the 
first 3 operators but only an 
obligation of fair and reasonable 
price for Q-Telecom 
2 - Obligation of non-discrimination 
3 - Obligation of access to, and use 
of, specific network facilities 
4 - Obligation of transparency 
EL/2005/0178 
(renotification 
of case 
EL/2004/0078 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Cosmote SA 
Info-Quest AEBE  
Stet Hellas SA  
Vodafone-Panafon 
SA 
5 - Obligation to publish a reference 
interconnection offer 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Formal notification ahead of transposition: 
The validity of the outcome of the present 
assessment is based on the assumption of a 
correct transposition of the EU regulatory 
framework into national law to the extent that 
the provisions concerned by this assessment are 
relevant to the current infringement proceedings 
pending against Greece. The time period 
between the market reviews, the national and 
Community consultations and the adoption of 
the resulting final measure should be kept as 
short as possible. 
1 - Obligation to interconnect on 
reasonable request 
2 - Non discrimination concerning 
quality & external non 
discrimination obligation concerning 
prices  
AT/2004/0099  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Mobilkom Austria 
AG & Co KG 
T-Mobile Austria 
GmbH 
One GmbH 
tele.ring Telekom 
Service GmbH   3 - Transparency - publication of 
reference offer 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation: Leaving the setting of 
cost oriented 
termination charges to commercial negotiations 
between operators does not seem the most 
effective way of dealing with the identified 
competition problem. By not specifying the 
LRAIC model and the costs which can be taken  
EN  447    EN 
Hutchison 3G 
Austria GmbH 
4 - Price control: cost orientation (on 
the basis of LRAIC) 
into account in advance, there is no guarantee 
that termination rates will be oriented on 
efficient costs only. 
1 - Obligation to interconnect on 
reasonable request 
2 - Non discrimination concerning 
quality & external non 
discrimination obligation concerning 
prices  
3 - Transparency - publication of 
reference offer 
AT/2005/0238  Operator-specific 
relevant markets.  National 
Tele2 (in addition to 
the five operators 
designated as having 
SMP in Case 
AT/2004/0099) 
4 - Price control: cost orientation (on 
the basis of LRAIC) 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Provision of access and 
interconnection 
2 - Transparency 
HU/2004/0101  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
T-Mobile 
Magyarország 
Távközlési Rt 
Pannon GSM 
Távközlési Rt 
Vodafone 
Magyarország Mobil 
Távközlési Rt. 
3 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation: In order to be able to 
assess the compatibility of the implementing 
measures with the requirements of Article 8(4) 
of the Access Directive, NHH is invited to 
notify, once adopted, the implementing 
measures setting out the timeframe and stages 
applicable for the reduction of termination 
charges.  
EN  448    EN 
4 - Accounting separation 
5 - Cost orientation and 
“controllability” of charges 
1 - Access to, and use of, specific 
network facilities 
2 - Transparency  
FR/2004/0104 
FR/2007/0592 
(details of 
remedies) 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market  
Bouygues Télécom 
s.a.  
Orange France s.a 
SFR s.a.  
.  
3 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Formal notification ahead of full 
transposition and of adoption of secondary 
legislation: The resulting measure will need to 
be re-notified as a draft measure, should any 
material/substantial elements of ART’s analysis 
be altered due to further delays in the 
transposition process, given that data and market 
structure may still change by a later date of 
transposition. 
 
Market analyses in overseas territories: The 
compatibility with Community law of the 
analysis of the relevant markets in the overseas 
territories will be assessed when ART notifies 
the corresponding SMP analyses pursuant to 
Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. 
 
Market definition and GSM gateways: While  
EN  449    EN 
4 - Accounting separation 
(modalities of which and costing 
methodologies to be notified) 
5 - Price control 
6 - Cost accounting obligation 
there remain doubts as to the inclusion of 
termination of fixed-to-mobile calls through 
GSM gateways in the relevant market, its 
exclusion from the market definition in this 
particular case would not have led to a different 
result in the SMP analysis. 
 
Accounting separation and price control 
obligations: Decisions setting (i) the modalities 
of the accounting separation obligation and the 
costing methodologies, and (ii) the price ceiling 
for the year 2007 in respect of SMP 
undertakings are required to be notified. 
1 - Provision of access to, and use of, 
specific network facilities 
FR/2004/0120 
(French 
Overseas 
Territories) 
FR/2007/0592 
(details of 
remedies) 
FR/2007/0596 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Bouygues Télécom 
Caraïbe s.a., 
Dauphin Télécom 
s.u., Orange Caraïbe 
s.a. and Saint-Martin 
Mobile s.u. 
in Guadeloupe, 
Martinique and 
Guyane; Société 
Réunionnaise du 
Radiotéléphone s.a. 
in Mayotte; Orange 
2 - Transparency  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Market definition and GSM gateways: While 
there remain doubts as to the inclusion of 
termination of fixed-to-mobile calls through 
GSM gateways in the relevant market, its 
exclusion from the market definition in this 
particular case would not have led to a different 
result in the SMP analysis. 
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3 - Non-discrimination 
Réunion s.a. and 
SRR in Réunion; 
Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon Télécom 
s.a.s. in Saint-Pierre-
et-Miquelon, 
Outremer 
4 - Price control 
Accounting separation and price control 
obligations: Decisions setting (i) the modalities 
of the accounting separation obligation and the 
costing methodologies, and (ii) the price ceiling 
for the year 2007 in respect of SMP 
undertakings are required to be notified. 
1 - Access obligation  
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation 
PT/2004/0129  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Telecomunicações 
Móveis Nacionais, 
S.A. 
Vodafone Portugal - 
Comunicações 
Pessoais, S.A.  
Optimus -
Telecomunicações, 
S.A.   5 - Price control and cost accounting. 
Pending adoption: progressive set of 
price reductions based on an 
international benchmark 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Further consultation planned by Anacom: 
Draft measures relating to implementation of the 
final cost orientation and cost accounting 
obligations are required to be notified. 
SK/2005/0136  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
Orange 
EuroTel 
1 - Access obligation  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Implementation of the proposed cost  
EN  451    EN 
2 - Non-discrimination 
3 - Transparency 
4 - Accounting separation and cost 
accounting 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
5 - Price control, including cost 
orientation 
orientation obligation: I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
specify a cost model and the level of wholesale 
charges as soon as possible. By doing so, TÚSR 
will provide adequate transparency and legal 
certainty for market players, without causing 
further delays in bringing termination rates to 
the cost oriented level. 
 
Scope of access remedies: TÚSR should make 
clear that the proposed access obligations aim 
exclusively at remedying the lack of competition 
in the wholesale markets for voice call 
termination on individual mobile networks and 
would apply only to these relevant markets. 
 
National public consultation: NRAs must 
conduct a national consultation on each draft 
measure which have a significant impact on the 
relevant market, i.e. including the market 
definitions, and to give all interested parties the 
opportunity to comment the draft measures. 
1 - Price control obligations based on 
FL-LRIC 
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Access to, and use of, specific 
network facilities 
LT/2005/0189  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Omnitel 
Bite GSM 
Tele 2 
4 - Transparency 
No comments made by the Commission.  
EN  452    EN 
DK/2005/0204  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
TDC 
SONOFON 
TeliaSonera 
“3” 
Tele 2 (MVNO) 
1 - Price control obligations based on 
benchmarking for TDC, Sonofon and 
TeliaSonera, and an obligation to 
charge fair and reasonable prices for 
"3" and Tele 2 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Price control based on comparison with other 
countries:  If a NRA decides to impose price 
regulation on the basis of a comparison with 
other countries, it should carefully select the 
objective criteria and clearly justify the reasons 
for which it believes that the relevant market(s) 
in these countries are, on the background of 
those criteria, most suited as the basis for the 
comparison taking into account differences 
between conditions prevailing on the relevant 
market(s) in the countries compared and its 
home market. 
 
Asymmetric regulation of Tele 2 (MVNO) 
and “3”: In circumstances where it is likely that 
the market failure identified will be the same in 
all markets and where a NRA intends to impose 
different remedies on different operators within 
similarly defined markets, the asymmetrical 
application of remedies should be adequately 
reasoned. NITA has not duly substantiated its 
intended decision not to impose price-control on 
Tele 2 and “3”.  
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1 - Price control and cost accounting 
2 - Non-discrimination  
3 - Accounting separation 
4 - Transparency 
MT/2005/0214  Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Vodafone Malta Ltd. 
Mobisle 
Communications 
Ltd. 
5 - Access 
No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Price control on the basis of cost 
orientation (FL-LRIC for all 
operators except for Tele2 Mobiel) 
2 - Provision of access upon 
reasonable request 
3 - Non-discrimination 
NL/2005/0215 
NL/2006/0420 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets. 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
KPN Mobile 
Vodafone 
T-Mobile 
Orange 
Telfort 
Tele2 Mobiel 
4 - Transparency 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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1 – interconnection obligation 
2 - Obligation to terminate incoming 
calls on their relevant network 
 
DE/2005/0249 
DE/2006/0421 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
T-Mobile 
Deutschland GmbH 
(“D1-Netz”), 
Vodafone D2 GmbH 
(“D2-Netz”), E-Plus 
Mobilfunk GmbH 
Co. KG (“E1-Netz”) 
and O2 (Germany) 
GmbH 
& Co. OHG (“E2-
Netz”) 
 
3 - Obligation to provide co-location 
 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation 
In view of this finding and in view of the fact 
that mobile termination rates in Germany are at 
present, three years after the entry into force of 
the EU regulatory framework on electronic 
communications, still not regulated BNetzA 
should without further delay ensure effective 
(price) regulation in these markets. 
The approach chosen by BNetzA, namely to let 
mobile network operators propose termination 
charges that are then subject to authorisation by 
BNetzA fails to provide legal certainty and 
transparency to operators and consumers over a 
longer period of time. Therefore, BNetzA is 
invited to decide in an expedient manner on the 
requests for authorisation of their termination 
charges made by the various operators. In 
addition, in order to better safeguard the interest 
of consumers, BNetzA should further develop a 
cost model for calculating the termination rates 
of the mobile operators as soon as possible. This 
costing model should reflect the fact that 
operators may have different cost structures 
which can inherently be linked to different 
technical conditions of their network or can be a  
EN  455    EN 
4 – non discrimination 
4 - Ex ante price control for access 
and co-location 
 
 
5 – transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
result of different economies of scale due to 
different market shares. Operators should, 
however, become more efficient over time, 
especially if they gain market shares. 
Finally, the Commission invites BNetzA to take 
into account any specific 
characteristics of products such as T-
Mobile@home, Genion and Vodafone 
Zuhause when calculating the costs and to 
examine whether the underlying costs for 
termination as part of those products would 
justify the setting of specific tariffs for those 
mobile termination services. 
Non-imposition of accounting separation 
Although tariff authorisation together with the 
annual reporting obligation might allow BNetzA 
to implement non-discrimination and to prevent 
cross subsidisation, the imposition of an 
obligation of separate cost accounting might 
nevertheless be necessary and proportionate to 
achieve further regulatory objectives such as 
rendering the tariff authorisation more efficient 
and making financial transactions more 
transparent. The Commission considers that in 
order to effectively remedy the market failures 
identified on the mobile termination markets, 
BNetzA should impose an obligation of 
accounting separation on the respective mobile 
operators. Without such an obligation, it seems 
more difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively 
price control. Therefore, such an accounting 
separation obligation seems necessary to 
implement effectively the price control  
EN  456    EN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 - Indication of sites for the access 
and the co-location to interested 
undertakings at 
their request. 
 
obligation it intends to impose. 
 
SI/2005/0276 
SI/2007/0591 
(second round 
of market 
review) 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Mobitel, Si.Mobile   1 – access 
In case SI/2005/0276 the Commission made 
the comment on: 
Proposed wholesale price control mechanism 
on Mobitel: APEK intends to address the 
problems for Mobitel’s competitors to 
effectively compete with Mobitel’s retail prices, 
in part, by proposing a remedy which links 
Mobitel’s termination rate to its retail on-net 
prices. This approach  
EN  457    EN 
2 - transparency 
might nevertheless result in indirectly regulating 
retail prices through a remedy imposed at the 
wholesale level. 
 
The Commission reminds APEK that problems 
identified by APEK in this wholesale market at 
first stage should be remedied by the 
implementation of an effective price control 
mechanism ensuring cost-oriented level of 
Mobitel’s termination rate at wholesale level. If 
APEK comes to the conclusion that the remedies 
available at wholesale level are not sufficient to 
solve the competitive problems identified at 
retail level but that there is also a need for price 
control of the retail prices, it may be 
appropriate to consider whether an intervention 
is required at that level. The 
Commission would like to emphasise that the 
retail prices of Mobitel may not be 
price regulated on the basis of the finding of  
EN  458    EN 
3 – non-discrimination 
SMP at the wholesale market.  
Implementation of the unique fixed to mobile 
termination rates: The 
Commission notes that in respect of Mobitel and 
Si.Mobil APEK proposes that the 
operators should gradually apply the same level 
of termination tariffs for both calls 
originated from other mobile networks and fixed 
networks by 1 January 2008. 
The Commission considers, on the basis of the 
information supplied, that allowing 
further delays in bringing termination rates for 
mobile and fixed calls to a unique 
rate would not be in line with the 
aforementioned provisions of the Framework 
and the Access Directives and that delaying the 
implementation of this obligation until 1 January 
2008 would not allow consumers to derive the  
EN  459    EN 
4 – price control 
5 – accounting separation 
maximum benefit in terms of price. 
The Commission would like to emphasise that a 
unique termination rate for calls from mobile 
and fixed networks should be achieved without 
any excessive delay in order to ensure that the 
obligations imposed are effective and 
appropriate to address the competitive problems 
identified. 
Asymmetric application of remedies on 
Si.Mobil and WWI: The Commission invites 
APEK to monitor in the context of the annual 
market review provided for by national law, 
whether the remedies imposed on Si.Mobil and 
WWI will, in the longer term, be sufficient in 
the light of the competitive problems identified. 
Taking into account the bilateral nature of the 
termination agreements, the Commission in 
particular invites APEK to ensure a coherent and 
non-discriminatory development of the 
termination rates in Slovenia. 
In case SI/2005/0276 the Commission made 
the comment on: 
Proposed retail price control mechanism on 
Mobitel and Si.mobil: APEK intends 
to address the issue of asymmetric on net/off net 
tariffs in the Slovenian retail mobile market by 
proposing a remedy which links the MNOs' 
termination rate to their retail on-net prices. This 
approach would nevertheless result in retail 
regulation through a remedy imposed pursuant 
to market analysis on a wholesale market. 
In accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access  
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Directive, the obligations imposed on SMP 
operators shall be based on the nature of the 
problem identified, proportionate and justified in 
the light of the regulatory objectives laid down 
in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. In the 
present case APEK does not demonstrate as to 
how the linkage of MNOs' termination rates and 
their retail on-net prices would resolve the 
lack of competition in the termination market 
nor does it show how the imposition of 
such a remedy would render other proposed 
obligations in the termination market effective. 
Therefore the Commission asks APEK not to 
impose the proposed internal non-discrimination 
obligation. 
The Commission reminds APEK that problems 
identified by APEK in this wholesale market 
should be remedied by the implementation of an 
effective price control mechanism ensuring cost-
oriented level of Mobitel’s and Si.mobil's 
termination rate at wholesale level. 
 
 
 
1- access  IT/2005/0316  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
TIM, Vodafone, 
WIND, H3G 
2 - transparency 
Cost orientation and cost accounting 
obligations 
The Commission encourages AGCOM’s 
intention to monitor the consistency of the 
imposed annual reduction of MTRs with the  
EN  461    EN 
3 – non discrimination 
market 
4 – price control and cost accounting 
(except for H3G) 
costs and, in the event that there will be 
differences between the actual cost evolution 
and the price cap, to consider such differences 
with the view to ensuring the cost orientation of 
MTRs. 
 
1- access and interconnectin  LU/2005/0321  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
EPT, Tango and 
Voxmobile 
2 - transparency 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Timely implementation of the price control 
obligation 
ILR intends to implement the price control 
obligation on the basis of an international 
benchmarking no sooner than end of 2007 or 
2008 following a separate national consultation. 
In the meantime, ILR will apply a 6% price 
reduction every six months for a period of at 
least two years and possibly three years. 
The implementation period envisaged by ILR 
appears disproportionate in light of these 
requirements, considering in particular that a 
price control model based on international 
benchmarking should not require that much time 
to implement. 
Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to 
implement by the end of 2006 its price control 
obligations based on an international 
benchmarking. 
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3 – non-discrimination 
4 – price control 
Price control based on comparison with other 
countries: 
Regarding the use of an international 
benchmarking to implement price control, the 
Commission considers that if an NRA decides to 
impose price regulation on the basis of 
comparison with other countries, it should 
carefully select on the basis of objective criteria 
the most appropriate countries of 
reference.Therefore, the Commission invites 
ILR to consider the development of a cost 
accounting model applicable to each SMP 
operator. 
Level of reductions 
The Commission urges ILR to further reduce the 
MTRs in Luxemburg already in the course of 
2006, in order to achieve a cost oriented level as 
quickly as possible. 
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CY/2006/0334  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
CYTA, Areeba  1 - access 
Effectiveness of remedies in the mobile access 
and call origination market 
The retail mobile market in Cyprus has been 
opened for competition only in 
September 2004. It still is in the early stage of 
transition from a monopoly situation to a 
competitive situation, with the incumbent 
operator having a market share well above 90%. 
The new entrant, Areeba, has entered the market 
relatively recently and is still 
rolling out its network. 
Under such circumstances OCECPR argues that 
it would be ineffective at this stage to oblige 
CYTA to provide MVNOs access to its network, 
since this would undermine Areeba’s chances to 
develop into a sustainable competing MNO on  
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2 - transparency 
the market. 
Indeed, in a market which is more or less 
mature, the arrival of MVNOs would make it 
more difficult for Areeba to acquire the 
necessary customer base to support the further 
roll out of its network. 
In absence of mandatory MVNO access, 
however, OCECPR should ensure through 
stringent and effective wholesale regulation that 
the two MNOs currently on the market in 
Cyprus are able to compete at arms length. In 
particular, the Commission 
would like to invite OCECPR to impose price 
regulation with regard to the roaming services 
which CYTA is obliged to offer to Areeba16. 
Such price regulation should, in the opinion of 
the Commission, ensure cost-orientation and an  
EN  465    EN 
3 – non discrimination 
appropriate margin between CYTA’s retail 
tariffs and its wholesale national roaming tariffs. 
Exclusion of 3G termination from the voice 
call termination markets 
OCECPR justifies the exclusion of 3G 
termination from the voice call termination 
markets by the fact that at the time of the 
analysis both MNOs terminated calls to their 
respective networks using a 2G interface only. 
The Commission would like to remind 
OCECPR in this context that market definition 
should be technology-neutral, i.e. based on the 
nature of the products or services provided, not 
on the technological platform used to provide 
them. To the extent that a MNO operates both a 
2G and a 3G network,  
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4 – price control 
there seems to be substitution from the supply-
side between 2G and 3G termination 
services (at least for calls to customers with a 
dual mode handset). In such a case, both 
services would also from the demand-side 
appear to be substitutable. 
Therefore, the Commission would like to invite 
OCECPR to reconsider whether on a forward-
looking basis 3G termination services do not 
already at this stage belong to the same market 
as 2G services, or at least to monitor closely the 
market and to analyse 3G termination services 
as soon as these services become available in 
Cyprus. An additional market analysis and/or 
separate remedies imposed for 3G termination 
services should be notified to the Commission 
under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.  
EN  467    EN 
5 – accounting separation 
 
UK/2005/0348  See case UK/2004/0040  Extension of remedies imposed in 
previous measures  No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - access 
2 - transparency 
3 – non discrimination 
4 – price control 
CZ/2006/0359  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Eurotel Praha, spol. 
s.r.o., T–Mobile 
Czech 
Republic, a.s. Oskar 
Mobil, a.s. 
 
5 – accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission.  
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PL/2006/0379  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Polkomtel SA, 
Polska Telefinia 
Cyfrowa Sp. z o.o., 
Polska telefonia 
Komorkowa 
Centertel Sp. z o.o. 
1 - access 
Price control obligation 
The Commission considers that the price 
regulation proposed by UKE is not sufficiently 
precise to address the identified concerns 
effectively. In particular, the draft measures do 
not specify the method on the basis of which the 
cost-orientation obligation will be implemented. 
The Commission invites UKE to impose a cost-
calculation obligation, and to assess whether a 
forward looking long-run incremental cost (FL-
LRIC) model would not be the most appropriate 
model (notably in terms of tariffs, and potential 
excessive costs and inefficiencies of the mobile 
operators), and to identify such model in the 
adopted measures. 
If cost orientation will only be achieved over 
time, the delay must not be unreasonably long. 
In such a case, moreover, UKE should foresee 
how mobile termination rates will already be 
reduced in the interim period so as to effectively 
remedy the market failures identified. 
If for this interim period UKE decides to impose 
price regulation on the basis of 
comparison with other countries, it should  
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2 – non discrimination 
carefully select the objective criteria and justify 
the reasons for which it believes that relevant 
market(s) in these countries are, on the 
background of those criteria, most suited as the 
basis for the comparison, taking into account 
differences between conditions prevailing on the 
relevant market(s) in the countries compared and 
its home market. Furthermore, under the current 
circumstances of the provision of mobile call 
termination, only where the prices for those 
services have been set on the basis of an 
appropriate cost accounting model and relevant 
cost accounting data to reflect cost orientation, 
the prices can be considered as appropriate to 
serve as a basis for comparison. 
Transparency 
The Commission invites UKE to include in the 
transparency obligation an obligation to publish 
a reference offer. In the absence of such a 
reference offer, interconnection negotiations 
may be unduly prolonged and multiple disputes 
may arise rendering the access obligation 
imposed on this market less effective.  
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3 – transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-imposition of an obligation of accounting 
separation: 
The Commission considers that further 
imposition of an accounting separation 
obligation is necessary as an appropriate 
complement to the other proposed obligations. 
Only an accounting separation obligation allows 
internal transfers to be rendered visible, and 
permits UKE to check compliance with 
obligations of non-discrimination.  
Entrance of new market players 
The Commission invites UKE to analyse the 
market of wholesale call termination in the 
networks of new MNOs when they commence 
operations, and to notify the results of that 
analysis in accordance with Article 7(3) of the 
Framework Directive. 
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4 – price control 
1 - access  EL/2006/0392  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
Cosmote SA 
(“Cosmote”),  
TIM/Q-Telecom SA  2 - transparency 
Timeframe for reduction of the MTRs and 
non-imposition of accounting 
separation  
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3 – non discrimination 
4 - requirement to publish a 
reference 
interconnection offer, service level 
agreements and performance 
indicators 
 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
(“TIM”), and 
Vodafone-Panafon 
SA 
(“Vodafone”) 
 
5 – price control and cost accounting 
Taking into account the recent voluntary 
reductions of the MTRs which already ensure a 
significant part of the reduction towards EETT’s 
target, the Commission invites EETT to 
implement a shorter glide-path period for the 
remaining decreases in order to reach EETT’s 
target levels before June 2007.  
In addition, the Commission invites EETT to 
reconsider the need for keeping the minimum 
period of 30 seconds charged by mobile 
operators for terminating a call. 
Such a minimum charging period is generally 
passed-through at the retail level creating 
confusion and lack of transparency for end-users 
(in particular residential 
consumers), since the nominal retail tariff 
announced is not reflected in the final bill. 
Moreover, in view of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation, the Commission 
reiterates that further imposition of an 
accounting separation obligation would seem 
justified as an appropriate complement to the 
other proposed obligations. An accounting 
separation obligation would permit EETT to 
easily obtain updated cost data from the 
operators based on an enforceable obligation and 
thus to ensure the cost-orientation obligation 
efficiently. 
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1 - interconnection  FI/2006/0403  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Finnet, Elisa, Sonera 
2 - transparency 
The exclusion from remedies of voice call 
termination in mobile networks when a call is 
originated in a fixed telephone network in 
Finland not using carrier selection or carrier 
pre-selection: a significant proportion of traffic 
from fixed to mobile networks – i.e. calls 
originated in a fixed telephone network in 
Finland not using carrier selection or carrier pre-
selection – can still not be subject to any form of 
price regulation.  
The Commission points out that the Finnish law 
in this respect, in spite of the amendment of the 
CMA, continues to be in breach of Community 
law as set out in detail in case FI/2003/0031 and 
in the reasoned opinion issued by the 
Commission in the ongoing infringement case. 
The Commission also reminds Ficora of the 
comment made in case FI/2003/0031 regarding 
the primacy of Community law in line with the 
settled case law of the Court of Justice. 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation:  
Despite the imposed cost-orientation obligation,  
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3 – non discrimination 
4 – accounting separation 
5 – price control 
Ficora does not intend to propose to control the 
level of termination rates ex ante. In practice the 
termination rates are negotiated between 
undertakings and Ficora controls the cost-
orientation and non discrimination of 
termination rates ex post on a case-by-case basis. 
The Commission acknowledges that the current, 
commercially negotiated, termination rates 
applied by MNOs in Finland are well below the 
EU average. 
Nevertheless, the Commission invites Ficora to 
monitor the evolution of termination rates and in 
case the commercial negotiations in future fail to 
yield cost-oriented termination rates and would 
not resolve the current asymmetries in 
termination rates, Ficora should consider 
imposing a proper ex ante price control 
obligation supported by an appropriate cost-
accounting methodology  
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1 – access and interconnection (all 
operators) 
2 – external non discrimination (all 
operators); internal non 
discrimination imposed on Belgacom 
Mobile and Mobistar) 
3 – transparency (all operators) 
4 – price control and cost accounting 
(all operators) 
BE/2006/0433  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Belgacom Mobile, 
Mobistar and Base 
 
5 – accounting separation (Belgacom 
Mobile and Mobistar) 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Price control obligation 
The Commission considers that termination 
rates should normally be symmetric and that 
asymmetry, acceptable in number of cases, 
requires an adequate justification. It recognizes 
that, in certain exceptional cases, an asymmetry 
might be justified by objective cost differences 
which are outside the control of the operators 
concerned. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
EN  476    EN 
1 - access 
2 - transparency 
3 – non discrimination 
LV/2006/0464  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Latvia Mobilais 
Telefons, 
Tele2, Telecom 
Baltija and BITE 
Latvija 
 
4 – price control 
Market analysis relating to mobile call 
termination services provided by BITE 
Latvija : 
The Commission notes that SPRK did not 
analyse the relevant market with regard to call 
termination services provided by BITE Latvija. 
Therefore it urges SPRK to conduct the market 
analysis with regard to this particular 
undertaking as soon as possible. 
Effective cost accounting methodology: 
In order to ensure effective price regulation, the 
Commission invites SPRK to develop as quickly 
as possible its own cost model. In this context, 
the Commission would like to stress that 
termination rates should normally be symmetric 
and that asymmetry, acceptable in number of 
cases, requires an adequate justification. 
Therefore, in order to ensure the fulfilment of 
this principle in Latvia in the future, the cost 
model (for example based on the FL-LRIC 
methodology) should take into account costs of 
an efficient operator. 
 
1 - transparency 
2 – non discrimination 
HU/2006/0478  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
Magyar Telekom, 
Pannon GSM and 
Vodafone 
  3 – accounting separation 
No comments made by the Commission  
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4 – access and interconnection 
market 
5 – price control and cost accounting  
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ES/2005/0251 
ES/2006/0471 
 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Telefonica Mobile 
SAU, Vodafone SA, 
Amena 
1 - access 
Imposition of remedies to the termination of 
calls originating on fixed networks only 
 
The Commission considers that CMT’s 
approach to regulate only the wholesale voice 
termination of fixed-to-mobile calls may not 
allow consumers to derive the maximum benefit 
in terms of price. 
Accordingly, the Commission invites CMT to 
consider regulating the provision of mobile 
voice call termination services regardless of the 
origination of the call (M2M or F2M). 
Finally, the Commission invites CMT to specify 
as soon as possible all necessary details 
concerning the implementation of the cost-
orientation obligation (cost accounting 
methodology, glide paths, if necessary, 
objectives and time-table. 
Minimum charging period of one minute for 
Amena 
The Commission invites CMT to reconsider the 
flexibility allowed to Amena to charge a 
minimum period of one minute for terminating a 
call. Such a minimum charging period is 
generally passed-through at the retail level 
creating confusion and lack of transparency for 
end-users (in particular residential consumers), 
since the nominal retail tariff announced is not 
reflected in the final bill. Consequently, such a 
tariff scheme may not be fully in line with the  
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2 – price control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 – accounting separation 
regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of 
the Framework Directive as well as Article 
13(2) of the Access Directive, while not 
ensuring that the end-users derive the maximum 
benefit of the proposed regulatory obligations. 
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access 
Non-discrimination 
UK/2006/0498 
UK/2006/0499 
 
Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Hutchison 3G UK 
Ltd  
O2 Ltd  
Orange plc  
T Mobile Ltd  
Vodafone Ltd  
Inquam Telecom 
Holdings Ltd 
transparency 
3G spectrum costs 
The value of 3G licences should be calculated at 
current value on a forward looking basis and not 
on the basis of spectrum values which 
approximate year 2000 levels. 
Termination rates should be set at the cost which 
would be faced by an efficient operator to 
provide the relevant service. What should be 
considered in the LRIC model, from today's 
perspective, are all the cost elements that are not 
sunk today. 
It is important that LRIC models use current 
costs and not historical costs which risks 
overestimating the appropriate costs 
considerably. This consideration is particularly 
relevant for spectrum fees which have been 
written off by operators since the relevant 
frequencies were auctioned and for which 
Ofcom considers that they may be an 
overstatement of the opportunity cost of 3G 
spectrum. 
In light of the above and with a view to fulfilling 
the objectives of the framework and allowing 
end-users, in particular retail fixed customers to 
obtain the benefits of the wholesale regulation 
proposed, the Commission invites Ofcom to 
reconsider the valuation of 3G licences.  
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Price control and cost accounting  
 
UK/2006/0499 
H3G's network 
(market redefined and 
assessed following the 
Appeal Body's 
decision) 
Geographic 
coverage of its 
network = 
geographic 
extent of its 
relevant 
market 
H3G   transparency  No comments made by the Commission. 
interconnection 
Non-discrimination 
AT/2006/0538  Operator-specific 
relevant markets 
Geographic 
coverage of 
each network 
= geographic 
extent of each 
relevant 
market 
Mobilkom Austria 
AG & Co KG 
(“Mobilkom”), T-
Mobile Austria 
GmbH (“T-Mobile”), 
One GmbH (“One”) 
and Hutchison 3G 
Austria GmbH 
(“Hutchison 3G”), 
Tele2UTA. 
Internal non-discrimination 
concerning prices for those 
convergent services allowing to 
terminate a call made to a 
geographical number onto a mobile 
network, 
Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation  
While in principle the undertakings should 
themselves negotiate in good faith their access 
and interconnection agreements, the 
Commission would like to reiterate that the 
competitive problems identified should be 
tackled as soon and as efficiently as possible. In 
view of the monopoly power of MNOs over 
termination on their network, the absence of 
countervailing buying power and, in particular, 
in view of the number of dispute settlements 
procedures regarding mobile termination tariffs 
that the TKK continuously has to face, the 
Commission is of the opinion that it would be 
more effective for the TKK to specify already in  
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Obligation to publish RIO 
Obligation to allow interconnection 
partners to contract out of an 
agreement within a period of 
maximum two months at any time 
Price control 
this SMP decision rather than in the context of a 
dispute resolution how the cost-orientation 
obligation is to be implemented. 
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Market 17: The wholesale national market for international roaming on public mobile networks 
 
              
   Remedies imposed 
Member State 
Market definition 
similar to 
Recommendation 
SMP found for 
access/interconnection  Non-
discrimination  Transparency 
Price 
control / 
cost 
accounting 
Accounting separation 
Slovenia YES  No SMP found
Czech Republic YES  No SMP found
Finland YES  No SMP found
Austria YES  No SMP found
Italy YES  No SMP found
Spain YES  No SMP found
Denmark YES  No SMP found
Poland YES  No SMP found
Ireland YES  No SMP found
Sweden YES  No SMP found
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
             
EN  484    EN 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation  
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SI/2006/0477  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Addressing high prices in the international 
roaming market 
The Commission notes that APEK has not found 
SMP in the market and therefore has not been in 
the position to regulate it despite concerns 
related to high prices. To 
deal with such difficulties, the Commission 
adopted on 12 July 2006 a proposal for 
a regulation of roaming on public mobile 
networks within the European Union 
 
PL/2006/0517  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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CZ/2006/0452  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
FI/2005/0304  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Development of effective IOTs net of 
discounts:  Ficora concludes in its analysis of 
the wholesale national market for international 
roaming services that foreign MNO’s ability to 
direct traffic onto preferred partner networks in 
Finland has not led to price competition at the 
wholesale level. Ficora expects, however, that 
traffic direction will lead to price competition in 
the future and considers the market to be 
effectively competitive. 
The factual evidence about the developments of 
average IOTs expressed in revenue per minute 
as well as a basket of wholesale prices does not 
seem to lend support to Ficora’s assertion that 
prices will soon start to decline. Over the period 
of 
implementation of traffic direction techniques 
(2002-2005) prices have risen by 7% on 
average. Over the period of the first quarter 
2003 until the third quarter 2005 prices 
(expressed as a basket of prices) of the two 
smaller of the three nationwide operators have 
risen disproportionately by […]% and […]% 
respectively. Operators with higher shares of 
directable traffic on their network should 
according to Ficora also face a greater 
competitive constraint. Contrary to these 
expectations, operators with higher shares of 
directable traffic on their networks appear to  
EN  487    EN 
have raised prices to a greater extent. Further to 
that average wholesale prices (as expressed as 
revenue per minute) have over the period 2004 
until June 2005 been aligned and are now within 
a narrower range and at a higher average level. 
The Commission acknowledges that discounts 
are yet to be included in the calculation of 
effective IOTs and that price baskets and 
average revenues may be overstating the true 
level of prices at least for the year 2004/2005. 
The Commission therefore asks Ficora to 
monitor the development of Finnish 
operators’ effective IOTs net of all discounts 
and analyse very closely these findings. 
Should effective IOTs net of discounts continue 
to rise or remain at their present level despite the 
ongoing implementation of traffic direction 
techniques, then Ficora is invited to review the 
effectiveness of competition without any undue 
delay in close co-operation with the National 
Competition Authority (“NCA”). 
 
AT/2006/0466  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Addressing high prices in the international 
roaming market 
The Commission notes that TKK has not found 
SMP in the market and therefore has not been in 
the position to regulate it despite concerns 
related to high prices. To deal with such 
difficulties, the Commission adopted on 12 July 
2006 a proposal for a regulation of roaming on 
public mobile networks within the European  
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Union. 
Calculation of market shares 
According to the practice of the Commission11 
and the case law of the Court of First 
Instance12, the inclusion of captive sales into 
the relevant market may depend on whether the 
traffic generated by the foreign subsidiary would 
be made available in the open (noncaptive) 
market in case of an increase or decrease of 
market prices, or in other words, whether 
captive sales would be switched to the open 
market as a response to a change in competitive 
conditions. In the absence of such an analysis, 
the analysis of SMP should also be based on 
market shares excluding intra-group sales. 
In the present case, as changes in the market 
shares of operators depending on the inclusion 
or exclusion of intra-group sales would not 
materially alter the analysis 
provided by TKK, the exclusion of intra-group 
sales would not lead to a different outcome in 
terms of single or joint SMP findings. 
 
SE/2006/0496  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission.  
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IT/2006/0393  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Addressing high prices in the international 
roaming market 
AGCOM recognises the high level of 
international roaming prices for end-users which 
may limit the use of mobile communication 
services outside national boundaries and which 
may constitute an obstacle to the development of 
the single European electronic communications 
market. The Commission notes in this respect 
that it has not so far been possible, for a national 
regulator alone, also because of the cross-border 
nature of 
international roaming services, to act effectively 
to address the high level of wholesale 
international roaming charges. The Commission 
is therefore considering the adoption of EU 
measures to address the high international 
roaming prices. 
The inclusion of captive sales 
When calculating the total size of the market as 
well as the market shares of the MNOs, 
AGCOM includes not only merchant sales (i.e. 
sales to third independent parties) but also 
(captive) intra-group sales. 
The Commission notes firstly that the traffic 
direction techniques available today allow the 
MNOs to direct a large majority of their traffic 
and secondly that contrary to TIM and WIND, 
Vodafone has a pan-European footprint and 
exchanges inbound roaming traffic within its 
own group. In this respect, a clear distinction is 
to be drawn between an  
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alliance of different undertakings, such as the 
Freemove alliance, and a group subject to sole 
control, which forms a single undertaking. 
Indeed, in an undertaking such as Vodafone, 
retail and wholesale prices are coordinated with 
the sole objective of coordinating the 
undertaking’s overall profit. Partially owned 
subsidiaries may also subscribe, depending on 
circumstances such as, the degree of influence or 
control and/or commercial agreements, to the 
common strategy. In an alliance only mutually 
advantageous agreements can be reached. The 
alliance capability to coordinate in a similar 
manner as a sole undertaking like Vodafone and 
to apply prices independent of market conditions 
is therefore more limited and the sales between 
the alliance members are therefore in general not 
considered as captive. 
According to the Commission’s practice and the 
case law of the Court of First Instance, the 
inclusion of captive sales into the relevant 
market may depend on whether the traffic 
generated by the foreign subsidiary of the group 
would be made available in 
the merchant market in case of an increase or 
decrease of market prices (i.e. whether the 
captive sales would be sufficiently quickly 
switched to the merchant market in response to a 
change in the competitive conditions). 
Therefore, the analysis of SMP should cover 
also the development of market shares of the 
MNOs excluding captive sales. 
Depending on whether captive sales are included  
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or not in the market, TIM’s market share would 
be in a range between 38.8% and 51.2%. 
In this particular case the Commission notes that 
the market share of TIM based on a market 
excluding captive sales would amount to slightly 
above 50% both in volume (voice) and revenues 
(voice and SMS)11. This market share is slightly 
declining from 2003 to 2005. 
Furthermore, for both SMS and voice, TIM’s 
market share is higher in volume than in 
revenues indicating that TIM has not been able 
to maintain higher IOT than its competitors. 
Consequently, the exclusion of captive sales 
from the market definition would not have led to 
a different result in the SMP analysis in this 
case. 
 
ES/2006/0460  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
DK/2006/0419  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed 
Addressing high prices in the international 
roaming market 
The Commission notes that NITA has not found 
SMP in the market and therefore 
has not been in the position to regulate it despite 
the concerns related to high prices. To deal with 
such difficulties, the Commission has adopted 
on 12 July 2006 a proposal for a regulation of 
roaming on public mobile networks within the  
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Community. 
Calculation of market shares 
According to the practice of the Commission18 
and the case law of the Court of First 
Instance19, the inclusion of captive sales into 
the relevant market may 
depend on whether the traffic generated by the 
foreign subsidiary would be made 
available in the open (non-captive) market in 
case of an increase or decrease of 
market prices, or in other words, whether 
captive sales would be switched to the 
open market as a response to a change in 
competitive conditions. In the absence 
of such an analysis, the analysis of SMP should 
also be based on market shares 
excluding intra-group sales and both methods of 
calculation (i.e. including and 
excluding intra-group sales) should be included 
in the final measure. 
In the present case, market shares vary between 
[…]% and […]% for the largest 
operator, between […]% and […]% for the 
second largest operator and between 
[…]% and […]% for the third largest operator,  
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depending on the calculation method used. The 
relative sizes of the operators change depending 
on the inclusion or exclusion of intra-group 
sales. Most notably, the difference in market 
share between the first and the second largest 
operator increases from […] to […] percentage 
points when intra-group sales are excluded. 
However, the Commission 
agrees with NITA that these relative changes do 
not alter its analysis, i.e. the absence of a single 
company having SMP and the unlikelihood of 
the three large operators jointly dominating the 
market (“collective SMP”). 
Consequently, the exclusion of intra-group sales 
would not lead to a different outcome of the 
SMP analysis in this case. 
 
IE/2006/0477  Similar to the 
Recommendation.  National  No SMP found  No remedies imposed  No comments made by the Commission. 
 
Market 18: Broadcasting transmission services, to deliver broadcast content to end users  
 
                 
Member State  Market definition similar to 
Recommendation  SMP found for  Remedies imposed  
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Access / 
interconnection  Non-discrimination Transparency Price control / 
cost accounting 
Accounting 
separation 
Austria NO*  SMP analysis not 
yet notified  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Finland NO* 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Ireland NO* 1  operator  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Sweden NO* 1  operator   YES  YES NO  YES  YES 
United Kingdom  NO*  2 operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Czech Republic  NO*  1 operator  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Spain NO*  1  operator  YES  YES  NO  YES   NO 
Netherlands NO*  5  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES**   NO 
Ireland NO* 1  operator  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO 
France NO* 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Lithuania NO*  1  operator  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Slovakia NO* 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Germany NO* 3  operators  Remedies not imposed 
Poland NO* 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Slovenia NO* 1  operator  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  
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Italy NO*  2  operators  Remedies will be imposed at the later stage. 
Cyprus NO*  No  SMP  Remedies not imposed 
*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets 
** only on certain operators  
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007  
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Market 18: Broadcasting transmission services, to deliver broadcast content to end users 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
Case 
reference 
Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
Terrestrial television 
broadcasting. 
AT/2003/0002 
(notification 
limited to 
market 
definition)  Terrestrial FM radio 
broadcasting. 
National  No SMP 
analysis  Not included in the notification 
The Commission declared the notification 
incomplete on the following grounds: 
No information was provided on essential 
information such as the number of undertakings 
in the market, market shares and price levels. 
No information was provided on the degree of 
competition at retail level. 
No information was provided to support the 
conclusion on the geographic scope of the 
markets.  
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AT/2003/0018 
(notification 
limited to 
market 
definition) 
Terrestrial television 
broadcasting.  National  No SMP 
analysis 
Remedies not yet notified 
 
 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Exclusion of the market for satellite television 
broadcasting transmission services from 
market analysis: Should a decision identifying 
trans-national market(s) under Article 15(4) of 
the Framework Directive be taken in the future, 
and/or should such decision provide guidance on 
how to treat the market for satellite broadcasting 
transmission services, NRAs concerned will be 
required to conduct the market analysis of these 
markets accordingly. 
1 - Transparency 
IE/2004/0042 
Radio broadcasting 
transmission 
services on analogue 
terrestrial networks. 
National 
RTE 
Transmission 
Network 
Limited 
2 - Non-discrimination 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Market definition: The lack of competitive 
pressure exerted by cable transmission services 
on satellite transmission services and vice versa 
raises doubts as to whether transmission services 
provided over these platforms constitute a single 
market.  
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IE/2004/0114 
(additional 
remedies 
related to case 
IE/2004/0042) 
See case IE/2004/0042.  1 - Accounting separation  No comments made by the Commission. 
1 - Obligation to relinquish capacity in a 
terrestrial mass communication network 
2 - Transparency - publication of delivery 
terms and tariff information 
Digital television 
transmission 
services in terrestrial 
digital television 
network in 
multiplexes A, B and 
C in compliance 
with the network 
licenses. 
3 - Cost-orientation cost accounting  
National analogue 
television 
transmission 
services in the 
terrestrial analogue 
television network. 
4 - Non-discrimination 
FI/2004/0076 
National digital 
radio transmission 
services in the 
terrestrial digital 
network. 
National, except 
for the 
autonomous 
area of Åland 
Digita Oy 
5 - Accounting separation  
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Monitoring the appropriateness of proposed 
remedies: In light of the review by the Finnish 
authorities of the market for television activities 
in the course of 2007, the Finnish authorities are 
invited to monitor the appropriateness of the 
remedies imposed on Digita. 
 
Exclusion of satellite broadcasting 
transmission services from market analysis: 
The Finnish authorities are invited to have 
regard to any future Commission decision on 
trans-national satellite broadcasting transmission 
services under Article 15(4) of the Framework 
Directive and, to the extent that such decision 
may affect the Finnish authorities’ current 
approach, the Commission invites them to 
revisit their current analysis with regard to 
wholesale satellite transmission.  
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National analogue 
radio transmission 
services in the 
terrestrial analogue 
radio network. 
1 - Provision of network access on fair 
and reasonable terms (markets 1, 2  
& 4) 
  
1/ Access to masts 
and sites operated by 
ntl. 
  
Market 1: 
Coverage area 
of ntl 
2 - Non-discrimination (markets 1, 2  
& 4) 
Draft measures concerning managed 
transmission services withdrawn by NRA  
2/ Access to masts 
and sites operated by 
Crown Castle. 
Market 2: 
Coverage area 
of Crown Castle 
  
Market 1/ ntl 
3 - Cost-orientation (markets 1, 2 & 4) 
UK/2004/0111 
3/ Access to other 
masts and sites used 
for the provision of 
broadcasting 
services. 
Market 3: 
National 
Market 2/ 
Crown Castle 
4 - Transparency (reference offer) 
(markets 1 & 2) 
The Commission made a comment on: 
 
Exclusion of satellite broadcasting 
transmission services from market analysis: 
Ofcom is invited to have regard to any future 
Commission decision on 
trans-national satellite broadcasting transmission 
services under Article 15(4) of the Framework 
Directive. Should such a decision be taken, and 
should Ofcom be an NRA concerned by such a 
decision, it is required to conduct the market  
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4/ National managed 
transmission 
services. 
Market 4: 
National 
5/ 
Regional/metropolita
n/local managed 
transmission 
services. 
Market 5: 
National 
Market 4/ ntl 
and Crown 
Castle (joint 
SMP) 
analysis with regard to wholesale satellite 
transmission services with other NRAs 
identified in such a decision in line with Article 
16(5) of the Framework Directive. 
SE/2005/0188 
(notification 
limited to 
market 
definition and 
SMP analysis) 
Analogue terrestrial 
television. 
Digital terrestrial 
television. 
Analogue terrestrial 
radio. 
 
National Teracom  AB 
 
 
access 
The Commission made comments on: 
 
Broadcasting transmission services via 
satellite:  Assuming that the market is trans-
national as stated by PTS, the Commission 
invites PTS to take into account any future 
decision by the Commission concerning the 
trans-national nature of the market for satellite 
broadcasting services under Article 15(4) of the 
Framework Directive. Should such a decision be 
taken and should PTS be concerned by it, PTS  
EN  501    EN 
Price regulation 
Non discrimination 
Accounting separation 
would – in accordance with Article 16(5) of the 
Framework Directive - be required to conduct 
the market analysis jointly with other NRAs 
concerned by the same decision. 
 
The exclusion from ex ante regulation of 
broadcasting transmission services via cable 
television networks: PTS considers that the 
barriers to enter the cable transmission market 
may not be sufficiently high and permanent (the 
first criterion) that this market would warrant ex 
ante regulation. The evidence provided by PTS 
does not enable the Commission to fully concur 
with such a conclusion. However, PTS has 
demonstrated to a sufficient extent that the 
structure of this market in Sweden is such that it 
tends towards effective competition (the second 
criterion) and therefore that no ex ante 
regulation is warranted.  
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1 - Access 
CZ/2006/0453 
National analogue 
terrestrial radio and 
television 
broadcasting 
services. 
national  RADIOKOM
UNIKACE as 
2 – Accounting separation 
The Commission made a comment on: 
Exclusion of other than nationwide analogue 
terrestrial broadcasting 
transmission services from market analysis 
In the current notification, CTU has defined and 
analysed only the wholesale market for 
nationwide analogue terrestrial radio and 
television broadcasting transmission services, 
which can be considered as part of the wider 
market 18, as defined in the Recommendation. 
Concerning other broadcasting transmission 
services, CTU declares that these do not belong 
to the same market as nationwide analogue 
terrestrial broadcasting transmission services but 
CTU does not carry out any further analysis as 
to whether these separate markets are 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
The Commission does not contest the market 
definition proposed by CTU (i.e. the 
division into various separate markets) but it 
would like to recall that each of these markets is 
part of market 18 as defined in the 
Recommendation. Whereas 
NRAs have the possibility, after having taken 
due account of particular national 
circumstances, to subdivide market 18 into a 
number of separate markets, 
whenever they do so, they have to determine  
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which of the individual markets 
fulfil the three-criteria test and, thus, are 
susceptible to ex ante regulation and 
they have to carry out a market analysis of all 
markets they have determined as 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
With regard to the above, the Commission 
would like to invite CTU to analyse 
those broadcasting transmission services that 
have been excluded from the 
current notification, to determine which markets 
are susceptible to ex ante 
regulation and notify their analysis to the 
Commission. This concerns in particular 
nationwide digital terrestrial television 
broadcasting transmission services, where it 
follows from the notification that these services 
have started to develop in the Czech Republic 
while the geographical coverage will further 
develop in the coming years. The Commission 
points out that despite the fact that digital 
terrestrial broadcasting transmission services are 
still developing in the Czech Republic, CTU 
may want to ensure that certain market failures 
resulting from RADIOKOMUNIKACE’s 
control over the analogue market (including the 
control over a nationwide network of masts and 
sites) do not jeopardise the  
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development of effective competition in the 
digital market. 
Non-imposition of transparency, non-
discrimination and price regulation 
obligations 
The Commission would like to invite CTU to 
consider the imposition of 
transparency and non-discrimination obligations 
in order to make the access 
obligation more effective. 
Further, the Commission notes that the reasons 
put forward by CTU to justify its 
intention not to impose any price regulation are 
not convincing. Whereas CTU 
refers to the fact that the market analysis has not 
produced any evidence of 
application by RADIOKOMUNIKACE of 
excessive prices in the past, it seems to 
be difficult to make predictions as to its future 
pricing policy based on its past 
pricing behaviour given that 
RADIOKOMUNIKACE was subject to price 
regulation so far. Concerning CTU’s argument 
that RADIOKOMUNIKACE’s  
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market power will erode due to the planned 
switch-off of analogue terrestrial 
television broadcasting, this may only be 
relevant for a part of the market given 
that the relevant market, as defined by CTU in 
the current notification, includes 
both radio and television broadcasting 
transmission services. 
Therefore, the Commission would like to invite 
CTU to impose on 
RADIOKOMUNIKACE an obligation to charge 
fair and reasonable prices for the 
purpose of the implementation of the access 
obligation. 
 
access 
Cost orientation 
Non-discrimination 
UPC, Essent, 
Casema 
transparency 
NL/2005/0246 
NL/2005/0270 
NL/2005/0277 
1. broadcast cable 
transmission 
services of free radio 
and television 
packages 
2. broadcast cable 
transmission 
services of pay radio 
and television 
packages 
National 
Multikabel,  access 
Exclusion of satellite broadcasting 
transmission services from market analysis 
The Commission invites OPTA to have regard 
to any future Commission decision on trans-
national satellite broadcasting transmission 
services under Article 15(4) of the Framework 
Directive. Should such a decision be taken, and 
should OPTA be an NRA concerned by such a 
decision, it is required to conduct the market 
analysis with regard to wholesale satellite  
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Non-discrimination    Delta 
transparency 
transmission services with other NRAs 
identified in such a decision in line with Article 
16(5) of the Framework Directive. 
 
ES/2005/0252 
Terrestrial analogue 
and digital television 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services 
national Abertis  1 - access 
The Commission made comment on: 
Inappropriateness of the proposed price 
control obligation: In accordance with 
Article 8(4) of the Access Directive8, the 
obligations imposed on SMP operators 
shall be based on the nature of the problem 
identified, proportionate and justified in 
the light of the regulatory objectives laid down 
in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive, in particular the promotion of 
sustainable competition and efficient  
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2 – obligation to charge reasonable prices 
3 – non-discrimination 
investment in infrastructure. 
The Commission considers that the requirement 
to charge reasonable prices, would not be 
effective without setting out the relevant details 
on the methodology and use of benchmarking. 
The Commission also invites CMT to set a clear 
framework for 
the commercial negotiations between operators 
and for the resolution of any dispute resulting 
there from. 
Non-imposition of a transparency obligation: 
CMT should also consider the 
imposition of a transparency obligation in order 
to make the overall access remedy 
more effective. Moreover, where an SMP 
operator has to comply with the non-
discrimination obligation, the NRA may also 
require the publication of a reference 
offer (Article 9(2) Access Directive). 
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1 - Delivering 
transmission 
services of analogue 
AM radio signals 
(high power) to 
broadcasters (i.e. 
radio stations) 
 
NL/2006/0410 
2 - Delivering 
transmission 
services of analogue 
FM radio signals 
(high power) to 
broadcasters (i.e. 
radio stations) 
national  no SMP  No remedies imposed 
The Commission made comment on: 
 
Although OPTA has not explicitly applied the 
three criteria test as regards the 
infrastructure markets, it appears from OPTA’s 
argumentation that competition law 
(including the structural separation imposed as a 
remedy in a merger control 
context) together with other legislative 
provisions can be deemed sufficient to 
address market failures that may arise on these 
markets. Hence, the Commission, in 
view of the elements set out above, agrees with 
OPTA’s conclusion that the 
infrastructure markets are not susceptible to ex 
ante regulation. 
However, the Commission invites OPTA to 
monitor the development of competition 
in the transmission services market in order to 
ensure that the alternative 
mechanisms to redress possible market failures 
on the infrastructures markets are 
effective.  
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1 - The market for 
terrestrial television 
broadcasting; 
 
access 
2 - The market for 
television 
broadcasting via 
cable networks; 
 
Non doscrimination 
3 - The market for 
satellite television 
broadcasting; 
 
Accounting separation 
AT/2006/0360 
4 - The market for 
terrestrial FM radio 
broadcasting; 
 
national 
SMP found for 
Österreichisch
e 
Rundfunksend
er GmbH & 
Co KG5 
(“ORS”) in 
markets 1 and 
4 
 
Price control 
Time lag between market definition and 
market analysis: 
The Commission draws attention to the fact that 
the present market analysis on wholesale 
broadcasting transmission services is notified 
more than two years after the notification of 
market definitions. Therefore, the Commission 
invites KommAustria to consider in the future to 
conduct and notify all stages of a market review 
(market definition, market analysis and the 
imposition of regulatory obligations) as close to 
each other as possible. 
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5 - The market for 
terrestrial AM radio 
broadcasting; 
 
Obligation to provide a reference offer 
FR/2006/0335 
Downstream 
wholesale market for 
TV broadcasting 
transmission 
services offered to 
broadcasters or 
multiplex operator 
 
Upstream wholesale 
market for radio and 
TV broadcasting 
transmission 
services 
Metropolitan 
France and its 
overseas 
territories. 
TDF  1 - access 
Lack of analysis of the market for 
broadcasting transmission services offered to 
broadcasters or multiplex operators: Market 
18 of the Recommendation is the 
wholesale market for broadcasting transmission 
services, to deliver broadcast 
content to end users. This market comprises 
commercial relationships where 
providers of broadcasting transmission services 
offer the delivery of broadcasting 
content to broadcasters (individual channels, 
multiplex operators or other content providers). 
ARCEP excludes these commercial relationships 
from its market 
analysis mainly on the ground that it claims not 
to be competent under French law to 
carry out such an analysis.  
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2 – non discrimination 
Pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Framework 
Directive, national regulatory authorities 
shall carry out an analysis of the relevant 
markets identified in the Recommendation. 
Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Framework 
Directive, Member States shall ensure 
that each of the tasks assigned to national 
regulatory authorities in the Framework 
Directive is undertaken by a competent body. 
The Commission therefore notes that the market 
or markets for radio and TV 
broadcasting transmission services provided to 
broadcasters still need(s) to be 
analysed by a competent body and that the 
results of that analysis must be notified to 
the Commission, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 3(1), 7(3) and 16(1) of the  
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3 - transparency 
Framework Directive. 
In assessing the level of competition in the 
market(s) for broadcasting transmission 
services provided to broadcasters, the competent 
body should take into account the effect of i) 
any must carry, must offer or must deliver 
obligation imposed under 
national law and ii) the regulatory remedies 
proposed in the draft measure notified 
by ARCEP under case FR/2006/0335. 
Competitive conditions in the wholesale 
market for terrestrial FM radio 
broadcasting transmission services offered to 
other broadcasting transmission service 
providers:  ARCEP defines the wholesale FM 
radio transmission market as being national and 
considers this market to be effectively 
competitive due to the easy replicability of 
TDF’s sites (where the infrastructure such as 
masts with antennae are installed). ARCEP  
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4 – price control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
concludes that barriers are neither high nor 
transitory and considers that competition law is 
capable of tackling market failures should these 
occur, ruling out as such the pertinence of ex 
ante regulation on this market. 
The Commission, however, points to concerns 
raised by third parties during the 
national consultation relating to what potentially 
could be a number of nonreplicable TDF sites. 
The Commission invites ARCEP to closely 
monitor the 
evolution of the competitive conditions in this 
market, especially as regards these 
potentially non replicable sites, and to do so 
notably in the context of the forthcoming call for 
tenders for broadcasting transmission services 
organised by Radio France. 
ARCEP is further reminded that Article 12 of 
the Framework Directive allows 
Member States to impose the sharing of 
facilities or property on operators where 
undertakings are deprived of access to viable 
alternatives to a certain infrastructure 
because of the need to protect the environment, 
public health, public security or to meet town 
and country planning objectives without the 
need to find SMP. 
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Obligation to provide tariffs and 
conditions to ARCEP  
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LT/2006/0376 
LT/2006/0468 
1 -  terrestrial 
analogue radio 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services where the 
radio 
frequency is 
allocated to the 
broadcaster; 
2 - terrestrial 
analogue radio 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services where the 
radio 
frequency is 
allocated to the 
broadcasting 
transmission service 
provider; 
National except 
markets for 
satellite TV and 
radio 
broadcasting 
Lietuvos radijo 
ir televizijos 
centras AB 
(„LRTC“) 
 
Accounting separation 
Exclusion of digital terrestrial radio and TV 
broadcasting transmission services 
from market review 
According to the Decision No 1492 (25 
November 2004) of the Government of 
Lithuania on the approval of the model 
concerning the implementation of digital TV 
in the Republic of Lithuania, it is planned that 
by 2009 95% of the territory of 
Lithuania should be covered by at least one 
terrestrial digital television network. TEO 
LT AB (formerly Lietuvos Telekomas AB) and 
LRTC have undertaken to install 
digital terrestrial transmission networks in 
Vilnius no later than 30 June 2006 and to 
transmit eight digital TV programmes each in  
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3 - terrestrial 
analogue television 
(TV) broadcasting 
transmission 
services where 
the radio frequency 
is allocated to the 
broadcaster; 
4 - terrestrial 
analogue TV 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services where the 
radio 
frequency is 
allocated to the 
broadcasting 
transmission service 
provider; 
5) wire radio 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services; 
6) radio broadcasting 
transmission 
services via cable 
TV networks; 
7) cable TV 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services; 
Price control 
other major cities no later than 31 
December 2007. Therefore, the Commission 
would like to invite RRT to assess digital 
terrestrial radio and TV broadcasting 
transmission services, as has been done by other 
NRAs, and notify such an assessment to the 
Commission as soon as these services are 
provided based on the above timeframe. 
Remedies in the markets for terrestrial 
analogue radio and TV broadcasting 
transmission services where the radio 
frequency is allocated to the broadcaster 
In its notification, RRT assumes that the access 
to masts and sites (“broadcasting 
transmission facility services”) is a part of the 
markets for terrestrial analogue radio 
and TV broadcasting transmission services 
where the radio frequency is allocated to the 
broadcaster. It should be taken into account that 
as much as 93% of radio hours 
broadcast and 69% of TV hours broadcast are 
not transmitted through the 
broadcasting transmission services provided by 
LRTC, whereas most broadcasters do use the 
broadcasting transmission facility services of 
LRTC. Without contesting the delineation of 
these markets, the Commission however invites 
RRT to reconsider whether the imposition of the 
same set of remedies for both transmission 
services and transmission facility services would  
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8) satellite radio 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services; 
9) satellite TV 
broadcasting 
transmission 
services. 
 
 
be proportionate and justified in the light of the 
objectives in Article 8 of Framework Directive. 
In particular, RRT is encouraged to consider 
lighter regulation for the broadcasting 
transmission services. 
Implementation of the cost accounting 
obligation and price control 
In accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access 
Directive7, the obligations imposed on SMP 
operators shall be based on the nature of the 
problem identified, proportionate and justified in 
the light of the regulatory objectives laid down 
in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, in 
particular the promotion of sustainable 
competition and 
efficient investment in infrastructure. 
The Commission considers that the period 
LRTC is allowed for introducing FDC 
based cost accounting is overly long, 
specifically in the light of the time normally 
required for an undertaking of the size of LRTC 
to develop such a cost accounting 
model (i.e. from six to twelve months). 
Further, the Commission is of opinion that the 
glide path of four years is too long 
because the switch-off of the analogue 
transmission will start from 2012, which means 
that analogue transmission will be of limited  
EN  518    EN 
interest for broadcasters by then. 
Therefore the Commission invites RRT to 
impose a considerably shorter period both for i) 
LRTC to introduce FDC based cost accounting 
and ii) the glide path.  
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SK/2006/0456 
The market limited 
to transmission over 
analogue terrestrial 
networks (including 
both transmission of 
radio and TV). 
 
national  Slovak 
Telecom  transparency 
Exclusion of other services than analogue 
terrestrial broadcasting transmission 
services from the market analysis 
In the current notification, TÚSR has defined 
and analysed only the wholesale 
market for nationwide analogue terrestrial radio 
and television broadcasting 
transmission services, which may be considered 
as part of the wider market 18 as defined in the 
Recommendation. Concerning other 
broadcasting transmission 
services, TÚSR declares that these are not part 
of the analysed market but does 
not carry out any further analysis as to whether 
these separate markets are 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
The Commission recalls that market 18, as  
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Non discrimination 
defined in the Recommendation, 
covers all types of broadcasting transmission 
services. NRAs have the possibility, after having 
taken due account of particular national 
circumstances, to subdivide market 18 into a 
number of separate relevant markets. However, 
whenever they do so and exclude some of these 
markets from the analysis, they have to 
demonstrate that individual markets excluded 
from the analysis do not fulfil the 
so called three-criteria test and, thus, are not 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
NRAs have to carry out a market analysis of all 
markets they have determined as 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
With regard to the above, the Commission  
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Accounting separation 
 
 
 
invites TÚSR to analyse those 
broadcasting transmission services that have 
been excluded from the current 
notification, to determine which markets are 
susceptible to ex ante regulation and 
notify their analysis to the Commission. This 
concerns: (i) cable transmission 
services, which are, according to information 
provided by TÚSR, provided by 
cable network operators that broadcast content 
to end users, thus in principle 
falling under the scope of market 18 as defined 
in the Recommendation, and in 
particular (ii) nationwide digital terrestrial 
television broadcasting transmission 
services, where it follows from the notification 
that these services have already 
started to develop in the Slovak Republic even if 
the geographical coverage will 
further develop in the coming years. The 
Commission points out that despite the 
fact that digital terrestrial broadcasting 
transmission services are still in a pilot 
stage in the Slovak Republic, TÚSR may want 
already at this stage to ensure that  
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Access 
 
Price control 
certain market failures resulting from Slovak 
Telekom’s control over the analogue market 
(including the control over a nationwide network 
of masts and sites) do not jeopardise the 
development of effective competition in the 
digital market. 
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DE/2006/0469 
1) cable operators 
feeding broadcast 
signals into their 
networks; 2) cable 
operators delivering 
broadcast signals to 
network level 4 
(“L4”) clusters, 
with a further 
refinement on the 
basis of the 
importance of the 
cluster; 
3) provision of 
satellite transponder 
capacity for the 
transmission of 
broadcast 
signals to content 
providers; 
4) provision of 
terrestrial 
transmission 
facilities for 
broadcasting 
analogue 
television signals to 
content providers; 
5) provision of 
terrestrial 
transmission 
national 
KDG, KBW 
and UM, 
 
Remedies will be imposed in a separate 
decision. 
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facilities for 
broadcasting digital 
television 
signals to content 
providers; 
6) provision of 
terrestrial 
transmission 
facilities for 
broadcasting 
analogue VHF 
radio signals to 
content providers; 
7) provision of 
terrestrial 
transmission 
facilities for 
broadcasting digital 
radio 
signals to content 
and 
telecommunication 
service providers; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
access  PL/2006/0455  (1)the provision of 
analogue 
transmission of 
television and radio 
national TP  Emitel 
Non discrimination 
Scope of the remedies  
Market 18 of the Recommendation is the 
wholesale market for broadcasting transmission  
EN  525    EN 
Accounting separation 
transparency 
programmes 
services, 
(2) the provision of 
digital television and 
radio programmes 
transmissions 
 
Price control 
services (for radio and TV) to deliver broadcast 
content to end users. This market comprises 
commercial relationships where providers of 
broadcasting transmission services offer the 
delivery of the content to broadcasters 
(individual channels, multiplex operators or 
other content providers).  
UKE, after analysing the market, identified a 
number of competition problems present in the 
relationship between TP Emitel and the 
broadcasters,  inter alia excessive pricing for 
those services which are not provided by 
alternative operators, while offering low prices 
on those segments of the market where there is 
competition, as well as discrimination of certain 
broadcasters. UKE indicates, however, that in 
accordance with Polish law it does not have the 
power to intervene in the relationship between 
transmission operators and broadcasters, as the 
latter are no electronic communications 
operators. In addition, UKE states that the 
competition problems identified as regards the 
provision of transmission services to 
broadcasters will be solved over time by the 
measures taken to foster the development of 
effective competition on the transmission 
services market, in particular by the obligation 
imposed on TP Emitel to offer alternative 
transmission operators access to its 
infrastructure at regulated conditions which 
should generate more competition between 
alternative suppliers of transmission services to 
broadcasters. 
The Commission shares UKE’s view that, where 
possible, competition law problems such as 
excessive pricing should be regulated by  
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fostering more competition rather than by 
imposing price regulation. However, where the 
development of effective competition on the 
transmission services market may take some 
time (which could be the case in view of the 
investment required), it may be necessary to 
impose for a transitory period of time, until the 
proposed regulatory obligations as regards 
access to infrastructure prove to be sufficient to 
remedy the identified competition problem, 
some form of price regulation which 
immediately prohibits TP Emitel from 
continuing its excessive pricing policy. For such 
excessive pricing, if continued, may lead to TP 
Emitel cross-subsidising those services for 
which it faces competition, which could undo 
the effectiveness of the access regulation 
imposed.  
The Commission therefore, in view of the 
concrete competition problems identified on the 
Polish market, invites UKE to reconsider the 
possibility to impose price regulation on TP 
Emitel for the provision of transmission services 
to broadcasters. On the basis of the EU 
regulatory framework, UKE (or another 
competent body assigned for this purpose) must 
have the legal power to do so. 
 
Exclusion of cable broadcasting transmission 
services from the market analysis 
In the current notification, UKE has identified 
the market for cable broadcasting transmission 
services as a market separate from terrestrial 
broadcasting transmission services. UKE  
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concludes that it is not appropriate to impose 
remedies on the cable transmission market, 
however, without carrying out any analysis as to 
whether that separate market meets the three 
criteria test. 
The Commission does not contest the market 
definition proposed by UKE (i.e. that cable 
broadcasting transmission services belong to a 
market separate from terrestrial broadcasting 
transmission services) but it would like to recall 
that market 18, as defined in the 
Recommendation, covers all types of 
broadcasting transmission services. While NRAs 
have the possibility, after having taken due 
account of particular national circumstances, to 
subdivide market 18 into a number of separate 
markets, whenever they do so, they have to 
determine which of the individual markets fulfil 
the three criteria test, and they have to carry out 
a market analysis of all markets susceptible to ex 
ante regulation. 
The Commission takes note of the limited 
coverage, the limited penetration and the 
fragmentation of the cable networks in Poland. It 
understands that the limited group of consumers 
who receive broadcasting via the cable also have 
access to terrestrial broadcasting (but not vice 
versa), which seems to limit the market power of 
the cable network operators vis à vis the 
broadcasters. Under these circumstances it 
appears that, at present, the market  for cable 
broadcasting transmission services in Poland 
does not meet the three criteria test (as it seems 
to tend towards effective competition) and 
therefore is not susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
Nevertheless, the Commission invites UKE to  
EN  528    EN 
clarify its views on this issue in the final 
measure.  
 
Possible differentiation of remedies as 
regards local terrestrial radio and television 
transmission services 
UKE identifies a single market for terrestrial 
radio and television transmission services, 
without distinguishing between local and 
national transmission services. The absence of a 
distinction between local and national services is 
in line with the Recommendation and the 
Commission does not have any indication that 
specific Polish circumstances should have led 
UKE to a different conclusion. However, in 
view of their experiences with notifications from 
other Member States, the Commission invites 
UKE to consider carefully whether it may be 
appropriate to differentiate the remedies 
imposed on this market so as to provide for 
more lenient access regulation regarding local 
broadcasting transmission infrastructure which 
may potentially be more easily duplicated than 
national broadcasting transmission 
infrastructure. 
  
Price control before approval of the cost 
calculation 
The Commission notes that UKE has not 
specified in its measure the basis of the 
verification of the appropriateness of charges for 
broadcasting transmission services proposed by  
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TP Emitel prior to the approval of its FL LRIC-
based cost calculation by an independent 
auditor, enumerating various possible methods it 
may decide to use. This approach affects the 
transparency and legal certainty for market 
players, in particular since TP Emitel has not 
prepared cost calculation in the past, which may 
make swift implementation of this obligation 
difficult, and no timing is foreseen for the FL 
LRIC-based cost calculation and approval.  
The Commission therefore invites UKE to 
precisely clarify in the final measure which 
verification method it will use to approve the 
charges proposed by the SMP operator before 
the cost calculation has been conclusively 
approved. 
 
access  SI/2006/0476 
1) Transmission of 
content through 
terrestrial broadcast 
transmitters; 
2) Transmission of 
content through 
cable networks; 
3) Transmission of 
content through 
MMDS4 systems; 
national RTV  Slovenija 
Non discrimination 
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4) Transmission of 
content through 
satellite; 
5) Transmission of 
content through 
Internet (IP) 
networks. 
 
transparency 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
IT/2006/0424 
a) National market 
for analogue 
terrestrial television 
broadcasting 
services, 
b) National market 
for digital terrestrial 
television 
broadcasting 
services, 
c) National market 
for terrestrial radio 
broadcasting 
services, 
d) Local market for 
terrestrial television 
broadcasting 
services, 
e) Local market for 
terrestrial radio 
broadcasting 
national 
RAI and RTI 
in the market 
for national 
analogue 
terrestrial 
television 
Remedies will be imposed at the later 
stage. 
Demand for analogue TV broadcasting 
transmission services 
In the absence of any past or current demand for 
analogue TV broadcasting transmission services, 
the Commission understands that any claimed 
tacit coordination can in principle be exercised 
vis-à-vis potential demand. However, AGCOM 
has not assessed the existence of such demand, 
in particular taking into account the forthcoming 
switch off of the analogue transmission. 
Therefore, the Commission invites AGCOM to 
make an assessment of the potential demand of 
analogue TV broadcasting transmission services. 
Basis for the calculation of the market shares 
AGCOM bases its estimation of market shares 
in the relevant market mainly on the 
number of installations/transmitters combined 
with the number of frequencies used in various 
transmission areas held by RAI and RTI18. 
According to the notification, 
however, a transmitter can cover between below  
EN  531    EN 
services, 
f) National market 
for cable television 
broadcasting 
services, 
g) National market 
for satellite 
television 
broadcasting 
services. 
 
15.000 and above 500.000 viewers. The 
Commission therefore considers that the 
absolute number of transmitters is not in itself 
the most appropriate indicator of market power 
in the relevant transmission market. 
AGCOM also uses the share of advertising 
revenue as an indicator of market power. 
Parties seeking access to transmission networks 
are exclusively interested in reaching a 
maximum coverage of the population and the 
audience (and hence advertising revenues) might 
differ significantly depending on the content of 
the TV programmes broadcasted. 
In the light hereof AGCOM should therefore 
strengthen its reasoning as to why the 
revenues from the advertising market should be 
an appropriate indication of market power on the 
upstream market. Programmes of vertically 
integrated operators with the same 
position/coverage in the broadcasting 
transmission market may achieve completely 
different shares of audiences (and hence 
advertising revenues) due to the attractiveness of 
the programme. 
Since coverage provided by transmission 
facilities is one of the most appropriate 
indicators of the position of each transmission 
provider, and considering that AGCOM does not 
today have fully reliable figures on this 
parameter, AGCOM is invited to continue 
monitoring the development of coverage in the  
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market and to re-notify this 
market in case the coverage of RAI and RTI as 
opposed to alternative networks do not 
any longer lead to the presumption of joint SMP. 
Ownership of facilities (masts and sites and 
antennas) 
The Commission understands that not all 
transmission facilities used by transmission 
service providers are owned by them, but are 
also rented from third parties. Therefore, the 
Commission invites AGCOM: 
(1) to clarify in its final measure to what extent 
the transmission service providers designated 
with SMP rely on facilities rented from third 
parties and to assess the duration and conditions 
of these contracts and their impact on the 
possible new entry (for example the presence of 
exclusivity clauses). 
(2) to assess to what extent new entrants would 
also have the possibility to rent facilities. 
Objective of collusion 
Considering the vertical integration of RAI and 
RTI, revenues from third parties are at present 
collected in the downstream advertising market. 
Rents to be protected by the colluding parties are 
at present only situated in that market. However, 
in its notification AGCOM does not give any 
indication of the level of rents achieved in the  
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advertising market. Therefore, the Commission 
invites AGCOM, in its final measure to define 
the boundaries of the advertising market (digital 
vs. analogue TV advertising, terrestrial vs. 
satellite vs. Internet-TV advertising) and to 
assess the level of rents and the development of 
price levels in that market, also in comparison to 
other EU Member States. 
Remedies to be notified 
The current notification does not contain 
remedies, which AGCOM intends to notify at a 
later stage. 
If, taking into account the comments above, 
AGCOM adopts the proposed measure, the 
Commission invites AGCOM to notify as soon 
as possible the appropriate remedies concerning 
the national analogue terrestrial television 
market. 
CY/2006/0497 
1) local analogue 
terrestrial radio 
broadcasting 
services; 
2) nation-wide 
analogue terrestrial 
radio broadcasting 
services; 
3) local analogue 
terrestrial television 
broadcasting 
services; 
national 
As all defined 
markets are 
considered as 
non 
susceptible for 
ex ante 
regulation, no 
SMP had been 
found 
No remedies imposed 
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4) nation-wide 
analogue terrestrial 
television 
broadcasting 
services; 
5) digital 
broadcasting 
services 
 
 
 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
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New Markets 
 
             
Member State  Market   SMP found for  Remedies imposed 
         Access / 
interconnection 
Non-
discrimination  Transparency 
Price 
control / 
cost 
accounting 
Accounting separation 
Ireland  Retail international 
leased lines  No SMP found 
Ireland  Retail leased lines 
above 2 Mbps   No SMP found 
United Kingdom 
Wholesale 
2 operators*  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  
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international services 
to termination points 
outside the UK 
France SMS  termination  3  operators  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Austria 
Call termination on 
individual public 
telephone 
networks provided at a 
fixed location in 
Austria/convergent 
services 
 
2 operators  NO  NO  NO  YES NO 
* 235 separate markets, 118 competitive 
 
             
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007           
EN  537    EN 
New Markets 
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007 
   Product Market 
Definition 
Geographic 
Market 
Definition 
SMP found 
for  Remedies Imposed  Results of Community Consultation 
IE/2005/0194 
Wholesale Market 
for call termination 
services to service 
providers at a fixed 
location. 
Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority. 
IE/2004/0128  Retail international 
leased lines.  National  No SMP found  NONE, withdrawal of regulation 
The Commission made a comment  on:  
 
NRA's finding is based on wholesale national 
leased lines. The Commission notes that the 
NRA will analyse possible leverage from 
wholesale markets when analysing this 
wholesale market and proposing remedies for 
these markets.  
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UK/2006/0354 
Wholesale 
international 
services 
235 route by 
route markets  No SMP found  Withdrawal of ex ante obligations  No comments made by the Commission 
1-access 
2-transparency 
FR/2006/0413 
FR/2007/0592 
(details of 
remedies) 
SMS termination 
Operator-
specific relevant 
markets 
Bouygues 
Télécom 
(“Bouygues”), 
Orange France 
(“Orange”) 
and SFR 
 
3-non discrimination 
Accounting system and price control 
Obligations imposed under the Access 
Directive should be based on the nature of the 
problem identified, proportionate and justified 
in the light of the objectives laid down in 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The 
remedies should provide adequate 
transparency and legal certainty for market 
players. In order to increase legal certainty the 
Commission invites ARCEP to specify the 
way towards a symmetric price cap in the final 
measure. Moreover, the Commission invites 
ARCEP to specify the accounting system to 
be imposed on the SMP operators as well as 
the cost model for calculating the MNOs’ 
SMS termination rates, giving an incentive for 
all MNOs to become efficient as soon as  
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4-accounting separation 
5-price control 
possible 
 
AT/2006/0432 
Call termination on 
individual public 
telephone 
networks provided at 
a fixed location in 
Austria/convergent 
services 
 
National  T-Mobile and 
One 
an obligation to charge prices based on 
benchmarking, the reference price being 
the fixed termination rate charged by 
Telekom Austria at the regional level 
 
No comments made by the Commission 
 
 
 
 
  
EN  540    EN 
 